

AN ACCOUNT
OF THE
WAR IN PORTUGAL
BETWEEN
DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL.

BY
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WAR OF SUCCESSION

IN

PORTUGAL,

ETC. ETC.



CHAPTER I.

DURING the inactivity of the enemy before Lisbon, and the festivities in consequence of the Queen's arrival, we were not idle in other parts. Captain Peak had possessed himself of St. Jago, a town twelve miles inland from Sines, but the guerillas having collected in great numbers, he was obliged to retire on the latter place, which was as well fortified as the nature of the ground would permit. Happily I had at my disposal

a considerable body of English and Portuguese marines, and two steamers, and was enabled to give succour to all parts of the coast in danger without waiting for the dilatory arrangements of ministers. Captain Peak was reinforced by ninety English marines, under Captain Birt, of the *Don John*, and about two hundred Portuguese collected from Peniché and Lisbon, under Colonel Almada. St. Jago was again occupied, and the whole country for a considerable distance cleared ; this done, Captain Peak sailed for Lagos, which was again in danger, and the English marines were embarked in the *George IV.* steamer for the same destination.

The frigate had hardly quitted the coast, when the guerillas again advanced in great force on St. Jago, which we were obliged to abandon for the second time. The English marines disembarked from the *George IV.*, and joining the Portuguese, left Sines at night, and making a circuitous route fell upon them at daylight, completely routed the whole party, who left one hundred and fifty on the field of battle. This example put an end to their depredations for some time, and the English marines

proceeded to Lagos. The governor of that town Francisco Correa de Mendonca, had done wonders in its defence, and had been a long time left to his own resources. His applications for provisions and assistance had slumbered in the minister's bureau; and the place must have ultimately surrendered but for the assistance I was enabled to give him from time to time. He had been lately hard pressed, and resorted to a stratagem which completely succeeded. By means of spies it was communicated to the guerilla chief, that if he advanced at a particular hour to a given place, the town would be surrendered on making the preconcerted signal. Captain Peak arrived in the afternoon, and having made arrangements with the governor, stood out to sea, and returned after dark to the anchorage.

A little after midnight, on the 17th of September, the signal was made and answered, and the guerillas approached the walls. The garrison was under arms, and a profound silence reigned on the ramparts. They were allowed to come close to the gate, where a tremendous fire of musketry was opened upon them from all points. A sally was then made by

the garrison, and the frigate's marines and seamen ; and as they retreated in confusion, they were exposed to the frigate's broadsides, which flanked the road. The George IV. with the English marines arrived before daylight, were landed, and completed the catastrophe. The loss of the guerillas was very great ; ours trifling. Excursions were made into the country, and the town was well stocked with provisions of every description, and got ready for another siege.

Setuval, the second best port in the kingdom, had been neglected by both parties ; all I could do for its protection was stationing a corvette there, and I became apprehensive that the Miguelites, who had a considerable force in the south, would for once do right and seize it. Captain Peak was in consequence ordered there in the Donna Maria, and Fort St. Philip was garrisoned by the marines ; the guns, which had been very improperly removed, were remounted, and a redoubt thrown up on a high point to the southward of the town, which, if in possession of the enemy, would have driven her from the anchorage. I went over for a day or two to examine the locality, and at once

saw the importance of putting it in a proper state of defence; and here I may observe that it is quite inconceivable how Don Miguel's advisers and generals could have neglected occupying this port, and garrisoning it. Had they ever entertained the least idea of procuring a squadron, Setuval was a port capable of receiving them; it can be entered at all times, and would have been a safe place for receiving stores and ammunition from England, which facility no other port in Portugal offers during the winter, on account of their dangerous bars. On my return to Lisbon, a garrison composed of a few regulars and a regiment of Lisbon volunteers were sent there, and the town was put in a tolerable state of defence; a small flotilla was also organized for the protection of the trade, and to facilitate our future operations on Alcacer do Sal.

General Zegallo was also crossed over to Aldea Gallega with one thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, a force fully sufficient to have advanced on Zamora, and probably on Salvatierra, supported by the force in Setuval, which could have moved out; but whether he had orders to remain

there, or had not sufficient enterprize to advance, I do not very well know. After remaining there a few weeks, he was recalled with his men to Lisbon, and the whole of that part of the country exposed to the incursions of the enemy, which, with the command of the Tagus in our possession, never ought to have been permitted. I neither was acquainted with the intention of sending or withdrawing him, and could offer no cooperation; indeed there seemed to be no plan; every thing was carried on by chance, without either system or consultation, as must always be the case when there are so many masters, all pulling different ways. Had the whole command been left to one head, without any interference on the part of ministers, things would have been managed very differently. On the 29th of September the Baron de Sa took possession of Obidos after a short resistance, the garrison and inhabitants taking flight: his loss was only two men wounded.

There appearing no further prospect of any movement against Lisbon by the enemy, preparations were silently made by Saldanha to drive them from their position in front of the lines.

Steam-boats were sent to Oporto for the twelfth caçadores and the Scotch and English battalions, the greater part of whom were landed at Peniché. The only effective troops left at Oporto were the tenth and fifteenth regiments of the line, now completed to six hundred strong, and the original volunteers. In addition to these were the first, second, and third fixos, twelve pieces of field-artillery, and some smaller corps, amounting to about two thousand four hundred men.

This force was by no means sufficient for the defence of Oporto, and the Miguelites, by their constant movements, seemed to indicate an attack. They were established to the north at Santo Thirso, about four leagues from Oporto, and on the south at Olivares de Azameis to communicate with Coimbra, Lamego, and Vizieu. Had the Miguelites shewed any enterprize, they would have stood a very fair chance of taking Oporto, and it was equally inexcusable in them not attempting it, as it was in the minister-at-war weakening it to the extent he did. He looked at the returns, which shewed about eleven thousand of all descriptions, but never took the trouble to consider whether

they were fit to contend against regular troops or not. Had Oporto fallen, which it ought to have done, the Miguelites would have gained confidence, and the war would have taken an entirely new turn.

At this time the enemy were supposed to have about twelve thousand men before the lines, including one thousand cavalry. Our force might be eight thousand regular troops and as many volunteers or moveable battalions, and not more than six hundred cavalry; in addition to this force there were about six thousand fixos and the three battalions of the naval and military arsenal and public works. The force of the enemy had very much diminished by sickness, desertion to their homes, and to the Queen's standard; though I must observe, to the credit of the Portuguese soldiers, that desertion to us bore no proportion to their losses by other causes, and yet Miguel's troops were ill-paid, ill-clothed, and ill-fed; but the Portuguese are generally true to their colours. The same praise is also due to the Queen's soldiers when suffering at Oporto under every privation. The desertion, though at once alarming, was nothing

to be compared to what might have been expected. The regular troops on the Queen's side were certainly much superior to Don Miguel's, but little could be expected from the volunteer battalions, composed of all classes of citizens, badly officered, with little discipline, and totally unacquainted with war; nevertheless Marshal Saldanha contemplated driving the enemy from before Lisbon.

Independent of the troops within the lines at Lisbon, we had between two and three thousand men at Peniché, under General Nepomuceno and the Baron de Sa; and orders were sent there by the George IV. steamer to march upon Torres Vedras, and be ready to cooperate with Marshal Saldanha in the event of his succeeding in driving the enemy from their positions. On the evening of the 9th of October the minister-at-war desired that I might have the boats of the arsenal and the ships ready, in the event of their being wanted in the morning, to embark the troops at Almada under Colonel Raboca, but without communicating to me Saldanha's intention of attacking the enemy. Next morning he came to the arsenal, and for the first time I was acquainted with

the marshal's intention, the minister observing at the same time that he was not himself aware of his plans till late the evening before. Whether this is true or not I cannot say, but it does appear that something must have been wrong in some quarter, if the marshal found it necessary to conceal so important a movement from the minister-at-war and marine, and in consequence from the commander-in-chief of the squadron.

Had the marshal contemplated making a reconnoissance, it was of less importance; but it ought to have been taken into consideration that that reconnoissance might cause the enemy to retreat, and every preparation should have been made to take advantage of circumstances; instead of which all that I could do to assist the marshal's movements was by moving up the flotilla, together with a brig and floating battery, and occupy the ground opposite Sacavem, to prevent a retreat across the river, and this at a considerable risk, because we knew nothing of the force the enemy had in that quarter, and the re-embarking, in the event of being attacked, was nearly impossible at low water. This, however, was done, and there we

remained the whole day within hearing of the action, and without receiving any communication from the minister of what was going forward.

Towards the afternoon I passed the river, and moved down to the powder-mills at Veralles, to be ready to act on the enemy's flank next morning, should it be necessary; and at sunset returned to Lisbon, and repaired to the Emperor's quarters in a house outside of the town. There I learnt that the attack had succeeded at all points, and the enemy were driven from their position. During the night they retired on Loures, and next morning the Queen's troops followed them to that place, marching over the hills, the cavalry keeping the high road. At four o'clock the high ground above Loures was occupied by our troops, and the artillery came up. The enemy were seen making every preparation to decamp; in fact their baggage was already on the move, and their cavalry were drawn up on the plain to protect their retreat. Here the division from Peniché should have been in their rear, but from some unaccountable mismanagement they halted at Torres Vedras. It has been said that they received the

despatch from Lisbon a day too late ; they, however, heard the firing, and ought to have felt their way : indeed, if they had, this day would probably have finished the war.

As soon as I discovered the enemy in retreat, directions were sent to the flotilla to move up to Alhandra, and flank the road which passed close to the river, and by which road they were moving off. The Emperor came up at this time, and after remaining a few hours returned to Lisbon. No attack was made by us ; but towards dark the Miguelites, I suppose to cover their retreat, attacked Saldanha's position, and were driven back with considerable loss. On the road to Lisbon I received a despatch from the marine head-quarters communicating the welcome intelligence that the inspector of the arsenal had anticipated my views, and moved part of the flotilla to Alhandra ; and I naturally expected, on his receiving my orders, the the brig and floating battery would have followed. This was communicated to the Emperor, who was delighted at their activity, and actually gave orders to have it put in the gazette. On my return to Lisbon I found to my surprise and asto-

nishment, that the inspector of the arsenal and the commander of the troops, after having landed on the road, and staid there a few hours, abandoned the position without having seen the enemy, and returned with all the gun-boats and troops to the arsenal, leaving the Miguelites and baggage a free passage, without the least annoyance. I ordered them to return forthwith ; but next morning it blew so fresh that neither the brig of war nor floating battery could get up in time ; and the enemy's army and baggage, who moved from Loures at two o'clock in the morning, passed without the least interruption.

Comments on this conduct are useless ; and it is only to be regretted that the Emperor had not had a little more of the devil in his composition, and made examples where they were necessary. If such an unpardonable neglect, to say the least of it, was committed by us, the enemy at the same time shewed great want of enterprize. Before dark they had a full opportunity of seeing the positions we occupied, and instead of retreating by Alhandra, they ought to have made a daring movement to their left on Sacavem, got

into the Lisbon road, which they might have done in the night, gained a march on the Queen's troops, forced the lines, which would have only been defended by the fixed battalions, and secured the capital.

It may be asked what they would have gained by this bold step, having Saldanha's army blockading them by land, and the fleet by sea. I answer, they would have regained the capital, captured the Queen and all the court, stores, arsenals, &c., which would have led to the entire disorganization of the army, and the probable return of every man raised in Lisbon. Besides, such a daring enterprize would have given confidence to their army, and struck such a terror into the Queen's troops that I doubt much whether they would have again followed them up to the capital. However, Don Miguel did not dare this, and lost his crown, as all princes ought to do who have not talent, courage, and enterprize, to put all to the hazard of a die to save it.

The Miguelites continued their retreat to Santarem, without even standing on the plain between Villa Nova and Azambuja, where from their su-

periority of cavalry, they ought to have risked an action. They entered Santarem on the 15th, without leaving a soul behind; indeed their retreat was conducted with great order and rapidity by General Macdonell, and was certainly not followed up with vigour by us. It must, however, be admitted that the discipline of our troops was by no means adapted for quick movements, nor were we prepared for so much success. Their cavalry was also infinitely superior to ours. On the other hand, the enemy were evidently frightened, and believed our force to be much greater than it was; and I have no doubt, had they been attacked at Loures, that they would have been totally routed.

General Nepomuceno arrived at Bucellas on the evening of the 12th, and at Sobral de Monte Agraco on the 13th. The same evening Saldanha halted at Villa Franca, and pushed his advanced posts on the roads of Rio Mayor and Santarem; and the flotilla went up to Villa Nova, where the enemy had halted, but retired on their approach. On the 16th Saldanha fixed his quarters at Cartaxo.

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Driving the enemy from before Lisbon was certainly a bold measure ; but I am sure the success we met with was not anticipated, nor do I believe any thing further than a reconnoissance was intended, for no preparations were made to follow them up ; and here I think the Emperor, minister-at-war or Saldanha, whoever it was, committed a great error.

The moment Don Pedro was of opinion that his troops were sufficiently organized for a forward movement, he ought to have called to his council the two marshals and myself, and laid before us the state of his army and that of the enemy, which could have been easily ascertained. He ought to have informed himself of their dispositions, and above all of the state of Santarem, and the force in it. At that time I do not believe it was fortified, nor do I believe it was garrisoned. With this information before us a regular plan ought to have been laid down, and advantage taken of the great superiority the possession of the sea and the Tagus gave us over the enemy.

I have already said that a force of between two and three thousand men was collected at Peniché,

who could operate on the enemy's left flank ; and no two men could judge better than the Duke of Terceira and Marshal Saldanha how the military movements should have been executed ; but neither the one nor the other knew any thing, or could be supposed to know, any thing of naval movements any more than the Emperor himself ; and it certainly would not have taken any merit from them had I been consulted before the campaign was opened. Who is to blame for not forming a plan I really do not know, but certainly none was formed.

Had my opinion been asked, I should have advised that the three steam-boats we had should have embarked the battalions of the naval and military arsenal, the public works and the troops from Almada, accompanied by all the armed boats of the squadron, the brig, and the floating battery ; and that the small craft on the coast should have been recalled. The day for opening the campaign should have been chosen when the wind and tide answered, an hour or two before daylight, or the wind need not have been considered at all. All this arranged,

and the orders sent to Peniché, and a certainty that they had been received, the flotilla should have proceeded up the river before daylight, and the first intimation the enemy would have had of an intended attack would have been their seeing a force in their rear on the right, while the troops from Peniché were at the same time threatening their left flank. The flotilla at Setuval, and the troops there, should at the same time have made a movement on Alcacer do Sal. The Emperor would then have marched out of his lines at dawn of day, and if he could beat them without any plan at all, it is very evident how much better he would have succeeded with a well-concerted movement.

The Miguelites at this time were so dispirited that the probability is they would either have laid down their arms or made a hasty retreat, harassed on their left by the Peniché division, and the road cut and blocked up at Alhandra, and flanked by two or three brigs of war. They must have lost all their artillery and baggage at least, or even had they succeeded in holding together, and taking the road of Bucellas, timely notice might have been sent to me, and I should have moved up the

flotilla, and occupied Santarem with the troops under my command. Had this been planned and well executed, the war would have been finished at a blow, and those employed would have had the credit of planning and executing the finest manœuvre that had taken place during the war.

This will no doubt be read by many naval and military men, who know the ground, and they will judge whether my observations are correct or otherwise. I have already said that who is to blame I know not. The minister-of-war had neither capacity to conceive, nor ability to execute such a combined movement ; therefore he is not to be censured, and I suppose it must be attributed to the Emperor and Marshal Saldanha not expecting the success they met with. Be that as it may, they lost a fine opportunity of finishing the war, and I shall now leave both armies looking at each other along the Ponte D'Areca, and return to Lisbon and examine a little into the naval and political affairs of the country.

CHAPTER II.

WHEN the enemy were before Lisbon, it was necessary to keep up a large naval establishment, both for its defence and in case of a disaster. That danger now over, the Cape St Vincent was paid off and fitted out as a sheer hulk. The *Rainha de Portugal*, my old flag-ship, and which by a decree of the Emperor was always to be in commission, was reduced to a lieutenant's command ; and the *Martin Freitas*, now arrived from Lagos, paid off. The *Duchess of Braganza* had her masts shifted and was refitted ; and the *Don Pedro* prepared to proceed to Angola to establish the Queen's authority in that colony. Store-ships were also sent to the Cape Verd Islands for the same purpose, and to bring home the political prisoners who had been sent there by Miguel's government.

On my arrival in Lisbon, a summons had been sent to Madeira ; but the governor, having an excellent garrison, was determined to hold out, and we had not sufficient force to undertake an expedition against it, or even to blockade it.

No navy in the world can be compared to the Portuguese ; they do manage to navigate their ships in the most extraordinary manner possible. There is not one ship in their whole service that would not be condemned in an English dock-yard. Their sails are only fit for summer ; the greater part of their blocks are made of pine with wooden pins, and are constantly tumbling about your ears ; there is no proportion in the strength of their yards to their squareness ; they never have an anchor or cable that would hold a ship in a gale of wind in an open anchorage, or a capstan that could heave an anchor up in blowing weather ; and should they spring a leak, they must go down for want of pumps ; and to crown all, the greater part of their officers have not the least pretension to seamanship. The boatswain and his mates, who are always respectable men, are the only people in the shape of officers that are sailors ; and indeed

they manage the ships; yet with all these disadvantages they do stumble through their work in a most extraordinary manner. They can never be intended to keep the sea in bad weather, nor indeed do they ever think of doing so; and should they by accident be caught in a gale of wind, their sails are sure to be blown away, and they have nothing to do but put their trust in Providence.

Very few of their officers are conscious of their inefficiency; on the contrary they think themselves capital officers though not sailors: — in short, if you ask what sort of an officer so-and-so is, the answer is generally—‘he is an excellent officer; he has completed his studies;’ indeed, their studies are the only thing thought of; and they certainly are good navigators and good mathematicians; and I should say pass a severer examination at their college than is done at Portsmouth academy. There is no regulation about their age in going to sea, and many of them never go afloat till they are upwards of twenty, and indeed there are many second lieutenants who have never been at sea in their lives.

The seamen are good and capital riggers, and

when well treated and taken care of by their officers, which they never are, are capable of being made any thing of. They are sober, quiet, and easily led ; their pay is good, *when they get it*,—about two pounds a month ; but they ~~are~~ wretchedly fed. The boatswain's mates registered have double the pay of the seamen, and those not registered one half more. There are no other petty officers allowed by the law. There are admirals, vice and rear admirals, commodores and brevet commodores, captains and brevet captains, commanders and brevet commanders, lieutenants, second lieutenants, midshipmen, and volunteers, pilots, second pilots, and volunteers. The midshipmen and volunteers mess with the officers ; the class of pilots are not provided for, nor could I ever find out what was their use ; they are not seamen, nor required to know any thing of the coast, and their education is inferior to the collegians. I set to work to remedy all those evils, and was foolish enough to think nothing was more easy ; but I soon found out from the minister to the lowest clerk in the establishment that I was

opposed by every species of intrigue so well known and practised in Portugal.

Mr. Freire was minister of marine as well as of war,—a man much too incapable and indolent to fill one office instead of two; and the only recommendation he could possibly have to office must have been his subserviency to the Emperor, who, although a liberal, like most other princes was very fond of having his own way, and was pretty sure of not being thwarted by this minister. His office was filled by twenty or thirty clerks lounging over their desks; the two principal ones as great intriguers as were to be found in Lisbon.

Formerly there was a Board of Admiralty; but the Cortes of 1820 replaced them by a major-general of the Armada with a staff of two adjutants, and three or four clerks, to which I was obliged to add a secretary and another clerk for the correspondence in both languages. This constituted the whole of the head-quarter department; and as I insisted on an immediate reply to all letters and applications, and as every officer and man, both in the civil and military depart-

ment of the navy are accustomed to write to the major-general, they certainly had no sinecure.

I have said that in the minister of marine's office, which is united with the colonies, there were about twenty or thirty employés. In former days the major-general was so completely under the minister, that, in order to preserve his place, he was obliged to submit to whatever he or his clerks thought proper; and as no minister had ever been acquainted with naval matters, it is easily to be supposed into what a deplorable state the naval department had fallen. The finances in Portugal had long been in disorder; and when the government was hard-pressed for money, the naval department was always the first to suffer. No stores could be obtained, except of bad quality and at exorbitant prices, as it was quite a lottery when the furnishers would be paid. They made their calculations, and charged accordingly, and those who had the most interest with the minister of marine, or probably who knew how to apply a *douceur* in the proper quarter, were the first paid. I could not permit such a state of things to continue, and the minister and his people very

soon found out I was the most improper person to be at the head of the naval department: but the war was not over, and it was necessary to act with caution, and begin by gradually disgusting me, which is always the Portuguese fashion.

Agreeably to the law of the Cortes, the whole business of the navy ought to be carried on through the major-general; and the minister of marine, as far as I could understand the law, had no right to issue any orders to the inferior departments. Indeed, if he had been endowed with honest intentions, and really wished to benefit and improve the naval service, nothing was more easy. It was only necessary to divide his department into two sections, viz., the colonial, and marine, the clerks in the colonial office having nothing to do with the marine department, or the marine office with the colonial branch. At the colonial office, which is by far the most important, and requires a man of real talent and political knowledge, (if they wish to draw any advantage from their numerous and valuable colonies,) the minister himself should preside, leaving the naval department to the major-general, who should

communicate with him in person, submit all papers necessary for his signature, and consult with him on naval affairs generally. Had such a system been followed, there would have been neither jealousy nor jarring between the offices, and the service would have been conducted pleasantly to individuals, and with advantage to the country. But neither minister nor clerks cared one sixpence about the good of the navy, if that could only be obtained by diminishing their importance, and taking away from them the means of persecuting the Miguelites, and doing mischief.

On first taking the command of the Queen's squadron at Oporto, I was authorized by the Emperor to promote officers, and I did not feel inclined to give up that power ; and shortly after my arrival in Lisbon, I selected and promoted a few of the most deserving who had been at Oporto, having already promoted the English officers who had served in the action. This alarmed the minister and his myrmidons, and my suspicions were first ^{Appendix}awoke by receiving a letter ^{No. 1.} on the subject from the minister, which drew from

me a remonstrance, and finally an appeal to the Emperor, who ordered the officers to be confirmed, without, however, acknowledging my right to promote without the approbation of the minister. I referred his majesty to the Carta Regia he gave me on taking command of his squadron; but that he considered only temporary, and observed that he himself, as regent and commander-in-chief of the army, had not the power of promoting an officer on the field of battle without the concurrence of the minister at war. This was followed up by withdrawing the naval hospital from my control, and appointing first a commission and then a medical officer to attend not only to the professional, but also to the civil branch. This gentleman was a friend of Freire's, a very good man, and a good physician no doubt; but such an arrangement was placing a great deal too much power in his hands, and opening the door wider to the abuses I wished to correct.

The decree depriving all officers who had served Don Miguel of the rank they had obtained during the usurpation had completely disorganised the navy. Captains were sent back to be lieutenants, lieutenants to midshipmen, and midshipmen to

volunteers, and so on; and this without any consideration whatever as to their political feelings, or whether their promotion had been obtained from favour, or from the common routine of the service. I laboured hard, but in vain, to shew the impolicy of this in the navy, as we were obliged to employ many of those officers; and sending them back to an inferior rank was certainly not the best means of making them faithful to the cause of the Queen. Few naval officers had emigrated to Oporto, and amongst these few several had served Don Miguel, and even commanded his ships when the French forced the Tagus, and took away the greater part of the squadron; and those men were by far the most violent against the Miguelites. Depriving officers of their rank who were notoriously attached to the usurper, and were of a sufficient age to judge for themselves, was perfectly correct, but visiting the same punishment on young men and boys whose parents had sent them into the service, and who had not the means of leaving Lisbon, and were obliged to serve if ordered, or go to prison,

was consistent neither with justice nor common sense.

The captains of ships had great difficulty in finding officers fit for service, and in many instances I was obliged to give acting orders to those who had been turned back, until some definitive arrangement should be made ; but so intent was the minister on folly that all my good intentions towards them were frustrated, by the countability refusing to pay them higher than the rank they had been sent back to, and this no doubt by the directions of the minister.

There was only one man of talent in the whole shipwright department,—the master-builder. We really wanted his services, but he had committed an irreparable error in having done his duty in fitting out the Rainha, an old broken-backed hulk, and which no nation but the Portuguese ever would have thought of sending to sea. Nevertheless, what with doubling her sides and diagonal timbers outside of that doubling, she was rendered sufficiently strong for all purposes of war during the summer. This man was sent to the right-

about, and as there was nobody competent to fill his place, I gave him an acting order, which was as usual counteracted by a refusal to pay him; he, as might be expected, got sulky, did little or nothing, and was ultimately sent about his business; thus we lost the services of the only native who had the least idea of ship-building.

No person who has not seen it can form an idea of the state of the naval arsenal at Lisbon; it was the receptacle for the blind, the lame, and the lazy. If a man was unfit for any thing else, interest was made to get him a place in the arsenal. The establishment consisted of between two and three thousand, certainly the worst artificers to be found in the whole country. There was hardly an officer in the establishment fit for his situation, and it was quite indifferent to them whether the men worked or not. In fact they were seen sleeping about in all directions, and even those who did work took especial care to do it in the manner most pleasant and agreeable to themselves, any thing like fatigue being quite out of the question. The inefficiency and indolence of the workmen in the

naval arsenal was proverbial, and in the constitution of 1820 the workmen used to say the Cortes might reform whatever they pleased, but they never could introduce it into the arsenal; and they were not far wrong. The only efficient way of doing good would have been by paying off the whole establishment and beginning afresh; but that could not be done in troublesome times. The first thing necessary was to pay them regularly, which was no easy matter in the state of the finances; however, for the first few months they were seldom more than a fortnight in arrear.

A survey was held on all those unfit for employment, and they were discharged with pensions agreeable to their services. The workmen were divided into different gangs, and foremen placed at their head, who, however, were always afraid to report men who neglected their duty. In short I had the whole dock-yard to fight against,—officers and all; and by either suspending or discharging those whom I caught idling away their time, as long as I was present, things began to improve; but the moment my back was turned,

they got into their old habits, and even used to place centinels in various places of the yard to give notice of my approach.

The Villa Flor, Portuense, and Liberal had been in hand four months, and little progress was made in their repairs; what with time lost in going on board, coming on shore, and idling, they cost more money than the purchase of new vessels. This was not the only inconvenience; as the season advanced, the difficulty of keeping up an effective blockade became greater; most of our vessels were crazy, and the officers had no idea of keeping the sea in bad weather. The Isabelle Maria, stationed off Figueras, quitted the blockade, and the captain reported that having only three weeks' fuel on board, he had called his officers together, and they were unanimously of opinion that they ought to return to Lisbon. Such was the custom, and it was considered very harsh to supersede the captain and send her to sea. The first breeze brought in a couple of brigs, who were unfit to keep their station, and were condemned. This very much reduced our blockading force, and I found it necessary to quicken the

operations of my friends the dock-yard men, by ordering them not to leave the ships in the river, till their repairs were completed. At first they laughed at this, but not finding themselves quite so comfortable as they were in their homes, they seriously set to work, remarking at the same time that treating them in that manner was not quite constitutional.

The marine corps had been sadly neglected, and I directed the commandant to send me a statement of the age, qualifications, and characters of the different officers composing that branch of the service, with the intention of carefully examining into its state, and putting on half-pay those who were notoriously attached to the cause of Miguel; but in my absence at Setuval, the report was sent to the minister of marine, and before my return the greater part of them had been reformed without any inquiry whatever, except the simple statement of the commandant, who thus got rid of all those senior to himself, together with many others. When any harsh measure was to be put in force, there was no delay in the minister of marine's office; it went through

like lightning; and if any person was supposed to be a Miguelite, little or no inquiry was thought necessary.

A council of state was now formed, consisting of twelve. Palmella and eight members were named; the other three places were kept open for the ministers. This council appears to have been of no use. Had the ministers been obliged to follow their advice, it would only have clogged the wheels of government; and if not, they might just as well have staid at home.

The assembling of the Cortes was put off *sine die*, as every body foresaw would be the case, and the ministers were only laughed at for their childish precipitation in calling them together.

Don Carlos was again peremptorily ordered out of the kingdom, and Don Miguel called upon to insist on his leaving; but he appeared to have made common cause with Carlos, and took no step to oblige him to quit Portugal. On the contrary, he gave every encouragement to the Spanish Carlists, and had actually a corps of two hundred men under the command of a Colonel Serredo. Strong representations were made on this subject,

but without effect. General Cordova said they were Carlist refugees, enemies of his country, over whom he had no controul; but it does not appear that he took any steps to insist on Don Miguel sending them out of the country, or even dismissing them from his army. In fact, the whole of the Spanish minister's conduct was inexplicable; he was a decided Miguelite in Lisbon, and I cannot conceive he can now be a constitutionalist in Spain.

It was also strongly reported that arms and ammunition were supplied from Badajos, and I thought it as well to accompany a remonstrance that was ordered to be made to Lord Palmerston, with a hint that the Portuguese squadron might probably take a trip to the southward.

On the 6th of October, the news of Ferdinand's death arrived at Lisbon, and the quiet succession of the young Queen, her mother assuming the regency. This event was most favourable to Portugal; on the thrones of the two peninsular kingdoms were now seated two queens, both minors;—the father of one queen, regent of Portugal, and the mother of the other regent

of Spain. Each queen had an uncle, and each uncle was a pretender to the throne, and one a usurper in arms. It was evident that in opposition to Carlos the despot, the Queen must establish a constitutional throne.

Don Carlos having assumed the title of King of Spain, refused to hold any communication with Cordova, and proceeded to the frontier, in hopes of finding a movement in his favour. The generals commanding those provinces were constitutionalists, and took steps to prevent him crossing the frontier: indeed there appears to have been no movement whatever in his favour.

One of the first acts of the Queen of Spain's government was recalling the legation from Portugal, and expressing, through the British minister at Madrid, their wish to see the war in Portugal terminated, and hinting at the same time their desire to see some concession. This communication was well received by Don Pedro's government, who promised to take into consideration any proposition Spain might make, provided it was not injurious to the prosperity and honor of Portugal, and above all to the charter. Any pro-

posal to meddle with it would not be listened to for a moment, and if listened to, would throw the whole country into a state of anarchy and confusion.

Don Pedro himself wrote a long letter to the queen-regent of Spain, which he requested Lord William Russell would forward to Mr. Villars, to be by him delivered to her Majesty ; but though
Appendix,
No. III. it was full of praises of the Queen, it reflected a good deal on the conduct of Ferdinand ; and as Spain was well inclined to Portugal, he was afraid it would give offence, and very prudently declined presenting it.

On the 16th of October, Candido Xavier, the minister of interior and foreign affairs, died. Hopes were now entertained that a ministry would be formed composed of some of the leading men of the Queen's party, and who had a stake in the country ; but Freire and Carvalho, thinking they possessed talent sufficient to carry on the government, appointed as their colleagues two men possessing neither talent nor property in the country. Majorchi, an astronomer, took the portfolio of the marine and colonies ; he thought more of the stars than either of ships or colonies,

in addition to which he was indolent and never thoroughly awake. It would have been as ridiculous to have appointed me archbishop of Braga as it was to place him at the head of the navy. Freire took the foreign department in addition to the war, and Aguiar, a professor of the university of Coimbra, the interior.

Those arrangements added nothing either to the popularity or respectability of the cabinet. Freire was bad enough in the marine, but this man was worse. Both were in the hands of their clerks, and I always observed, if I proposed any thing conciliatory or of use to the service, that my applications were unattended to ; any thing, on the other hand, against a Miguelite officer or unpleasant to myself, was promptly executed ; and as this man was still more indolent than Freire, he was still more governed by the people about him, and the annoyances became so great that nothing but a sincere desire to see the war finished could have induced me to put up with them.

The British government, justly incensed at the vicious system of government adopted by Don

Pedro's ministers, remonstrated in strong terms against their proceedings, and threatened to withdraw their countenance if a more mild system of government was not adopted. Freire acknowledged the severity of the decree of sequestration, as well as the rigour with which it was executed, and endeavoured to excuse himself on the plea of necessity, remarking at the same time that at Oporto they had no other means of raising money during the siege. Such severity might have been excusable at Oporto, but at Lisbon it could not be justified either in point of justice or policy.

A severe remonstrance was also sent to Sylva Carvalho, the minister of justice and finance, who pleaded the propriety of retaliation, and his hope that confiscation would induce the followers of Don Miguel to abandon his cause, and come to Lisbon to save their properties. He did not take the trouble to reflect that his victims were between two fires ; if they absented themselves from Lisbon, their town property was confiscated by Don Pedro ; and if they should absent themselves from the provinces, their country property was sure to be confiscated by Don Miguel.

The remonstrances had some effect ; better behaviour was promised for the future, and the sale of moveables discontinued. A promise was also made that all prisoners against whom there was not sufficient proof should be discharged. Many were said to have been imprisoned to save them from the fury of the populace ; but the Lord help those shut up in a Portuguese prison, nine chances to one they are forgot, and if they have not friends to look after them, they have a very fair prospect of starving.

The general feeling in Lisbon was certainly against the Emperor's ministers, and Don Pedro himself was becoming unpopular. Many excused them on account of the difficulties with which they were surrounded, and it was difficult to persuade others that there was any very great crime in persecuting a Miguelite. Even the most moderate objected to the employment of people who had remained in Lisbon during the usurpation, and Palmella's putting the Count of Porto Santo at the head of the municipality was not generally approved of.

On the 2d of November about six hundred

English and Scotch arrived, chiefly boys. Promises, as usual, made by the Queen's agents, were not kept by the government, and the poor men were the sufferers. Had the agents exceeded their authority, it was the duty of the government to have settled the business with them ; but the unfortunate wretches who had been kidnapped ought not to have been ill-treated. Many of them were perfectly unfit for soldiers ; some were received as boys on board the Don John ; others were sent back to England without any remuneration whatever ; and those who went to the depôt were swindled in every direction.

CHAPTER III.

I SHALL now return to Santarem, which the enemy were fortifying, while Saldanha, on the other hand, was strengthening his position, which extended from Val to Azumbujeira. The enemy had their piquets at one end of the Ponte da Asseca, which is a long causeway leading to Santarem: our piquets were at the other. A small river in front ran from Val nearly parallel with the Tagus, and joined it below the bend of the river, opposite Salvaterra; and up this river vessels brought the supplies for the army. A brig of war was anchored at Villa Franca, the floating battery at the entrance of the creek leading to Villa Nova, and the gun-boats and lighter vessels were pushed up abreast of Salvaterra, which we ought to have occupied and

intrenched. The enemy took advantage of our neglect, and passing over a small force at Almeirim, on the 17th marched on Salvaterra, opened a fire on the flotilla next morning, which retired, leaving two barges aground, without making any very great exertion to bring them off.

The possession of this port opened the whole of the south to the incursions of the enemy's cavalry as far as Aldea Gallegos and even Moita ; and had they profited by this advantage as much as they ought to have done, and occupied the island, the water communication with the army would have been entirely cut off. During the occupation of Santarem by the French, the Duke of Wellington never allowed them to get a footing in the south, and his example ought to have been followed. It is true we were much inferior in cavalry, and the south is a cavalry country ; but that ought not to have prevented the occupation of Salvaterra. I repeatedly proposed to Saldanha to attack it, but his views turned more to the north ; and for the present both parties kept looking at each other.

From our position Santarem appeared very strong

and unattackable; and when occupied by the French with a large army, was certainly accounted so by the Duke of Wellington; but though not a military man, I can understand that a position occupied by ten or twelve thousand men is a very different thing from the same occupied by sixty or seventy.

When our troops first appeared at the Ponte da Asseca, the old redoubt which raked the bridge was neither armed nor repaired; and I think we might have pushed boldly on, and occupied the ground on the opposite side of the bridge, between which and Santarem there are two distinct ranges of hills before you come to the table-land on which Santarem stands. It would have required some hard fighting to have gained it, but still it was to be done; and if we were able to drive the enemy from before Lisbon without the assistance of the Peniché division, on their junction some attempt might have been made to have driven them into the town, which could then have been besieged; and abundance of heavy cannon might have been brought up by water from Lisbon for that purpose. The fixed battalions, together with the arsenal battalions, and seamen

from the ships, should have been brought up to support the attack of the regular troops. All this would have been attended with some risk, and it was perhaps judged better to wait till the army was better disciplined, and until reinforcements should arrive from England. At the same time we had no right to suppose the enemy would not take advantage of our inactivity, and penetrate to Setuval, and having possession of the whole of the country, increase their troops, while their friends in England and elsewhere were making exertions to furnish them with money and arms, which, though difficult to land, was still possible, as Portuguese men-of-war were not very well adapted for winter blockades. Don Miguel was, however, ill served. Intrigue was rife, which had driven away Bourmont, and shortly after Macdonald was also obliged to give up the command of the army. Desertion also began to increase to the Queen's colours, and many retired to their homes; in addition to which, sickness made its appearance in their camp, while our troops remained tolerably healthy and were well fed. The Emperor went up frequently to review

the army, and Saldanha was indefatigable in forming them, and at each review their improvement in dress and organization was very evident.

On the 26th Leiria declared for the Queen, and on the 28th the Emperor received at Cartaxo a deputation from that town. On the same day Captain Henry embarked, in two steam-boats, the troops at St. Ubes, composed of Lisbon volunteers, a part of the ninth regiment, and about one hundred and fifty English and Portuguese marines under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Florencio José da Silva. They landed at Fayus, about a league below Alcacer do Sal, which had been occupied for some time by the Miguelites, and after a slight resistance, in which they lost a few men, they abandoned the town, and retired on Evora. Had we been in possession of Salvaterra, this would have been a very proper movement; or, indeed, had we reinforced Baroca d'Alva, where there were a few Portuguese marines, we would have reaped some advantage from this enterprise; but, as usual, we did nothing more, supposing the enemy would be equally inactive, but for once we were mistaken.

General Lemos passed the river at Santarem with about fifteen hundred men, and on the morning of the 2d of November attacked our position, in advance of Alcacer do Sal, which in point of fact was no position at all. Colonel Florencio had his troops drawn up on a plain, with a wood on each flank, which he did not occupy. The English and Portuguese marines were thrown out in front as skirmishers. Our force was inferior to the enemy, particularly in cavalry, which circumstance ought to have confined the colonel to the defence of the town only; but unhappily he advanced. Captain Birt, who commanded the marines, on seeing the approach of the enemy's cavalry, formed his men into a rallying square, and twice repulsed them with great loss. He then formed in line to receive a column of infantry who were advancing; and hearing a firing in his rear, he turned round, and observed the Lisbon volunteers and ninth infantry fire off their muskets and take to their heels as fast as they could run, without having ever seen an enemy. He immediately commenced his retreat, covering the fugitives as well as he could;

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but the colonel, instead of occupying a convent on his right, and endeavouring to rally his men, made for the marshes by the river side, where every thing got into greater confusion. The cavalry closed, and cut them down in all directions. Captain Birt managed to conduct his men in tolerable order to the river, leaving only three men behind, when, for want of boats, they got into confusion, threw away their arms and ammunition, and took to the water.

In this affair the loss of marines was two officers taken prisoners, and between thirty and forty non-commissioned officers and privates killed and taken. The loss of the Lisbon volunteers and ninth regiment could not have been less than eight hundred men in killed, wounded, and missing. The greater part of those taken were delivered up by General Lemos to the guerillas and put to death; and he had the hardihood to announce this transaction in his public despatch. Report of this disaster found its way to Lisbon a day or two before the official account, and a Belgian regiment having arrived on the 30th of October, which was being clothed on board the sheer hulk, with

great difficulty, and after vacillating half the day, I persuaded the minister to allow me to embark two hundred of them in a steam-boat, and carry them to Setuval, where I arrived at daylight of the 4th of November. The town was in great confusion; the principal people were embarked, and not a soul was left to defend it. The Belgians were put into the castle, and the Donna Maria's broadside brought to flank it. This timely succour saved the town. What General Lemos was about after the affair of Alcacer do Sal God knows; he had only to make his appearance, and he would have been received with open arms by the inhabitants, the greater part of whom were staunch Miguelites. As I could hear nothing of him at Setuval, I concluded he would march on Sinnes, and surprise the garrison in that town, for which place I started, and finding it not defensible, I withdrew the garrison, (consisting of two hundred marines,) and the principal inhabitants, and brought them to Setuval. On the same day the rest of the Belgian regiment, who I requested might be sent, arrived, as also the cavalry, who, after the affair of Alcacer do Sal, had retired on

Almada; and this important post was again placed in security. General Lemos, finding I was beforehand with him, was content with surprising Baroca d'Alva, and I apprehend the detachment there had never been acquainted with the affair of Alcacer.

After restoring order, I returned to Lisbon, and pressed the minister to pay the Belgian troops at Setuval the bounty that had been promised them on landing. This, however, was as usual delayed, which happened more or less with every foreign soldier who arrived. Abundance of promises were made in England, but were so ill kept by both parties in England and at Lisbon, that the men got discontented on their landing, and many were sent back without having ever joined their regiments.

The Algarves were still suffering from the depredations of the guerillas, and I was much pressed by the governor of Lagos to come to his assistance. I had frequently sent him provisions from the naval arsenal, and I now decided on collecting all the marines I could muster, and endeavour at once to free that unfortunate kingdom

from the miseries of war. This was approved of by the minister, who gave me full power to command the forces there; and my friend Colonel Loreros, one of the best officers in the Portuguese service, but who was not employed, accompanied me, as also the young Count Ficalho. The weather was still fine, and I was in hopes it would continue so for a few days; but on our arrival at Setuval, the cavalry I had expected to embark with me had been ordered in the neighbourhood of Aldea Gallego or Moita, were surprised, and cut off. This detained us a day, and we were obliged to proceed with about twenty cavalry and fifty mounted guerillas, and between four or five hundred marines, including those who had escaped from Alcacer and were now re-equipped. Before starting I took upon myself to order an advance to the Belgians from the custom-house coffers, they were still unpaid, and were nearly in a state of mutiny. This delay was occasioned not from any intention of breaking faith, but simply from the indolence with which every thing was carried on in the war department; and this indolence extended to every

branch of the establishment. In more than one instance, I had sent provisions to the Algarves when starving, and which arrived there before even an order had been issued for their supply; and once from the neglect of the authorities in the naval arsenal the whole flotilla in the south were reduced to the last extremity, and on inquiry at the inspector's office their demands had been thrown on one side and entirely forgot. Such was the manner in which war was carried on in Portugal on both sides, and with the exception of the minister of finance, who was most zealous in procuring funds, the ministry deserve not a particle of credit for bringing the war to a successful termination; and although I have no doubt they will feel much offended at reading this narrative, it is proper the Portuguese nation should know that it was to the Emperor and his officers in the field that the whole merit of their deliverance is due, and not to the imbecilles who amused themselves from morning to night issuing out a parcel of foolish decrees.

I arrived off Lagos about the middle of November. The weather had been threatening for a day

or two, and it now became so boisterous, that it was difficult to approach the coast. The vessel was very crowded with men and horses, who were drenched with wet; nevertheless the old governor of Lagos, who saw our approach with pleasure, managed to send off boats sufficient to carry between one and two hundred marines on shore. We then proceeded to Faro, but found it impossible to pass the bar. The weather was getting worse, and to mend the matter, the captain of the steam-boat reported that he had only one day's fuel and water on board. This was not a pleasant situation to be in, and we were obliged to return to Setuval. The other steam-boat persevered and succeeded in landing the guerilla cavalry at Faro. I was much annoyed at this, as I hoped to have been able to set things to rights in the Algarves, and still more annoyed when on our return to Lisbon I found the captain of the steam-boat, who did not like the weather, had framed the excuse of having only one day's fuel and water on board to induce us to return to Setuval.

The weather was now too unsettled to undertake

any more excursions of this description, and I was obliged to content myself with the reinforcements I had thrown in, and leave the Portuguese marines to reinforce the garrison, and bring the English ones back to the Don John, where they might be ready for any future enterprise.

During my absence in the Algarves the Emperor had been with the army, and decided on sending a detachment to destroy the mills at Pernes, from whence the enemy received the greater part of their flour. On the 10th November the fourth and fifth columns stationed at Azumbujeira were directed on Pernes by the road of Tremes, another column marched from Rio Maior by Alcanede, the whole under the command of Brigadier Joao Nepomucenos de Macado. The enemy, consisting of the fourteenth, a battalion of the fifth infantry, and one of royalist volunteers, had time to form, and were attacked in two columns, one consisting of the twelfth caçadores and ninth of the line, the other by the three English regiments, supported by several

pieces of artillery. They were immediately driven from their positions, leaving in our possession twenty-eight prisoners. The loss on both sides was trifling; the mills were destroyed and the detachment returned, and occupied the positions of Sicurio and Mucarria near the main body of the army.

When the columns marched on Pernes, Marshal Saldanha advanced to the Ponte da Asseca, which he occupied with the first column; the second and third were in reserve at the Ponte de Celeiro. This demonstration prevented any interference with the expedition to Pernes.

The marshal was much dissatisfied with General Nepomuceno for not having proceeded to Thomar agreeable to his orders, and in consequence relieved him from his command. It appears to me the risk was too great, which was probably the general's reason, but Saldanha thought otherwise, and he was an officer who would have his orders obeyed, taking the responsibility on himself, Nepomuceno was nevertheless esteemed a good officer, and was very generally respected by the army.

After this affair and that of Alcacer do Sal, both parties seemed satisfied with what they had done, and were inclined to repose. Don Miguel hunted, and Don Pedro became unpopular through the acts of his ministers. The tobacco contract had been given to the Count Farola, who shared it with another party, himself pocketing a large sum. This was wrong ; it ought to have been put up to public auction. He had certainly advanced large sums of money when Don Pedro was in distress at Oporto, and at considerable risk ; and it was right he should be rewarded, but people were of opinion that his remuneration was too high, and even hinted that a *douceur* had been applied in the proper quarter.

The old contractor offered a much higher sum, which so enraged the ministers that they persuaded the Emperor, to issue out a very severe decree, calling upon Joao Paulo Cordeiro and Company to pay up within ten days a large sum due to the government, on pain of having the tobacco machinery, &c. seized. It was quite notorious how great had been the exertions of this

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company against the liberal cause; nevertheless the decree was considered by right-thinking men as most unjust, because it was impossible for the old contractor to receive remittances from the country occupied by the Miguelites. The commission appointed declined to carry the decree into execution, and Lord William Russell laboured in vain with Don Pedro to induce him to modify it.

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This called forth a strong letter from the Count de Taipa to the Emperor, which, however, had no effect.

After this decree came another, repealing a former one, which placed certain foreign coins considerably higher than their intrinsic value. This in itself was not reprehensible, had not the bank been previously made aware of it, and issued their foreign coin the day before at the higher value, thereby defrauding the public of a considerable sum of money. This caused general indignation against the government.

The mercantile distress at this time was also great, particularly amongst the English merchants,

who could receive no remittances from the prisoners: the exchange was at 52, and had every appearance of getting worse.

On the 23d of November, a council of state was held, and a new tax proposed. The Duke of Palmella took a general view of the state of the country, which was objected to by Don Pedro, and caused an angry discussion. Both Palmella and Guerrero read papers censuring the whole system pursued by the government, and which they deposited on the council table. These papers Trigosa offered to sign, which, however, Palmella declined, as he had no intention of making a formal charge against the government; he only wished to discharge his duty, and relieve himself from the accusation of being a tacit approver of their acts. The ministers announced their intention of replying to what they considered an attack on them by three councillors of state. The tax they proposed was refused unless an exposé of the state of the finances was laid before them, which was not done.

About this time Spain offered to mediate

between the contending parties in Portugal in conjunction with England, and authorised Lord William Russell to make the offer. A confidential agent was also sent to Don Miguel's court to notify that Lord William Russell had been requested on the part of Spain to propose her good offices. This was approved by Don Pedro's government, who also gave their confidence to Lord William, and explained to him that peace on any terms would be a blessing to Portugal provided Don Miguel left the country. Colonel Hare was sent to Saldanha's head-quarters to put himself in communication with the Baron Ramefort, the Spanish agent, and three days were given to Don Miguel to accept or refuse the mediation.

It is, however, singular that the Baron was not instructed by Zea Bermudez* to insist on the departure of Miguel as a *sine-qua-non*, though he had signified to Mr. Villars that instructions to that effect would be given him, and indeed he even proposed to Hare that Miguel's marriage with the Queen should take place.

The Count San Lorenzo did not entirely reject the mediation, but would not accept it till made acquainted with the basis on which they were to treat. Colonel Hare, who was the bearer of Lord William's reply to San Lorenzo, was not permitted to enter Santarem, but delivered his letter to General Macdonnell, and after waiting five hours for a reply, was sent back without it, under the pretext that Saldanha's piquets had fired during the time he was waiting. This was purely accidental, and need not have been noticed, particularly as Hare made no complaint of having himself been fired at by the Miguelites.

Three days more had been granted to accept or decline the mediation, which Miguel refused on the basis offered, but was willing to make any other concession consistent with his dignity. The Baron Ramefort in consequence quitted Santarem. Lorenzo's Despatch.

This proposal of mediation was followed up by Lord William Russell obtaining permission, with great difficulty, for the Marquis of Olhao (who had been at the head of the municipality when Miguel was declared king) to leave his hiding-place in Lisbon, and proceed to Santarem to use

his influence over Don Miguel to induce him to abdicate. He there pointed out to Miguel the great sacrifices that had been made by his party, and that now all hope was gone, it was time he should in his turn make sacrifices to them. Miguel, however, was obdurate, and would listen to no proposal that had for its basis the loss of the crown of Portugal, to which he considered himself fully entitled.

The rejection of the mediation caused a good deal of discontent at Santarem amongst those who saw no prospect of ultimate success, and who were sufficiently moderate to see that the continuance of the civil war would be the ruin of their country, but the ultra royalists were determined to support their king to the last extremity, relying probably on the chapter of accidents, as well as on the hope of Pedro's ministers committing acts that would render him unpopular with his party; and for this they did not wait

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long. Count de Taipa had written a second letter to the Emperor, which was seized, and an attempt made to arrest him in the street: this he resisted, and sought refuge in the house of Count Ficalho,

a high-spirited young nobleman, and one of the Emperor's aid-de-camps. He threatened to put to death the first person who dared break in on the sanctity of his house, and sent to the peers to inform them of what had taken place; the peerage who supported the Queen's cause consisted of only nine, and yet Pedro's ministers were foolish enough to affront them. I will not call it either courage or boldness, for they possessed neither the one nor the other; it was nothing but downright folly, and had the peers gone in a body to the Emperor and insisted on his dismissing his ministers and sending them out of the country as men totally incapable of conducting the affairs of the nation, they would have acted right, and the Emperor must have complied, because they would have been supported both by the army and navy: but they were more moderate; they drew out a protest, and sent a deputation, consisting of the three youngest, viz. the Marquises of Loulé and Fronteira and Count Ficalho, to the palace, to deliver it to the Emperor. They acted with great spirit and told him that they had fought for their own privileges as well as for the Queen; and if

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redress was not given, they would sheath their swords and retire from the contest. The Emperor pleaded ignorance of the case, but said he would consult his ministers and reparation should be made.

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No. IX. This reparation consisted in a reply to the peers being inserted in the Chronicle; at this they were justly offended, again assembled, and drew out a second protest, which was delivered by the same peers. The Emperor declined receiving it at present, as he was on the point of setting out for the army, but promised an answer on his return.

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No. X. Taipa in the meantime took refuge on board the Asia, which was decidedly wrong; had he been arrested, the affair would have been brought to a crisis. From the Asia, he went to the Duke of Terceira's, and no further notice was taken of him.

Pedro probably became alarmed, and wished to consult Saldanha; he was accompanied only by his Brazilian aid-de-camps. On his arrival at head-quarters, he was coolly received by the troops, and Saldanha told him plainly, had he been a peer, he also would have signed the pro-

test. The Emperor was in very low spirits, saw the folly committed by his ministers, was afraid of a collision between the aristocracy and democracy, and requested Saldanha to become prime-minister and form an administration. This the marshal declined, but advised him to conciliate the peers and form a new ministry, leaving out Aguiar and Sylva Carvalho, and bringing in Palmella, Guerrero, and Liberata. Why Saldanha wished to preserve Freire and Majorchi I am at a loss to know; they were both most incapable, which he afterwards found out, while Carvalho was certainly the only minister of finance who had the talent of procuring money: he had, however, a personal antipathy to that minister, which was to be regretted. The Emperor was undecided; he saw no prospect of obtaining money except through Carvalho, and though I believe he led Saldanha to think he would follow his advice, he only did it in part; he kept his ministers and endeavoured to conciliate the peers.

On his return from the army he received the Duke of Terceira with great kindness, and the minister of interior was instructed to write to him;

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this, however, did not satisfy the peers, and indeed nothing but a change of administration could make up for the insult they had received.

The Emperor thought nothing could be done without Carvalho in the way of finance, and he would not separate himself from Freire; the rest were ciphers. As for my old gentleman Majorchi, he was quite immoveable, totally incapable of deciding upon any one question, except what his chief clerk brought before him; and any thing that I wished carried into effect was sure to be neglected, particularly as regarded the English, or indeed any point I wished attended to for the good of the service. On the other, if any complaint was made against an English officer, it was sure to be brought before me in the most indecent terms. The Chart forbid corporal punishment in both army and navy; but still it was found necessary to continue it in both services, and in the navy it was inflicted agreeably to the customs of the British service, sanctioned by the twelfth article of Sartorius's contract; and men were not allowed to be beat with sticks, as practised in the Portuguese navy.

It happened that a Portuguese seaman had deserted from the *Eliza*, and Captain Charles Napier inflicted a dozen lashes on him. The man, by some means or other not very creditable to the party, had it communicated to the minister, and exaggerated to an extraordinary degree. This was too good an opportunity to be lost; and without the least enquiry on the subject, I received a letter from the minister, to which I replied in rather severe terms, and took both letters to the Emperor, and told him I had no choice left but either to disobey the minister's orders, or run the risk of seeing a mutiny through the fleet, which the very act of the minister having written to me on the subject was enough to occasion. I also observed that he was totally unfit for his place, and also told the Emperor frankly, that I had hitherto made a rule not to interfere in any manner with politics, but things had now come to such a push that I considered it my duty to speak my opinion plainly, and that if he did not like it, I should not trouble him again. I then referred to the affair of Count de Taipa, who I did not pretend to say was either right or wrong ;

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but it had created a great sensation, and in fact there was a spirit of discontent in Lisbon ; and if he did not take care, there would be a reaction. The Emperor seemed surprised, but at the same time incredulous. I remarked I had done my duty, and that it was the last time I should speak to him on the subject. I wrote, however, a letter, more clearly stating what my sentiments were, but which by the advice of some friends was withheld ; but as that letter contains my feelings at the moment, I annex it to this

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No. VIII. history without any alteration.

After this conversation I absented myself almost entirely from the palace, and simply attended to the duties of my own office, feeling quite convinced that my opinions were neither wanted nor desired.

During the time these scenes were acting in Lisbon and Santarem, Oporto was exposed to considerable danger.

Sir Thomas Stubbs had been left with a very small effective garrison ; he was not only desired to send more troops to Lisbon, but was called upon to act himself on the offensive. He had not more than

three thousand effective men, but he had from ten to eleven thousand on paper, all fed and paid. The general embarked nine hundred men composed of volunteers and movables in the Superb steamer, who by great good-luck at that season of the year were landed safe at Nazareth. On the 31st of October he made a reconnoissance to Grijó, and towards dark was suddenly attacked by the enemy, who endeavoured to cut him off from the city, and very nearly succeeded. This affair cost him twenty men in killed and wounded.

On the 5th of November Oporto was reconnoitred on the side of St. Mamede by two thousand infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and fifty lancers; and on the 26th Sir Thomas Stubbs made a reconnoissance with two columns, one on the Cosmo road, the other on Valongo; and after driving in the enemy's piquets returned to Oporto. All this did not please the minister-at-war; he had his map before him of the forces at Oporto, and looked to their numbers and not to their efficiency; and he determined to get rid of Stubbs, who was a very old lieutenant-general, and much esteemed at Oporto; but this was not to be done

in an open manner. Letters came to Oporto addressed to old Torres, now the Baron de Pico, as governor, but without any hint to Stubbs ; and the Baron shortly after arrived, without any order to assume the command. Stubbs very properly refused to give it up, and both generals were in the habit of receiving letters addressed to them as commander-in-chief.

On the 1st of December the Miguelites again reconnoitred Oporto, and were attacked by two columns. The eleventh infantry, under Colonel Pacheco, advanced on the main road, and the volunteers moved across the open fields covered by the guns on the lines. They were charged by a few lancers and fled ; poor Pacheco was obliged to retreat, and in the retreat was killed. He had served the whole war, was an excellent officer, and sincerely regretted by the whole army.

Shortly after this, Sir Thomas Stubbs was formally relieved and created Baron of Villa Nova de Gaya. The only reason I could ever find out for thus treating so old an officer as Sir Thomas Stubbs, and one so highly respected, was his having had too much sense to obey the minister-at-war's

orders and risk Oporto. Attempts had been made to induce the Duke of Terceira to go there, which was to be an independent command, and called the army of the north ; but he very frankly told the minister he would not go without an effective force ; and when I spoke to him on the subject, he gave the same answer, and told me not to believe one word about the paper force the minister shewed me.

On the 1st of December a vessel arrived from the Cape de Verd Islands with the intelligence of their having declared for the Queen. Before the arrival of the transports sent there, several of the political prisoners arrived from thence. The revolution was brought about without bloodshed. Madeira, however, still held out, and the governor seemed determined to be faithful to his employer as long as there was the smallest prospect of saving his cause.

CHAPTER IV.

THE new year was ushered in by the news of the surprise of Marvao on the morning of the 12th of December, by a constitutional force that had been formed at St. Vicente in Spanish Estremadura, about the middle of November, without any knowledge of the government in Lisbon, by a patriotic Portuguese, José Joaquim d'Abreu by name, and other respectable Portuguese. This corps was called the patriotic legion of Alemtejo, and composed of Portuguese of all descriptions, who had emigrated, or quitted the standard of the usurper. Marvao had been for some time the rendezvous of the adherents of Don Carlos, being advantageously situated to carry on their correspondence with Spain ; and here they had collected a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. Though not a regular fortification, it was sufficiently strong, and attracted the attention of this patriotic column.

Its distance from Vicente was about ten leagues, and it is rather singular that the Spanish emigrants had chosen Marvao from whence to disturb the government of the young Queen of Spain, and the Portuguese San Vicente to disturb the government of Don Miguel.

The small force that surprised Marvao was divided into two columns, one commanded by Captain Mattheus José Rouxo de Fonseca, the other by the patriot José Joaquim d'Abreu, accompanied by other constitutional Portuguese; and after overcoming considerable difficulties and obstacles, succeeded in ascending the steep mountain on which the citadel was placed, and at day-light of the morning of the 12th of December surprised it without losing a man. A council of war was called, and Brigadier Pinto Alvares Pereira, who was released from prison, appointed governor of the province, Major José Victorino du Silveira, governor of the place.

Marvao was not regularly fortified, yet sufficiently strong to be defended against any attack except a regular siege; it was not well provisioned, but successful attacks were made on

Portalegre and Castello de Vide, and a considerable quantity of stores brought in. On the 27th the forces which had been collected round Marvao under the command of Landerset, one of the aid-de-camps of Don Miguel, were withdrawn without any ostensible reason, and the governor seized that opportunity of detaching a small force against Castello de Vide, which they surprised, and took fifty prisoners. The governor and many armed peasantry made their escape. On the 28th Pereira again marched on Castello de Vide, but the enemy having collected a force of fifty cavalry and two companies of the militia of Evora, on the road of Esucsa, he was obliged to regain Marvao by a mountain path.

The enemy returned to Portalegre, leaving Castello de Vide without a garrison; and on the 30th a convoy of provisions proceeding from that place to Portalegre, was captured and conducted into Marvao. In a short time the garrison greatly increased; many deserters came from the enemy, and also from Spain, together with a few but good officers, and several respectable families from Portalegre and Castello de Vide took refuge there.

Within the walls all were united, and as the place was well found in ammunition and now tolerably provisioned, the governor determined not only to defend it to the last extremity, but hoped to keep the enemy on the alert in the adjacent country. This was a most important acquisition to the cause of the Queen : situated in the enemy's rear, it served as a rallying point for all her partizans in that part of Portugal, who from want of a place of refuge had been prevented from rising in her favour.

At this time we had a large flotilla in the Tagus, and the command of the river as high as Salvaterra ; and I frequently urged the propriety of carrying on operations in the south to straighten the provisioning of Santarem, and also to cover the flotilla in a nearer approach to that town with a view to future operations ; but my ideas did not at all coincide with those of the marshal, who perhaps thought want of cavalry made military operations precarious in that quarter, and contemplated other movements which were now carried into execution with comparative success, but with-

out having any definitive effect in driving the enemy from Santarém.

On the 12th of January, the Duke of Terceira took command of the army and fixed his head-quarters at Cartaxo; Saldanha set out the same day for Rio Maior, to which place he had detached a force the evening before; to form a junction with the troops already stationed there and at Alcobaca, the whole consisting of between four and five thousand men. On the 13th the cavalry occupied Os Carvalhos, and the infantry Os Molianos and the adjacent villages. Lieutenant-colonel Vasconcellos, with the first regiment of the Queen's light infantry, marched the same day for Cos, and next day reached Batalho. A heavy rain which lasted forty-eight hours without interruption, had inundated the whole country; but notwithstanding those difficulties, the columns were eager to march on to Leria and attack that city before the enemy had time to escape. The difficulties of a night march were, however, so great that the marshal decided on waiting till the following day.

Lieutenant-colonel Vasconcellos was directed to march by the royal road with the third column, fifty cavalry of the tenth, and all the artillery; the second column under the command of Colonel Xavier, reinforced with the first regiment of the Queen's light infantry, and fifty horse, were appointed to attack by the road of Batalho. Saldanha put himself at the head of the cavalry commanded by General Bacon. The first column under the orders of General Schwalbach were to pass by Liz and the bridge of Cavaleiro, and from thence to Vidigal, to get into the road of Coimbra leading to Leiria. The second column was directed to attack when they heard the firing of the first, and the third, when the second began. On the morning of the 15th, when Colonel Xavier approached the city, the enemy were drawn up beyond their entrenchments to receive him; two companies of the fifth caçadores advanced and drove them back, and the moment they knew that Schwalbach had passed the bridge of Cavaleiro, they prepared to abandon the position of Castello, which, by means of a parapet mounting several

heavy guns, was connected with the place of Bispo.

From the village of Poisos, they were seen moving on the road of Coimbra. General Bacon, with two squadrons of the 10th and one squadron of lancers, advanced at a trot, and the moment he charged they were totally routed, scarcely having time to fire more than thirty or forty shots which caused some loss. The cavalry followed them a league, killed and took many prisoners. The staff-officers accompanied the cavalry, and found much delight in dyeing their swords in Miguelite blood. Such is civil war. Colonel Vasconcelles and Xavier, learning from the inhabitants that the city was evacuated, immediately entered and sent the cavalry of both columns in pursuit of the enemy, Vasconcellos occupied the castle and sent a force on the road to Figueira. Xavier and Schwalbach advanced with their columns, but too late, the cavalry having done all the work.

This affair cost the Miguelites fifteen hundred men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; our loss

was not above twenty killed, and wounded. Saldanha was well received by the inhabitants, who were chiefly in favour of the Queen,* and very properly commenced fortifications, to prevent the chances of war again throwing it into the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant-colonel Vasconcellos was left governor of the town with a garrison of fifteen hundred men; and on the 24th Saldanha arrived at Aklea da Cruz and Ourem, and before daylight of the 25th marched on Torres Novas. The ground was favourable for a surprise and a squadron of cavalry drove in the enemy's piquets without discovering the marshal's force. A little distance from the town two hundred and twenty of the Chaves cavalry and two hundred royalist volunteers of Torres Novas and Santarem were posted; the cavalry were halted till Schwalbach's column came up, and then marched on two branches into which the road divided, the enemy retiring at the same time. The quarter-master-general accompanied one squadron to the right, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Simao da Costa Pessoa, and Bacon headed the other, which advanced by the

left. Both squadrons entered the town about the same time, the infantry having already marched out, leaving forty or fifty horses in the Rosio, the rest in column on the road; they were immediately charged, and pursued for two leagues. Twice they attempted to form and were overturned, with considerable loss in killed and seventy-eight prisoners.

This advantage was gained without the loss of a man or horse on our side, with the exception of Captain José de Vasconcellos, who was a few minutes in the enemy's power and received a slight contusion. The Chaves cavalry had always been considered the right arm of Don Miguel's army, and in no one instance had any of those men come over to the Queen; and this little affair was considered of great importance, as they were expected to fight well, but they could not stand the impetuosity of Bacon, who was always at the head of his men, and in more than one instance with one or two officers rode into the middle of the enemy's cavalry. On the 26th a patrol was sent to Golegão and Pernes, who brought in a quantity of flour, cattle, mules, and

several of the Chaves cavalry, who were found wounded.

During the time these movements were going on, the enemy appeared to be asleep at Santarem. Instead of taking advantage of the absence of Saldanha at Leiria with the best troops of the army, and throwing their whole force on the Duke of Terceira, whom they had a chance of driving from his position, they remained quiet till the arrival of Saldanha's forces at Torres Novas and Pernes. They then appeared to have planned an enterprize, which, if undertaken and vigorously executed at the proper time, might have been attended with dangerous consequences to the Queen's cause.

Before daylight of the 30th they passed over a corps of infantry and cavalry at Vallada, and threatened the communication of the Duke of Terceira with Lisbon; at the same time they showed a force in front of the Ponte d'Asseca. Brigadier Nepomuceno was detached against the first corps, and on the appearance of his cavalry they hastily retired and had time to reembark under cover of the guns on the oppo-

site bank of the Tagus. At the Ponte d'Asseca their attack was confined to the firing a few shot, and showing a few troops. At three o'clock a severe cannonade was heard in the direction of Pernes, which the Duke thought was Saldanha attacking the enemy—at four Captain Jervis, Saldanha's aid-de-camp, arrived at Terceira's quarters and informed him that on the 28th the Marshal having received intelligence that the enemy was marching a large force on Pernes, he had detached the first Queen's light infantry and a battalion of the tenth to reinforce Colonel Romao, who occupied that position, and returned himself to Torres Novas. On the evening of the 29th the enemy reconnoitred Pernes in force, and by their disposition evidently showed their intention of attacking the following day: their force was supposed to amount to four thousand five hundred men. At midnight Saldanha moved his whole force from Torres Novas, and arrived at Pernes before daylight. At 8 o'clock, seeing the enemy ready, the marshal put his troops in motion on the road of Santarem.

The generals Canavaro and Bressaget, who commanded the Miguelite forces, having ordered

an attack at 10 o'clock in the morning, were not a little surprised to find their piquets cut off by the Queen's cavalry. The enemy were now under arms, and the first, seventeenth, and twentieth infantry being in squares, were surrounded by the tenth cavalry.

Colonel Pimentel, with a squadron of lancers under command of Captain Wakefield, having cut off a few of the enemy's piquets on the left, were attacked by double their number of cavalry, and for some moments the conflict was severe. The enemy were, however, obliged to give way, afraid of being intercepted by a part of the tenth cavalry, who were making for the road by which they must retire. The first company of the second battalion of caçadores were led by Captain Guerriero to some high ground near where the enemy were in square; their fire caused some unsteadiness in the seventeenth regiment, and Colonel Pessoa, with the tenth cavalry and a detachment of the eleventh, profiting by the occasion, charged and broke them; at the same time the lancers fell upon the other square, and were equally successful. This finished the

battle, and the enemy retired to Santarem, leaving in our possession one of the colours of the first regiment, and both of the seventeenth, seven hundred and ninety prisoners, including twenty one officers, and fifteen horses of the Chaves cavalry, and many dead on the field: our loss was three soldiers and eight horses killed, four officers, thirteen soldiers, and two horses wounded.

It does appear strange, on reading the despatches of the two marshals, that no communication appears to have taken place between them till after Saldanha's action, and too late for the Duke of Terceira to act. Saldanha appears to have known on the 28th of their moving a large force on Pernes; he knew also of it having been reconnoitred on the 29th, and he himself moved at midnight. All this ought to have been communicated to the Duke, which would have opened his eyes to the feints made by the enemy at Vallada and in his front; and he ought to have seized that occasion of attacking the enemy at the Ponte d'Asseca, when a great part of their force were acting on Saldanha, and were on the south of the Tagus. Had that been done, and Saldanha fol-

lowed up his victory, Santarem would have been taken, and the war ended. Whether this want of concert proceeded from jealousy or other causes, I am not prepared to say ; but it proves at all events the folly of employing two men of equal rank with independent commands so near each other. The Emperor, it is true, commanded the army, but the Emperor was not there to direct the movements of the two corps, and in his absence, if he thought it necessary to employ the Duke of Terceira, to him ought to have been given the command of both armies, being senior officer.

The Duke may be blamed, and I think he in some measure deserves censure, after having driven the Miguelites across the Tagus, and seeing the small force they showed at Ponte d'Asseca, for not attacking the moment he heard the firing, as he ought to have judged that their false attack upon him was only to cover their real attack on Saldanha.

The Emperor, on hearing of these movements, joined the army on the 31st. His health had been indifferent, and he was obliged to keep his bed a day at Cartaxo from an attack in the chest and

spitting blood. On the 1st of February Saldanha arrived, and his division occupied the same position they did before going to Leiria. He now took upon himself the command of the army. Terceira returned to Lisbon, and Sir Thomas Stubbs took command of his division. Saldanha expressed himself to me much dissatisfied at being ordered back to Cartaxo; his wish was to have gone on to Coimbra, and from thence to Oporto. Whether it was the marshal or the minister of war, or both, who planned the expedition to Leiria, I have never been informed; but taking it in a military sense, it appears to have been a bad movement, and had the enemy profited by the absence of Saldanha, it might have been attended with fatal consequences to the Queen's cause. It is true we gained more territory and destroyed about fifteen hundred of the enemy, but we left a like number at Leiria; and when Saldanha re-occupied his positions, the two armies in point of numbers were pretty nearly on the same footing.

Had he remained at Torres Novas and Gallegao, his operations would have more closely shut the enemy up at Santarem, and I should have been

enabled to have established a flotilla on the upper part of the river; but he was not strong enough to do so, or even prevent a reinforcement from arriving from the north, who joined the army at Santarem about this time. The project of marching on Oporto could not have succeeded; he must either have kept a strong garrison in Coimbra, or exposed the town to be again occupied by the Miguelites; besides it is not certain that he could have obtained possession of Coimbra: he had the Mondego to pass, which had been swollen by the heavy rains, and at that season it was impossible to calculate on effecting a landing at Figueiras, and affording a naval cooperation; and even had he succeeded in getting possession of Coimbra, from thence to Oporto was a long march, and several rivers, particularly the Vouga, to cross, all of which would or ought to have been disputed by an active enemy. But suppose he had overcome all those difficulties, and formed a junction with the garrison of Oporto, the enemy would have retired on Braga, and if hard pressed crossed the Lima, having Vianna, Caminho and

Valenca in their rear, a strong country to defend themselves, and the richest province in Portugal to maintain them.

Considering all these circumstances, I have no hesitation in pronouncing the expedition to Leiria as altogether dangerous, and the object obtained not at all to be compared with the risk that was incurred. We have seen that the enemy could cross over at Vallada, and as the river or canal leading to Cartaxo was always full of boats, a bridge might have been made of them, and they would have got into the rear of the army and pushed on to Lisbon without difficulty; or a still safer and more enterprising road was open to them by collecting the whole of the boats in the river, either at Santarem or in the creek of Benevento. They might there have embarked the greater part of their army, leaving a garrison in the town of Santarem, and taking advantage of the first fresh and fair wind, run down the Tagus, and landed in Black-Horse-square, (taking care to occupy the roads leading from Lisbon,) seized the Queen, sent for the patriarch, and married her forthwith to Don Miguel, making the Empe-

ror and Empress witnesses, declared a general amnesty, fired lots of salutes during the day, illuminated Lisbon for three nights, and either kept the constitution or thrown it overboard, as was most suitable to their disposition and the will of the people. Had Don Miguel or those about him possessed courage enough to have executed such a plan, he would have deserved both crown and Queen, and obtained a reputation that would have insured him forgiveness for all his former sins. This is no after-thought ; it was my opinion at the time, and I often gave it as a reason for occupying the south of the Tagus.

I again pressed this measure on Saldanha, which he proposed to the Emperor ; and it was finally decided that a force of three thousand men, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, should be crossed over under the command of the Duke of T rceira, as soon as they could be prepared. The Emperor got better, and on the 2nd of February returned to Lisbon, and preparations were made to reinforce the flotilla with a sufficient number of boats to pass over the force required.

CHAPTER V.

ON the 14th of February, Lord Howard de Walden arrived at Lisbon as minister in lieu of Lord William Russell, who was appointed to the mission at Wirtemberg. Lord Howard was a disciple of Mr. Canning's, and had been a good deal employed in the Foreign Office. His last appointment was at the court of Sweden. It was naturally to be expected on the arrival of a new minister from England, some attempt would be made by him to bring things to a close. Lord Howard began by pressing a general amnesty, and to allow any Miguelites who desired to leave the country, to embark in a British ship of war. This was approved by the Duke of Terceira and Freire, but objected to by the Emperor; he, however,

consented to General Macdonell, who had now resigned and been replaced first by Povoas, and finally by Lomes, to embark on pledging his honour not to serve again in the Peninsula, and not to remain in the Tagus or hold communication with any of the Miguelites in Lisbon. This he refused. When the amnesty was proposed, Freire consented to it, but on condition if the government became unpopular in consequence, England would support them with six thousand men. The property of all those who accepted it would then be restored.

There was little use stipulating for such terms, because the English government would not accede to it, nor could even the moderate Miguelites themselves ostensibly accept it without running the risk of having the whole of their country property destroyed. The feeling for Don Miguel was gone, but they were all too much compromised, and the priests kept up the disposition for absolutism; in fact they were constantly proclaiming religion as the rule of their conduct, while they outraged all its precepts. Pedro's ministers talked as much of liberty, and all their

acts were despotic ; both parties hated each other cordially, and whoever became master would be sure to tyrannise over the other. Spain at the same time shewed a disposition to send troops into Portugal to drive out Carlos, and had actually twice crossed the frontier for that purpose ; and it was apprehended she might not be satisfied with that measure and crushing Miguel, but would probably wish to interfere with Pedro's government, while the Portuguese democratic party in return would appeal to the republicans in Spain to assist them, and anarchy and confusion would in consequence spread from one end of the Peninsula to the other.

Since Saldanha's recal from Leria, he became still more dissatisfied with the ministers ; he always disliked Carvalho, and now Freire became odious to him. He requested permission to come to Lisbon under the pretence of settling his affairs, but in reality to endeavour to bring about a change of ministry, in which all proper thinking men agreed with him ; and I believe even the Emperor himself, but he saw no prospect of replacing Carvalho, who always managed to procure funds ;

indeed, he was the only minister good for any thing amongst them, and the Emperor justly dreaded, if he was displaced, the army would be unpaid and the cause endangered. Saldanha was refused leave, and indeed the Emperor wrote to him and begged he would not quit the army at this critical period. These disagreements retarded, and the movements of the enemy put a stop to the expedition to the south.

When Don Miguel became acquainted with the dissensions in Lisbon caused by the folly of the ministers affronting the peers, and the disagreements between Saldanha and the government, he issued out a general amnesty, forgiving all political offences. How much he must have been led astray by those about him to suppose for one moment that it could have the least effect on the supporters of the Queen, who, though disgusted with Don Pedro's ministers, never once thought of turning their views to Miguel. This proclamation he followed up by detaching a force on the left bank of the Tagus in front of Lisbon. The force consisted of two thousand infantry, two squadrons of

cavalry, and four pieces of artillery ; they quitted Vendas Novas on the 5th of February, and marched on Aldea Gallego, which they occupied together with the village of Alcuete and Moita. This demonstration had no other effect than proving the incapacity of the minister at war, who with an army at least equal in number to the Miguelites, and much better disciplined, permitted them to beard Lisbon without any other molestation than a brig of war, which I despatched to Aldea Gallego, occasionally firing at them with little effect. The Miguelite minister, equally as incapable as his brother officer Freire, after allowing the troops to take a view of Lisbon, instead of marching them on Setuval, supported by Louis de Bourmont from Alcacer do Sal, ordered Lemos back to Santarem, and Bourmont to Alcacer, having plundered the country of all the provisions they could lay their hands on.

A considerable body of troops had been withdrawn from the lines to Cartaxo shortly after Saldanha's return from Leiria, preparatory to the projected expedition, of which the Miguelites were aware ; and Count D'Almer having arrived

at Santarem with a division from the north, General Lemos determined on attacking the marshal, and making a bold effort to drive him back to Lisbon. At six o'clock of the morning on the 18th of February a fire was opened from four pieces of artillery, and an obus on the picquets in front of the bridge of Cellerio; the artillery was supported by a force of one thousand infantry and two small squadrons of cavalry. An hour after this a fire from eight guns and an obus was opened from the redoubt at the foot of the Ponte d'Asseca, where was assembled a division of from two thousand to two thousand five hundred men and a strong squadron of cavalry; at the same time four strong columns of infantry and five hundred horse passed the bridge of Calharris, and marched in the direction of Villa Nova de Outeiro and the small village of Santa Maria, making a long circuit round our extreme left. At the first fire of the Miguelites the picquets were reinforced, and preparations made for battle.

From the moment the movements of the enemy were observed, it was evident their main attack would take place on the left; and the first, third,

and sixth regiments marched by Atalaia, and the battalions, second and twelfth, by the left to Casal do Paul, on the right of Almoſter, holding themſelves in readineſs to fall with all their force on the enemy as they approached, and at once overturn them. Two pieces of artillery were placed at Outeiro D'Almedelim, which commanded the bridge of Celleiro; and leaving a ſufficient quantity of artillery to ſweep the Ponte d'Asſeca in the event of the enemy attempting to force it, the remainder of the guns and all the Congreve rockets were directed on Casal do Paul. At eleven o'clock the enemy's columns were ſeen marching on the table-land oppoſite Almoſter. Schwalbach commanded the column which defended this diſtrict, and exchanged a few ſhot with the enemy as they advanced.

The Miguelite cavalry and ſeventh corps of infantry having ſhewn their intention of paſſing to the left of Almoſter, the firſt, third, and ſixth of the line, with the ſecond and twelfth caçadores, advanced by the hills on our ſide, accompanied by a brigade of artillery. Bacon with the eleventh cavalry, the Queen's lancers, and a detachment

of the tenth, followed in a parallel line the movements of the Miguelite cavalry, with orders to charge the moment the nature of the ground permitted an attack.

At noon great demonstrations of joy were observed in the Miguelite army, and loud vivas given for Don Miguel; it was afterwards ascertained that this was occasioned by the Miguelite general reading the order of the day, which promised a great victory and a victorious march on the capital. They were to be at Villa Franca on the 19th, and Lisbon on the 22d, and all this might have been accomplished had they chosen the proper way of going about it.

Appendix,
No. XIV.

These shouts were heard with derision by the Queen's troops, and they tranquilly waited the orders of their officers to again conduct them to victory.

Here, then, we have the Queen's army and Don Miguel's fairly out of their respective lines, both equally devoted to the cause they served, numbers nearly equal, and all ready for fight; one party trying to get to Lisbon, and the other to Santarem, and yet neither one or the other

accomplished their object. I don't understand these shore-fights ; they last a long while, a great deal of noise on both sides, and when both parties are tired, they finish without any result ; but to return to my subject.

At three o'clock, the enemy's columns having crowned the heights above the bridge of Santa Maria between Villa Nova and Alforgemel, to the left of Almoester, they opened a lively fire from their tirailleurs, throwing at the same time many balls from eight pieces of artillery and an obus ; the Queen's troops, however, stood firm. The marshal knew by his spies that every means had been used by the Miguelite generals to encourage their men ; they had been assured that a new squadron would shortly arrive before Lisbon ; and that the moment the Queen's troops were attacked they would retire on the capital. Lemos had chosen the best soldiers he had, at Santarem, had united the force from the Alemtejo, and Rebocho had arrived with reinforcements from Oporto and Coimbra, and he appeared determined to signalise his having taken command of the army, by a daring attack and great victory. Sal-

danha was equally anxious to bring the approaching battle to something decisive, and allowed the enemy to approach his position without interruption, intending to cut them off if possible from the Ponte de Santa Maria.

At half-past four o'clock, the enemy, about three thousand five hundred strong, formed their columns and deployed one regiment, throwing out an immense number of light troops in the plain below. Colonel Quieroz, with the second and twelfth caçadores, formed in line, and advanced on the enemy's flank, directing on the bridge two companies to cut them off. At the same time General Brito, placing himself at the head of the sixth infantry in line, and the third in column, attacked their front ; the first regiment remained in reserve, formed in line half musket-shot from the enemy, exposed to a heavy fire, which the Miguelites continued with great activity, till being charged by the Queen's troops, they turned and fled with the greatest precipitation to the bridge. The carnage there was dreadful, and the reflection that Portuguese were butchering Portuguese was horrible. The enemy made little resistance, but did

not surrender and were slaughtered without mercy. Saldanha in his official letter observed that, except at the breach of St. Sebastian, he had never before seen such a scene, and very seldom so heavy a fire, up to the moment the enemy fled ; it must have, however, been very ill directed, as the loss of the Queen's troops was trifling.

In a few moments the heights of Villa Nova, which the enemy had occupied with their artillery, were crowned. Nevertheless Lemos, confiding in his cavalry, ordered them to charge the Queen's troops. Bacon, who was on the left, seeing their danger, came galloping to their assistance with eighty horse, charged with his usual impetuosity, and overthrew them with great loss, leaving only seven horses on the field. It was now nearly dark ; Saldanha halted, and the enemy retired on Santarem.*

During the attack on Saldanha's left, the enemy were prepared at all points in the event of success

* It was reported that one of the Queen's officers, seeing the cavalry approach, called out "turn by three's," which they mistook for one of their own officers and obeyed.

to push on boldly. At the time the Miguelites attacked the left, a strong column was posted in the plain in front of Almoster, disposed in two divisions, to attack by that bridge and Quinta de Moira; they were repulsed at both points, by three companies of the ninth infantry, and two of the British grenadiers, who bravely drove them to the heights of Valla.

To the left of the convent at this place, the Queen's light infantry regiment kept up a lively fire of musketry and artillery, and the Quinta de Moira was defended by three companies of the tenth caçadores, who behaved with great courage. At the bridge of Cellerio the troops stationed there, supported by those who were posted at the Ponte d'Asseca at the beginning of the day, consisting of two regiments of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, put themselves in motion in the direction of Almedelim; they were attacked and driven back with much loss by the second column, commanded by José Pedro Celestino Soares, reinforced first by the fourth infantry, and ultimately by a company of the fifth caçadores and one of the fifteenth of the line. During the

rest of the day the enemy kept up a sharp fire from the tirailleurs on the positions we occupied near the bridge and mountain, defended by the sixth national battalion, two companies of the fifteenth, and the bridge by fifty of the fifteenth and a company of the fourth of the line.

On the right of the bridge the enemy kept up a sharp fire from their tirailleurs, supported by a fire in ambushade in the olive grounds of Lezirao.

At noon the enemy's force in the neighbourhood of the Ponte d'Asseca occupying the heights to the right, detached four hundred tirailleurs in front, who opened a fire on General Brito da Franca, commanding the column that defended that position, and as they seemed desirous to attempt a passage by Valla, to give support to their sharp-shooters, it was necessary to extend, as light infantry, almost the whole of the thirteenth of the line, and a company of Scotch fusileers, stationed on that point, and they were afterwards supported by the fifth national battalion. In fact the dispositions of the enemy were excellent, and they neglected no manœuvre to

distract our troops, employing the whole force they had in Santarem. Their forces in the south menaced Azambuja, approaching the margin of the river with two pieces of artillery and a hundred infantry; but on being fired at by the picquets and gun-boats they retired on Salvaterra.

During the whole of this affair the artillery kept up an excellent fire at the various points they were stationed, and behaved with great courage and activity.

The small number of cavalry engaged, consisting of only half a squadron of the eleventh, half a squadron of the Queen's lancers, and a few soldiers of the tenth, though opposed by triple their number on the heights of Villa Nova, drove the enemy with considerable loss; the rest of the cavalry were to the right and not engaged.

The marshal observed in his despatch that in his long military career he had never seen more courage displayed or more sang-froid than in this battle; all behaved well and deserved praise. The enemy must also have conducted themselves not only with bravery, but also with considerable talent, for although defeated, they only left two

hundred and thirty prisoners in our hands, the greater part of whom were wounded. Our loss was three hundred and five killed and wounded, and three hundred and seventy-two missing.

The battle ended without any advantage to the cause on either side, except proving to Don Miguel's forces that they were not competent to drive the Queen's troops from their positions, far less to arrive at Lisbon, as had been promised to them by their general. It also put a stop to the projected expedition to the south, which was no more thought of, and both armies took up their former positions, and reposed from their labours. It was reported, and at one time believed, that a Spanish regiment in the service of Don Carlos was engaged in this action, but, on every enquiry being made, it appeared incorrect; there were a few Spaniards present, but nothing in the shape of a regular force.

CHAPTER VI.

ON the 28th of February, Lord Howard proposed to Freire, that in the event of an opportunity offering for mediation, the terms should be left to England, France, and Sweden, as he was satisfied the opposite party had no confidence either in Don Pedro or his government. This observation was received with great indignation by Freire. With respect to the Emperor, he was wrong, for he was decidedly a man of his word. As to Freire I know from experience no reliance could be placed in him, and the Miguelites knew him well, as did every officer, native and foreign, in the whole army. I cannot speak so positively of the other ministers, but it is certain they had given no reason by their actions to sup-

pose the Miguelites could put any confidence in them. The French minister consented to arbitrate in conjunction with Lord Howard, who sub-

mitted a project of a convention.

Appendix,
No. XV.

On the 8th, Lord Howard was presented at court, and made a speech to the Queen. I am not much acquainted with diplomatic etiquette, but it appeared to me, as the Queen was a minor and Pedro regent, that he ought to have addressed the Emperor and not the Queen; and I am inclined to think Don Pedro felt it. He was not well disposed to Lord Howard, having an idea that he was instructed to get rid of both him and his ministers, and oppose the Queen's marriage; this interview did not at all tend to do away these suspicions.

On the 11th of March a communication was made from Santarem, that General Lemos, Count San Lorenzo, and General Munich were disposed to treat on the basis that England should guarantee the treaty, and that Palmella should be minister. A hint was also given that £20,000 or £30,000 could be advantageously employed. This communication must have come from some unau-

thorized person, for in no one instance, even to the last, was there the smallest disposition on the part of any of Miguel's friends to betray him ; and about the same time this communication was made, General Lemos had proposed to treat on the basis of Miguel's marrying the Queen, which was of course rejected.

On the 19th of March a despatch was received from Mr. Villars, notifying that Spain would send troops into Portugal if required, that Mr. Sarmentos's arrival at Madrid was agreeable to the government, and the recognition of the Queen of Portugal was only delayed, least the pope should refuse to acknowledge the Queen of Spain. This Lord Howard communicated to Don Pedro, who was very much elated, till he told him that they should not pass the frontier till proper terms were offered to Don Miguel. This was decidedly wrong. Proper terms had been offered on condition he would quit Portugal, and the Emperor very properly refused to treat on any other basis. He, however, had no objection to Lord Howard making proposals, which he did in writing to Freire. This minister, I think, pro-

perly declined giving an answer till he had received Sarmentos's despatch, and equally improperly proposed a military convention should be entered into with Spain before she passed the frontier. This was losing time. Spanish intervention ought to have been accepted without any terms, as Great Britain was at hand to see she did not play foul.

On the 21st a decree was issued, depriving Don Miguel of his rank and titles of Infant, and declaring the Infántado national property. At this Lord Howard took fire, as he conceived it would render useless any further proposals he should make to Don Miguel's government, and he at once accused the ministers of wishing to prolong the war. This accusation, I think, was just, as they neither shewed by their actions or military plans that they had any desire to finish it. They were much more taken up with what they called reforms, and issuing out decrees, than in military matters, being pretty well convinced that the war once concluded, their power ceased. The depriving Miguel of his titles and property was however correct, and ought to have been done long before instead of confiscating that of his

followers; he was the head offender, the punishment should have begun with him, and been followed up by the confiscation of one or two of his principal advisers, leaving a loop-hole for the inferior culprits to escape by.

In answer to Lord Howard's project of conven- Appendix,
No. XVI. tion, Freire proposed a counter project, which Lord Howard disapproved of. He, however, took his project to Cartaxo, Palmella and Terceira being of opinion he might, in concert with Saldanha, make some alterations without departing from the spirit of the amnesty, and the government would be obliged to accede to it. The alterations Lord Howard contemplated were leaving out the offensive expressions against Miguel, calling him usurper, and excepting him from the amnesty, making the article concerning civil and ecclesiastical appointments more explicit, doing something for the military, and qualifying the engagement of Don Miguel not to return to Portugal without permission of government. The latter stipulation was quite absurd, because, whether he was banished for

a time or for perpetuity, the Cortes would, on meeting, have the power of altering as they pleased.

On Lord Howard's arrival at Cartaxo, he wrote confidentially to the Count San Lorenzo, who declined any other than a public correspondence. Lord Howard in consequence sent his proposals officially.

Mr. Grant was the bearer of them ; he was well received by General Lemos, who proposed to meet Lord Howard, which was accepted.

They met on the Ponted'Asseca, halfway between the outposts. Saldanha and Lemos also met, and shook hands ; the former entreated him to put full confidence in Lord Howard. Admiral Parker and Captains Richards and Fanshaw were of the party ; and after exchanging compliments, they withdrew, leaving the minister and Lemos to settle the affairs of the nation between them.

After a good deal of discussion the Miguelite General gave him to understand that if the basis of Don Miguel's removal from Portugal was insisted on, he could hold out no hope of reconciliation ; and

that he would not desert his king, and the same feeling pervaded all his party. He also alluded to their improved resources, and the expectation of a squadron, and a more moderate ministry being appointed by Don Miguel. Lord Howard at once stopped him by observing that any change was now too late. The Duke of Wellington was no longer prime minister of England, Charles Xth no longer king of France, or Ferdinand of Spain; and even if Miguel was successful, these powers were determined not to acknowledge him; he also observed that a squadron was out of the question, and even if they had one, they had no ports. Admiral Napier had surprised Caminho, and taken Vianna, and as they would not be received in Spain, their cause was desperate. Spanish troops were about to enter Portugal, and such terms would never again be offered. This was the first intelligence he had received of the operations in the north.* He was much startled, nevertheless he said he was prepared for the worst, and never would desert his king. Lord Howard remarked there was nothing dishonourable in submitting to the chances of war; they had already

done all they could for Don Miguel, and he ought to think of them. Both Napoleon and Pedro had abdicated when necessary, and Miguel ought to do the same. He then delivered a letter to San Lorenzo, with the modified proposals, and returned to Lisbon. A few days after he received an answer from San Lorenzo, rejecting the terms.

Certainly Lord Howard had done his best, and was right in doing so, but his failure was a triumph to Pedro, who was not sorry they were rejected. His great desire was to see the Miguelites lay down their arms without conditions, and trust to his generosity. This would be gratifying to his vanity, and give him an opportunity of shewing he was merciful as well as just, and the sequel will show he was right.

CHAPTER VII.

It is now time to take a view of the military operations in the south and north, the latter of which led to the successful termination of the contest.

In the Algarves things remained pretty nearly in the same state. The guerillas surrounded Lagos and Faro, and harassed them with repeated attacks, but without success. They were little thought of at Lisbon, and were often reduced to the greatest distress for provisions. The governor of Faro shewed little activity, and contented himself with acting on the defensive.

I have already shewn that after the Duke of Terceira quitted the south, and marched on Lisbon, guerilla parties spread themselves all over the country, Mertola, Castro Marim, and Tavira ;

and indeed all the other towns had fallen into their hands, with the exception of Faro and Lagos. The French regiment had not conducted themselves well, and were in consequence very unpopular with the inhabitants ; and this may in some measure account for the guerillas increasing to the extent they did. Had that regiment been kept in constant motion, supported by moveable battalions, which ought immediately to have been formed, the line of the Guadiana would not have been lost ; that was the origin of the mischief which afterwards befel that unfortunate kingdom.

Lagos had been twice saved by the marines, but no active operations had been undertaken to any extent ; and when I went there, the weather was too bad to land more than two hundred men. The Emperor at last decided on sending the Baron da Sa to the south ; he had been kept lounging about the palace for many months in idleness though he was a brave and active officer, but it did not suit the government to employ him. Colonel Loreiros, for the same reason, remained at Lisbon ; he was on the Duke of Terceira's

staff, and was only employed with him ; he was too honest a man to be a favourite with the ministry.

On the 19th of February the Baron de Sa left Lisbon: he had pressed me very hard to lend him a few marines in addition to those already in the Algarves ; but I had so much reduced my own disposable force in succouring that kingdom, that it was quite impossible to accede to his wishes without cramping my own operations, and he was equally unsuccessful with the Emperor and the minister-at-war. The baron, nevertheless, obeyed his orders, and he soon shewed what could be accomplished by an ardent mind. He arrived at Lagos on the 20th, embarked a part of the garrison, and on the 21st took the military command of the kingdom at Faro.

The baron was determined the grass should not grow under his feet, and on the 22d he sallied out with a small column, and attacked the enemy at St. Bartholomew de Pexão, one league from Faro, drove them from their position, killing between forty and fifty, and making a few prisoners. His loss was five killed and ten wounded ;

amongst the former was Pedro Antonio Lobo, a cornet of cavalry, a brave and distinguished officer. The enemy retired and were followed to the heights of Boa Vista, a strong position, and where they had a permanent camp; but seeing the determination of the baron, they abandoned their station, which was occupied for the night by the Queen's troops, who were regaled with the provisions the enemy had provided for themselves. On the 23d he marched on Aldea de Moncarapacho, where the enemy left three field-pieces, an obus, some provisions and horses; he pushed on boldly and entered Tavira, with the cavalry at a gallop, and made some prisoners. This was the head-quarters of the Miguelite General Bandedeira. In this town they were well received and found a considerable quantity of powder, military stores, a cahique of war, and a gun-boat, with six thousand rations. Here he published a proclamation. On the 24th he marched on Castro Marim, dispersing a small force at Villa Real, and on the same day a flotilla entered the Guadiana. On the 25th he halted and placed a garrison in

Appendix,
No. XVth.

Castro Marim, a military post of great importance, which, assisted by the flotilla, commanded the navigation of the Guadiana. This place had been before protected by an eighteen-gun brig and a flotilla, and ought never to have been abandoned. On the 26th the baron marched, and entered the mountains, following the footsteps of the enemy through roads almost impassable; and in the evening encamped at Altamora. On the 27th he reached Martinlongo, and though only four leagues distant, such was the badness of the roads that they were twelve hours on the march. Having learnt that General Bandeira had quitted the road of Almodovar, on which he was marching, and arrived at Aldea de Cachopo, situated between Martinlongo and Sao Braz, the baron marched on the 28th on that village. Bandeira, hearing of his approach, retreated into the Alemtejo.

At daylight on the 1st of March the baron was again in motion for Sao Braz, and at ten o'clock he observed a force of from eight to nine hundred men, commanded by Camacho, posted on the heights of the Serra d'Alportel; and as he ad-

vanced, they threw out a numerous body of light troops, who commenced firing at a great distance. They were immediately attacked by a company of the first battalion of the Queen's light infantry, followed by a column, while the volunteers of Olhao advanced on the enemy's right. In ten minutes the action was over, the enemy flying in disorder to the highest mountains. They lost between twenty and thirty men, and twenty prisoners, chiefly peasants, who were sent to their homes. This had a good effect on the people. Two hours after the defeat of the first guerilla party, the gucrillas of Ramochino were met in the Serra do Farrobo, who also fled at the first fire. On the 2d of March he marched on Loulé after the guerillas of Lagos, commanded by Remechido, a man of singular ferocity. They were posted on the heights, and appeared determined to defend the town, but were attacked and dispersed amongst the mountains, leaving twenty dead on the field. The baron had two men killed and six wounded.

After this skirmish he returned to Faro. The

activity of Baron de Sa shews what ought to have been done ; and I have no doubt, had he been left in the Algarves after the advance of the duke, they never would have been disturbed, and much life and property would have been saved.

During the absence of this expedition Faro had been attacked on the 23d and 27th, and the enemy were as usual repulsed. The military governor, Lieutenant Colonel Luna, deserved great praise for the activity with which the works for the defence of the town were constructed. The Baron de Faro, the former governor of the Algarves, had continued in the government at the request of de Sa during his absence, and conducted the defence of the place much to his satisfaction.

A Belgian battalion had arrived at Lisbon, certainly the best organized foreign troops that had as yet arrived in Portugal. One half of the regiment had been very improperly landed at Oporto on the 3d of February, and the other half proceeded to the Tagus, and it was not before the 16th they were united at Lisbon. They were

in the first instance ordered to Santarem, but their destination was afterwards changed for Faro, where they arrived on the 4th of March. This was a good reinforcement for De Sa, and after allowing them a few days of rest, he put them in march for Sao Bras, where the enemy had again appeared in force. They were strongly posted on the heights, and as the baron approached, a company of the Belgian battalion, under the command of Colonel Le Charlier, marched on their right, another company, with the volunteers of Beja and Faro, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Goes, on the left. De Sa, heading the other six companies formed in column, supported by the cavalry, attacked in front.

The enemy opened a heavy fire and maintained their position until the bayonets approached ; they then fled from mountain to mountain with such rapidity that there was no coming up with them ; indeed nothing short of a hound could compete with an Algarve guerilla. The enemy lost a good many men in this attack ; our loss was two killed and seven wounded. Next day they again col-

lected in force in a strong position near St. Bras, and drew up in line, were again attacked and again fled, but were soon lost sight of by the infantry. The cavalry, however, killed upwards of seventy and took fifteen prisoners, much baggage, and a few horses.

On the 12th a company was detached to Tavira, who drove out the guerillas, who had again taken up their quarters in that town. On the 13th the division bivouacked on the Sierra de Penafines, and on the 14th at Alte. Here two men were shot for having endeavoured to excite a revolt amongst the troops. This severe example checked any further disposition to insubordination. After the execution the troops were marched on Ribeira de Merinho, where they halted for the night.

At daylight of the 15th the baron marched on Bartholomew de Messines. This was the rendezvous of Remechido, and the head quarters of the guerillas; they had arrived two hours before, and in their retreat two men were captured, who gave information that the whole of the Algarve guerillas had received orders to rendezvous at the

gorge of Val Fortes. Thither the baron proceeded in hopes of surprising them ; few only were captured, the rendezvous having been changed in consequence of the baron's movements. On the 16th the divisions marched on Almedovar, a town on the frontier of the province of the Alemtejo. The weather had set in bad, and the troops were much harassed ; nevertheless he continued his march in the night, and defiled through the intricate pass of Val de Matta. Here were stationed a small party of guerillas on the mountains that hung over the defile. After firing a few shot, they retired, and the troops halted at Respingadour.

On the 17th they were again in march, and after passing through the mountains of the Algarves arrived at half-past two at Almedovar.

Thus in eight days were two or three thousand guerillas and royalist volunteers beaten and dispersed by about one thousand men, including forty lancers, and the Algarves pretty nearly cleared of the most ferocious band of robbers and murderers that ever disgraced a war. Remechido and his followers, in their depredations, were not over nice who they attacked ; it mattered little to

them whether they were Miguelites-or Pedroites ; his object was plunder. Miguel's cause was a secondary consideration, but a good excuse for every species of atrocity.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE news of these reverses on the Algarves decided Don Miguel to send reinforcements to the south, and they were entrusted to Brigadier Louis de Bourmont, one of the most active officers Miguel had. Saldanha was aware of their intentions, and had urgently requested Freire to reinforce De Sa; but as usual that minister was much too incapable to look upon things *en grande* and concert measures (which the advantage of steam-boats made easy) to frustrate the foresight of the enemy.

I had long urged the Emperor and minister-at-war to permit me to withdraw the marines who formed part of the garrison of Setúbal, in order that I might be ready, on the first appearance of

fine weather, to seize the sea-ports still in possession of the Miguelites, and keep the war alive ; and I now became more pressing, as all prospect of any future operation being carried on south of the Tagus was at an end. I at last gained a reluctant consent—I say reluctant, for at this time I really believe neither the Emperor or ministers had the least wish to put an end to the war ; they were more occupied with hasty reforms and issuing out decrees than planning campaigns ; and although the minister-at-war in his Relatorio would have the world believe that what I am now about to describe was brought about by the most beautiful combinations, I have no hesitation in saying that the whole was chance, and indeed against the minister's wish ; and that the Emperor was quite right when he said the Baron de Sa and myself were making war on our own accounts, and that he had nothing to do with us.

The minister-at-war says that the Emperor, to cover his intentions in the north, appeared to be occupied with the south, and that the Baron de Sa was sent to the Algarves as governor on the

19th of February with orders to act on the offensive; and that a column of fifteen hundred men was formed at Setuval. Now the Baron de Sa went to the Algarves a few days after the battle of Almoester, and was ordered there at the time preparations were making to occupy the south bank of the Tagus, and which expedition was given up after the attack on Saldanha; but the Baron de Sa did not take with him a single soldier, and it was his own singular activity that enabled him to act as he did. The fifteen hundred men were placed in St. Ubes purely for its defence, and had been gradually increased since the affair of Alcacer do Sal; and with the exception of making a sally out under Colonel Calce de Pina, who was wounded, did no good whatever; and I will show in its proper place, while the Baron de Sa and myself were surprising and conquering on the north and south, Setuval was surprised and nearly taken by the Miguelites.

I sailed for that port on the 16th of March with about one hundred and twenty English marines, and thirty or forty seamen, in the City of Edinburgh steamer, with the intention of embarking

the Portuguese marines there, and attacking Figuciras. This much the Emperor and minister-at-war knew, and directions were given to the governor of Leiria to assist my operations. It was given out and generally believed I was going to the south to assist the Baron de Sa. On the 17th I arrived at Setuval, and the weather not appearing settled, I asked permission by secret telegraph to surprise Alcacer do Sal. The garrison there was weak; it might easily have been done; and it was an important position. The answer I received was, "That it is his imperial Majesty's orders that the admiral returns immediately to Lisbon in the City of Edinburgh." I waited till nearly dusk and replied, "My return will have a bad effect—I shall proceed to my destination." All this may appear very wrong, and no doubt was, but I have before said, this war was unlike all others. So much intriguing and vacillation constantly at work, it was necessary for officers to take much on themselves, or give it up altogether. I therefore decided on not returning to Lisbon till I had struck a blow somewhere.

I left the Baron de Sa, after clearing the Algarves, at Almodovar, preparing to advance into the Alemtejo on the 17th, the very day I was at Setuval, and had prepared to advance on Alcacer. It is very evident, had I been allowed to proceed, reinforcements would not have been sent to the south, and the disaster the baron met with would have been avoided. I was not aware where he was, but I knew he would not be idle, and it was the duty of the minister to have established secret communications with the Algarves, which in civil war is always easy. We shall now see Freire's combinations, of which he boasts in his Relatorio.

On the 19th Colonel Lècharlier was detached to Mertola with half of De Sa's division, having orders to surprise that post, which was garrisoned by a considerable band of guerillas and a battalion of royalist volunteers. The baron with the other half covered the Algarves, least the guerillas should attempt another irruption. The distance from Almodovar to Mertola was seven long leagues, which the troops marched in one day; but the enemy having notice of their approach, had decamped at noon, taking the route of

Beja. On the 21st De Sa joined, and on the 22d the whole marched on that town, and arrived on the 23d. It was also abandoned, and Count Louis de Bourmont had thrown himself into Serpa on the opposite side of the Guadiana.

Beja was a constitutional city, and although they had already suffered severely for having espoused the cause of the Queen after the landing of the Duke of Terceira in the Algarves, their feeling for freedom was in no way cooled, and the troops were received by both sexes with the greatest enthusiasm. Here then was the Baron de Sa and his small division in the heart and capital of the Alemtejo, totally unsupported. It was a bold undertaking, and deserved a better finish than it met with. On the 24th he was in march for Serpa, and crossed the Guadiana on three points without opposition. One of the enemy's videttes fell into his hands, and from him he learned that Bourmont had evacuated Serpa, leaving a garrison in the fort, with orders to defend it to the last extremity, to give time for the arrival of expected reinforcements.

On the approach to Serpa the advanced guard were met by a part of the garrison outside the town; they were instantly attacked and driven into the citadel. Two companies, under the command of Captains Bergé and Poutrain, were ordered to advance without firing, and endeavour to force the gates. The walls were nearly forty feet high, and well lined with troops, who opened a heavy fire as they advanced. They, however, persevered, covered by the rest of the division, but found it quite impossible to force the gates. Both parties abused each other, and the vivas for Donna Maria and Don Miguel, shouted by either party, were heard amongst the noise and confusion occasioned by the heavy discharge of musketry. Stones were thrown down from every part of the ramparts on the assailants, and many men were knocked down by them, as well as killed by musketry. All efforts to force the gates were unavailing, and the gallant troops were ordered to withdraw. One officer was killed, seven wounded, and a considerable number of men. At half past eleven the division retired, recrossed the Guadiana at one in the morning, and arrived next day at Beja

at two o'clock. The advanced guard, who were ignorant of the retreat, did not arrive till seven in the evening, and though they passed close to the fortress of Serpa, they were undisturbed by the garrison.

On the evening of the 25th a Miguelite courier was intercepted carrying despatches to General Bourmont, announcing the approach of two columns to Beja, one from Alcacer do Sal, and the other from Evora.

The capture of the courier gave De Sa time to make arrangements for retreat, and at one in the morning of the 26th he was in full march for Mertola, leaving Beja again to the tender mercies of the Miguelites. He arrived there on the 27th, and at daylight of the 31st he retired on the Algarves. The guerillas, having collected a large force, were marching on Loulé, in a parallel line with the baron on his right flank, and separated from him by high mountains about a league distant. On the 2d the division arrived at Loulé, and on the 4th Colonel Lecharlier was obliged to march out and disperse the guerillas, who had made demonstrations to attack him.

The day before the baron quitted Beja

Louis de Bourmont attacked a small body of the Queen's troops in the valley of Barrancos, and forced them to retire into Spain, where they were well received. He then marched to Serpa, expecting to surprise and overwhelm De Sa, who, it has been seen, had timely notice, and retired on Mertola.

The garrison of Setuval, taking advantage of the absence from Alcacer of the greater part of the troops, marched on that town, which they occupied without loss, the enemy retiring on Evora. This obliged Bourmont to return from the south, and having formed a junction with General Cabrera, who commanded a moveable column, and was making towards the Algarves, both retraced their steps to Alcacer, which was now abandoned by the Queen's troops, who retired on Setuval.

The indefatigable De Sa had gone to Faro on the 4th, to celebrate the Queen's birthday, and to put in motion a battalion of the 4th and thirty lancers sent to his assistance, returned on the 6th, and hearing of Bourmont's and Cabrera's return to Alcacer, marched on the 11th to Silves, and from thence to the heights of St.

Bartholomé de Messines, the only road by which the Miguelites could advance into the Algarves.

The baron's first irruption into the Alentejo, and subsequent march on Serpa, had obliged the enemy to detach a force into that province ; before that force the baron was obliged to retreat, after receiving rather a severe check at Serpa. The return of the enemy to Alcacer do Sal, and the reinforcement he received, enabled him again to advance, and Don Miguel's government now determined to make a last effort to crush him, little thinking of what I was preparing for them in the north. A division of three thousand men, with six pieces of artillery, and between two and three hundred cavalry, was detached from Santarem under the orders of General Cabrera, who boasted that in eight days the Queen's troops should be driven from the Algarves. I shall leave him on his march and relate my own operations in the north.

On the evening of the 15th of March I sailed from Setuval, and anchored under Cape Mondego the following night ; I found there the Eliza and Portucense corvettes ; the Isabel Maria, who had been ordered there from Lisbon, had not yet arrived.

At daylight we weighed, and after reconnoitring Figueiras, I decided on landing the marines at Buarcos, a little to the north, under cover of the ships, and if possible driving the enemy into Figueiras, and attacking it by land and sea at the same time. The weather was fine, but on approaching the beach I found the surf so high that it was quite impossible to attempt it, and the bar was equally impassable. I then reconnoitred to the northward of Cape Mondego, intending to land there, and march over the high land, but not a creek or corner fit to land one boat was to be found, much less to disembark five hundred men ; indeed, during the whole time the *Eliza* had been off Figueiras, at no time could the beach have been attempted. The whole coast of Portugal, from the Minho to the Tagus, at all seasons of the year, is rendered extremely difficult of approach on account of the constant swell setting in, and I have never yet been able to make out how the Duke of Wellington succeeded in landing his army in Mondego Bay.

The Lord of the Isles steamer now joined me from Caminha, and as Mr. Gidney gave a better ac-

count of the coast to the northward, I decided on attempting a landing there, and immediately started, desiring the *Eliza* to follow. Next morning we were joined by the *Villa Flor* and *George IVth* steamers, and in the course of the day by the *Eliza*.

The *Minho* divides Spain from Portugal; in the centre of the river, on an island, stands a strong castle belonging to the Portuguese; this was garrisoned by the Miguelite troops. There are two passages; that on the north belongs to Spain, on the south to Portugal; both passages are safe, when the water is smooth, the Spanish passage the widest. On a close reconnoitre of the bar it appeared practicable, and I landed at the small town of *Guarda* in *Gallicia*, to obtain information, reconnoitred *Caminha*, which is situated five or six miles up the river, and endeavoured to hire boats sufficient to carry over my men. I was well received by an old captain, the Spanish commandant, and by the Portuguese consul, a Spaniard. The commandant conducted me to the top of a high mountain, where we had an excellent survey of the river and

town. The scenery was beautiful; the valley of the Minho, the richest in Portugal, and the river running through that valley, extremely picturesque; but I did not come to look at the beauties of the country, therefore will not attempt to describe them; I came to look at the defences of Caminha, and the best way of approaching them, and will give the result of my observations. The fort in the middle of the river was very strong and very high, and a heavy surf rendered an attack there impossible; it was also doubtful whether the bar was passable, and almost certain that we should be discovered in passing, and the town in consequence be prepared for our reception.

Caminha itself was walled round, and ditched on the land sides, but only mounted a few guns. The sea-wall was not ditched, and on the quay where the vessels unload several store-houses were built against the wall. These store-houses I intended should serve for my scaling-ladders, if I could once get up to the town. From Guarda a road leads through a valley on the left of the mountain to a Spanish mercantile estab-

lishment just opposite Caminha. Through this valley Marshal Soult drew boats and endeavoured to pass the Minho, but failed; and through this same valley I was very anxious to march my troops and cross over; but Spain was a neutral territory, and my friend the commandant would not hear of it. The judge was a clever young man and a constitutionalist, and so was Don Manuel Espagnol, the Portuguese consul, and both were anxious for my success. They persuaded the commandant to station his men along the banks of the river and prevent any communication with Portugal, and assisted me in hiring boats to transport the men across the bar.

All this settled, I returned on board, and towards dark we stood into Guarda with the boats and steamers. I had still some doubts of the bar, and I went myself to examine its practicability, and found it so bad that no boat could pass with safety. On my return on board, the judge and consul were both disappointed at the difficulty of the bar, and most anxious to facilitate my operations, but afraid to commit themselves

in countenancing our landing; however, after a good deal of persuasion, and threatening to abandon the enterprize altogether, which would have been very much against the interest of the mercantile establishment on the river, which I soon perceived belonged to them, the judge consented that we should land after midnight, when the villagers were in bed, and undertook to manage the affair with the commandant. No time was to be lost; boats were sent off, and by one o'clock we were all drawn up on the beach, and soon after marched through the valley, and arrived about two opposite Caminha, distant two miles across the river. All seemed quiet; no guard boats appeared, and no communication had been allowed during the day. I expected to have found boats sufficient to carry the whole across, but only two passage boats were to be seen, and they were to be pushed across by long poles, and as the ebb tide was strong they necessarily would drift down nearly at the entrance of the river. The boats could only contain about half our force; they were composed of the English marines under Captain Birt, the seamen under

Captain Liot and Mr. Robinson, and a division of Portuguese marines under Major Carvalho. I was not aware of the manner of effecting the passage, nor till after they pushed off did I exactly understand how far they must drift down. I, however, took the precaution of leaving the operation entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer, either to take up a position until I could bring the remainder of the men across, or push on according to circumstances. From the length of the passage and the impossibility of the boats returning before the tide turned, the commanding officer at once saw that no time was to be lost, and having an excellent guide, he pushed on for the town.

About a mile in advance of the town their picquets were surprised asleep; the gates were shut. No sentries were on the ramparts, but they were too high to get over. The guide, no way disconcerted, led them down a lane to the water-side, keeping close to the walls, and thus they marched the whole length of the town in perfect silence, and gained the quay. A sally-port was open, through which they passed;

one party seized the guard, another the barracks, and a third made for the governor's house, who had just time to poke his head out of a window, and cry out "to arms," when he was shot by one of the marines. A priest, at another window, shared the same fate. The soldiers in the barracks made no resistance, and in a few minutes the town was secured, and all was quiet. An officer and a small party had been detached on board the Scorpion cutter under command of Lieutenant Whitaker, of the navy, who had broke the blockade, and very politely requested him to come on deck. As he awoke out of his sleep, he exclaimed "Good God! is it possible! If I had had sufficient warning you should not have had the Scorpion—I should have set fire to her."

During this time I was under great anxiety for the success of the enterprize, and had almost repented of having undertaken it; but my fears were soon relieved by seeing a movement amongst the fishing boats, which were sent over for the rest of the division. Caminha is a strong walled town, but had been much neglected; the garrison consisted of seventy men, who might have defended

it for some time had they kept their eyes open. The people were almost all constitutionalists, but afraid of declaring themselves, on account of the smallness of our numbers. A summons was sent to the fort, in the middle of the river, which was immediately given up and garrisoned, and the Minho, in consequence, shut against any supplies from without.

Appendix,
No. XIII.

The George IVth steamer was despatched off Figueiras for the marines of the Portuense and Isabel Maria; and the Don Pedro arriving at the same time from England, our garrison was reinforced by nearly two hundred men. Despatches were sent to the general at Oporto, requesting him to put himself in movement, and I turned my attention to securing the town, and preparing for further military operations. The same day I surprised Caminha, the Baron de Sa, it has been seen, entered Beja. Had all this been planned as the minister-at-war would have the nation believe, nothing could have been more beautiful, and planned it might and ought to have been the moment the enemy weakened their force in the north to strengthen Santarem; but, so far from that, we

were both accused of making war on our own account; and when Lord Howard congratulated the Emperor on my success he was much annoyed, and said he had nothing to do with it.

The position of Caminha with a sufficient force was excellent for clearing the province of the Minho, but with a small one I was placed between three fires; the fortified town of Valenca was on my left, about four leagues distant, Vianna on the right about the same, and Ponte de Lima, leading to Braga, in front. If I marched on Ponte de Lima, both flanks were exposed, and a certainty of being attacked in front; should the Baron de Pico not act on the offensive. Valenca was too strong to reduce without a siege; but if pressed, I could cross over to Spain and the Spanish general was disposed to support me, and had asked permission so to do; I managed to persuade him that it was probable Don Carlos would endeavour to throw himself into Valenca, and in fact apartments had been prepared there for a great personage. There was also danger of going to Vianna, which was garrisoned by five hundred men with a strong citadel; and if attacked on the left flank, I

might find a difficulty in embarking, still it was necessary to do something. The governor of Valenca had detached one hundred men to watch our movements, and the governor of Vianna was posted at Fifo, two leagues off, with the greater part of his garrison.

In the midst of these perplexities the enemy themselves solved the question. On the morning of the 27th twenty men and an officer of the Vianna militia joined my standard. I beat to arms and marched on Fifo, leaving a garrison of one hundred men in Caminha, with orders to patrol on the Valenca road and organize a force in the town. Here, then, I started mounted on my charger, a wicked pony that had belonged to the governor, my staff on mules and donkeys, or whatever they could find, opening my first campaign at the head of five hundred Portuguese and English marines and sailors, as well pleased as the Duke of Wellington at the head of his army. The Don Pedro and George the Fourth steamer followed along shore, with orders to anchor as close as possible to where we expected the enemy would stand. The sailors carrying little weight, were

extended on each flank as we passed through a wood, and an advanced guard two hundred yards in front. In this order we marched on Fifo, a village sufficiently strong for defence had it been necessary to pass through it, but as it lay some distance from the sea I determined on taking the beach, and there fighting our enemy should they be inclined to stand, which I thought preferable to mountain warfare. On arriving within a mile of the position where the deserters pointed out the enemy were stationed, a soldier was despatched to parley with their centinels and invite them over. The only answer he received was a shot, and we marched on. They consisted of two or three hundred men of the Barca militia. They preferred the mountains to the beach; and as we were amphibious animals and did not like to be far from the water, each party pleased himself. We pushed on, and the enemy decamped over the hills very civilly, leaving our flank unmolested. We had only now to encounter the Vianna militia and the remainder of the Barca stationed at the former town, the villagers having assured us that our other opponents had

made the best of their way into the interior and probably to their homes.

After marching another league, I received a despatch from the colonel of the Vianna militia, requesting me to halt for the night, and he would make an arrangement with the Barca militia, and come over to the Queen. In war delays are dangerous; this might have been a ruse to give time for the other party to rejoin, or he might expect reinforcements; so I preferred marching on, and desired the colonel to meet me outside the town, which he did with the greater part of his regiment, consisting of three hundred men well equipped. The Barca militia declined the honor of the interview and marched out at the other gate. The hymn was now played, and our new comrades led the way into the town; the constitution was proclaimed in the great square, the troops then marched off to their different quarters and strict orders given that the barrack-yards should be shut, and not a soul allowed in the town.

Vianna is a very nice clean place, at the entrance of the Lima, having a strong citadel for its defence. The harbour, like all those on the coast of Portu-

gal, has a bar, only accessible in fine weather. The inhabitants of this town were reported to be strong Miguelites, as well as all the province; but they took no part in the war whatever, or showed any disposition to defend their town, which might have been done successfully against my small force; in fact they wanted peace, commerce, and good government. It is also just to observe that there was very little appearance of joy, and no enthusiasm for the Queen evinced by the inhabitants. We were received with much civility by the English consul, who informed me that the Baron de Pico had marched from Oporto and driven the enemy to Guimaraens. This welcome news left us at liberty to continue our operations without risk of surprise.

Appendix,
No. XIX. The following day I organized the government, and issued a proclamation, ordering the inhabitants to return to their habitations, and gave strict orders to the authorities to allow no person to be persecuted for their political opinions. The rank of the officers of the Vianna militia was confirmed, and half a moidore given to each soldier who came over to the Queen. Towards the

evening I received the submission of Espinosa and Villa de Conde.

At daylight of the 29th I marched on Ponte de Lima, to prevent the enemy, should they be so disposed, from crossing the river and occupying the rich province of the Minho, making Valença the basis of their operations; and considering the strength and richness of this country, with a strong fortress, that was the line they ought to have adopted.

The march through this province was most delightful; nothing could exceed the richness and beauty of the two valleys of the Minho and Lima, bounded on either side by high mountains. The valleys are well cultivated, the inhabitants peaceable and industrious, taking so little interest in the war, that although we marched within a mile of a village where there was a large cattle fair, not a soul came to see us pass. I rode up to the village, and desired them to give vivas for Donna Maria, which was willingly complied with, and I have no doubt they would as willingly have given them for Don Miguel. This province did not appear to have suffered from the war, and considering the length

of time so large an army had been before Oporto, it might have been expected the country would have been entirely drained of cattle. As I approached Ponte de Lima, I received a deputation, informing me the Queen was proclaimed, that the Miguelites had retired from Braga, which had also declared for the Queen, and the country was clear as far as Amarante, to where the enemy had retired. The preventing the Miguelites from occupying this rich province was a great point gained, but be it remembered there was no combination to effect this; it was all chance; the ignorance of both ministers of war was upon a par; but fortune declared in favour of the Queen. At four o'clock we marched into Ponte de Lima, and were received with much enthusiasm. The men were quartered in the houses of the inhabitants, who treated them in the kindest manner, and shewed great enthusiasm for the Queen. This was a constitutional town.

I now determined to march on Valenca, and sent orders to Captain Bertrand of the Don Pedro, who was at Vianna, to return to Caminha, and make preparations to send me guns and mor-

tars for a siege. The Spanish general at Tuy had offered his assistance, and I wrote to him to join me on the morning of the 1st of April, before Valenca, and likewise to Major Carvalho to march from Caminha with his garrison for the same destination.

Before leaving Ponte de Lima on the 30th, a detachment of the Vianna militia brought in three cart-loads of copper money, which had been removed from the government coffers, and having organized the authorities, and appointed officers to form a local force for the protection of the town against any guerillas that might appear, I marched on Valenca, with about seven hundred men. After a march of five leagues over bad roads and a mountainous country, we bivouacked for the night in a small wood, lighted fires, caught and killed a bullock, and managed to rough it out tolerably well on a beef-steak and a bottle of wine, without bread. I collected the seamen and marines in a clump, and encouraged them in relating their adventures and the reasons that brought them to Portugal. Some of their stories were amusing in the extreme; we had, as might be supposed, all sorts of characters,

good and bad. There were broken-down shoemakers, tailors, drapers, man-milliners, poachers, disappointed lovers, several resurrection men; and it was even said there was a *Burker* or two in the society. Most had entered voluntarily, but several had been kidnapped when drunk, and shipped off without their consent. Nevertheless they were generally very well behaved, and few instances of plundering or maltreating the inhabitants had occurred, and in all cases they were most severely punished.

At daylight we were again on march, and at ten the fortress of Valenza appeared about two leagues distant in the plain below. The mountains here opened into a wide space, which afforded us an opportunity of making our force appear considerably larger than it really was. The troops marched into this space, which overlooked the plain, and the ground allowed them to file off to the right and left without being seen, and return over the hills into the space I have described. Here we halted to refresh the people, and as the country through which we were to pass was well wooded, we naturally expected the enemy would take advantage of

their local knowledge, and harass our march to the town. Our skirmishers were thrown out on either flank, and we advanced cautiously, but without molestation, through the wood, and about two o'clock arrived within range of shot of the fortress. The Portuguese marines were quartered in a village on the left, the English marines in the centre, and the Vianna militia on the right; the advanced posts pushed close up to the walls.

Valenca is a strong fortress, accessible on the western side only, where is placed a very strong outwork, totally independent of the fortress, though connected with it by a bridge. The fortress is a little distance from the Minho, over which it hangs; the walls are high, and the ground on which it stands, except on the western side, is almost perpendicular, and surrounded by a covered way for musketry under the guns, with which it was well bristled.

A flag of truce was sent by a young Portuguese emigré with a summons, but he was ill received, and rather pleased to get back safe, the garrison vociferating vivas for Don Miguel, and a letter I sent in by a peasant remained without a reply.

Appendix,
No. XX. In the evening the enemy made a reconnoissance, but were driven back; we lost seven men killed and wounded. We were supplied with abundance of fresh beef and wine, but bread was scarce, the ovens being insufficient to bake for the troops: part of the money taken at Ponte de Lima was served out to the men, which soon produced a good and abundant market. Orders were sent to Captain Bertrand to hurry up the guns and mortars, and next morning I was joined by the detachment from Caminha and two hundred and eighty Spaniards, which the governor of the district put at my disposal.

The Vianna militia were detached to watch the eastern gate, the Spaniards the southern; the Portuguese marines were quartered in a small farm, protected by the brow of the hill from the fortification, and their picquets pushed up to the glacis, under cover of a wall and hedge; the English marines and sailors at head-quarters between the Spaniards and Portuguese, to support either in the event of being attacked. Strict orders were given to each party to defend their position to the last extremity, except the Vianna

militia, who were to fall back on the road, being too distant to be succoured. I now reconnoitred the fortress on all points, and decided on attacking the outwork, which appeared to me the only place against which I could bring up the guns with safety, and with a probability of success. The walls were much too high to attempt an escalade even had we been provided with ladders.

I received a visit in the afternoon from Lord William Russell and Colonel Hare, who had put into Vigo on their way to England, and I prevailed on them to accompany me in having a near look at the town; they were not a little surprised to find our men pushed so close up; they had little opinion of marines and sailors being very useful on shore, and after a pretty good reconnoitre, which they made from a covered road which led to the glacis, and looked round a corner to an angle of a bastion, where was placed a gun pointing direct to the opening, they were of opinion I could not succeed. I thought otherwise: fifty guns was a powerful argument to make use of, and to besiege it I made up my mind. In the afternoon the Spaniards reconnoitred the gate on the side

they were stationed nearly up to the glacis, and had an officer and several men wounded. An attempt was made to dislodge the Portuguese from under the wall, but without success.

The governor now released the state prisoners ; this proved he could not be very well supplied with provisions ; many of the unfortunate wretches had been confined in the dungeons for five years, and were in a miserable situation.

About midnight our piquets were alarmed by the appearance of men advancing upon them from the town, and were well nigh commencing a fight with the Portuguese marines, who fancied the whole garrison were marching out against them, got into a panic and bolted in spite of their officers. Fortunately they were discovered, and ordered back to their posts. This was no great encouragement to begin with, and still less, when next morning an order came from the captain-general of Galicia for the Spaniards to return to Tuy. This was never explained ; their departure made a considerable gap between the Vianna militia and the English seamen and marines ; nevertheless I was determined to go on. The

part of the marine brigade, who had behaved so ill in the night, were paraded, and given to understand a similar behaviour would be punished with shooting every tenth man. This day several men of the Vianna militia (a detachment of whom were in the town) lowered themselves from the walls and joined us. They appeared to think the town would be defended, and great exertions were making to mount guns in various parts of the fortress.

In the afternoon I received a communication Appendix
XXI. from an officer in garrison who requested I would not attack that night. At daylight of the 3d two heavy guns arrived, and six more with two mortars were on their way up the river. I crossed over to Spain and waited on the governor of Tuy; from thence we could distinctly see the separation between the outwork and the town, and the strength of the place towards the river. On my return I found an officer with a flag of truce, offering to surrender the town.

I wrote a few lines in reply, and desired the Appendix,
XXII. officer to say I should march to the glacis in ten

minutes and there receive the governor. To this he objected, as it would be necessary to enter into a regular capitulation. I replied I had nothing further to say, and immediately put the troops in motion, and marched up to the walls. There seemed to be some hesitation on the part of the governor, and our position was rather critical, as we were exposed to the fire of the place in the event of his having changed his mind. An aid-de-camp was despatched to say I was waiting, and to request his immediate attendance, which he complied with. Several objections were made to this haste; he was anxious to wait a few days and draw up a regular capitulation. I gave him his choice, either to allow me to march in or he might return; and I should re-occupy my former position. After a shrug or two of the shoulder and a wry face he consented. In we marched, and in half an hour were as comfortable as if we had been in quarters a fortnight.

Valencia is a town of great strength, capable of mounting several hundred guns; seventy were mounted when I took possession of it, and more

were in progress ; the garrison was fully equal for its defence against my small force, and had they been well managed they might have given me a considerable deal of employment ; there was, however, no energy amongst them, and they appeared stupefied at the successes we had met with, and were much alarmed at the idea of being stormed by seamen and marines.

Next morning the garrison were ordered under arms, and had the choice of serving the Queen or returning to their homes. They preferred the latter, deposed their arms and marched quietly off. The officers did the same ; they consisted of between four and five hundred men of the regiment of Bastos, and part of the Vianna militia, who joined their corps, now named the Vianna volunteers. Thus, in ten days was the whole of the province secured, the siege of Oporto raised, and the enemy entirely cut off from the richest provinces of Portugal.

I may here mention a circumstance to show what little attention was paid by the minister of marine to those who were exerting themselves for the Queen. I had sent the inspector of the arsenal to Brest,

to fit out the Portuguese ships that had been taken away by the French, and had appointed his adjutant, a very active man, to act in his absence. Before I quitted Lisbon it had been rumoured that he would be removed, which I communicated to the minister, and exacted a promise that he should remain; but I had hardly got well out of the Tagus before he was superseded. This I learnt at Valenca, which called forth as
Appendix, severe a letter as I could pen. This letter and
XIII, my success had its effect, and the same gazette that announced the appointment of a new inspector, also announced his dismissal. This shews one specimen of the intrigues that were set on foot against me even before the war was over, and principally caused by wishing it finished while the ministers wished it continued.

After having organized the government at Valenca, and sent the Vianna volunteers to Barca, least the militia of that place, who had disappeared from Vianna, should be troublesome, I left, and embarked on board the Don Pedro, and proceeded to Oporto in the City of Edinburgh steamer. The Don Pedro and Eliza were sent to reinforce the

blockade off Figueras and Aveiro, and to get all the information they could before my arrival. I found some difficulty in persuading the governor of Oporto to send a battalion of fixos to relieve my men at Valenca, so unaccustomed were the old gentlemen placed in these situations to take responsibility on themselves, and I was obliged to threaten to withdraw my men and leave the place to itself. This had its effect, and the same evening the City of Edinburgh returned to Caminho with a battalion to garrison Valefca.

Oporto was fast recovering from the effects of the siege, and under the direction of Mr. Miranda, the prefect, public works were advancing. Colonel Sorrel took me over the lines constructed by Don Pedro, and as far as I am a judge I should say they were not defensible in any one point, and nothing can speak more favourably of the goodness of the Queen's troops than the constant and successful defence of those lines against so superior an enemy, and in the last attack, commanded by an officer of Marshal Bourmont's reputation. I met with the greatest attention from the inhabitants of Oporto, and in

the evening on my appearing at the opera, the whole of the audience stood up, and on some allusion being made to the capture of the fleet and our successes in the north, it was received by vivas, and the waving of handkerchiefs by the fair sex. The same attention was shewn me on leaving the theatre.

CHAPTER IX.

HAVING described my own operations in the north, I shall now relate what took place at Oporto after the news of the surprise of Caminho. The uncertainty of landing on any part of the coast of Portugal was so great that I did not communicate my project to the governor of Oporto. I was also afraid that, in the event of delay, what I wished to keep secret might leak out, and the enemy in consequence get wind of it. I, however, immediately on getting possession of Caminha, sent the City of Edinburgh to Oporto and Lisbon, and at eight o'clock at night of the 25th the Baron do Pico do Celeiro, better known by the name of old Torres, (who so gallantly defended the Serra con-

vent,) marched out of Oporto in three columns, taking the road of Santa Thyrso. Next morning the enemy were attacked in their position of Santa Christina, and driven to Guimaraens. At daylight of the 27th, they retired by the road of Lexa. Raymondo José Pinheiro remained in the Carvalho D'Este with some militia and guerrillas, whom he was recruiting at that point, and in order to prevent him disturbing my operations in the north, the Baron do Pico detached a force of fourteen hundred men to occupy Braga, and on the 30th his force marched on Raymondo, who was obliged to retire on Salamonde. The rest of the enemy's forces from St. Thyrso and Baltar were now united with a division from the south at Penafiel, and to drive them from thence, the column which had been sent to Braga was ordered back to Guimaraens. One division was directed on Barragus, and Torres made a movement on the right, which obliged the enemy to retire by the road of Lixa. On the 2d of April they occupied a strong position near that place, which they defended for two hours and a half, and finally retired on Amarante, at which place they passed

the Tamego, the Queen's troops occupying a position close to that town. The force of the enemy was nearly three thousand men, including two hundred lancers. Their retreat was well conducted; about a hundred killed and wounded were left on the field of battle: our loss was trifling, principally in cavalry.

Our unlooked-for successes in the north now convinced the ministers that their officers in command were not inclined to protract the war if they were, the Duke of Terceira was hurried off with reinforcements to Oporto, where he arrived on the 3d of April, the day that Torres had driven the enemy across the Tamego and the day I entered Valenca; and all the thanks the old general got for marching out of Oporto when he heard I had landed in the north was a reprimand for not having waited for the arrival of the duke of Terceira, which if he had done, I should certainly have neither taken Vianna or Valenca, and in all probability would have been attacked by a very superior force, and probably annihilated, and instead of the enemy being driven across the Tamego, the Douro, the Mondego,

and finally to Santarem, by the Duke of Terceira, he would have had to have fought them in the richest and strongest provinces of Portugal, with three fortresses in their rear, which would have occupied him the whole summer, and completely answered the wishes of the minister in protracting the war.

Appendix,
XXIV.

On the arrival of the duke, he issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the north. On the 5th he despatched the twelfth caçadores to Baltar, and on the 6th he took command of the army at Amarante, which was in position close to that place, having a battalion in the town, and the foot of the bridge fortified, with posts of observation on different parts of the river, at present fordable, and the second moveable battalion of Oporto at Canaveyes, with two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge at that place, and observe the enemy's force on the opposite bank, and to keep in check the guerillas which were stationed at Melres, and between the two rivers. A detachment was also placed at Penafiel to maintain order, and give security to the peaceable inhabitants. And

the moveable battalion of the Minho was stationed in the vicinity, and part of another that had been organized at Guimaraens observed the bridge of Carvez.

It may here be as well to observe the rapidity with which these battalions were formed in every town the Queen's troops got possession of. All the young men were armed and accoutred; and though not clothed, it is quite astonishing in how short a time they assumed a military appearance. The life was new to them, and as they were both fed and paid, for a short time it was by no means disagreeable.

As the Baron do Pico de Celeiro had marched from Oporto when he heard of my successes in the north, he had not sufficient time to prepare for a campaign to any distance from Oporto. It now became necessary for the Duke of Terceira, who saw the enemy were cut off from the north, to put himself in a fit state to follow them up to Santarem, on which place it was most probable they would retreat. He therefore ordered the necessary baggage from Oporto, and began to

mount the cavalry with the horses he brought from Lisbon; and be it known here that at the time the minister-at-war was sending horses from Lisbon to form a cavalry corps at Oporto, the prefect there was actually preparing to send horses to Lisbon, having more than he knew what to do with, and no men to mount them; so much for the military combinations of the war minister.

During the time these preparations were going on, the duke put his troops into cantonments in Amarante and the quintas along the banks of the Tamego. He relieved the battalion of the Minho at Braga by the volunteers of Lexa, and established a more prompt communication with the detachment stationed at Cavez by placing the first moveable battalion of Oporto at Freirero. They also protected the inhabitants, who were overjoyed at being able to proclaim the Queen. This disposition of his forces along the banks of the Tamego deceived the enemy as to any intention of an immediate attack, and gave the duke an opportunity of observing what might be their intentions.

I shall leave the troops here for the present,

and relate the operations in other parts of Portugal.

After the City of Edinburgh returned to Oporto with the seamen and marines, I had some thoughts of crossing the Douro, and marching on Aveiro, as the most certain means of getting possession of that place, and subsequently of Figueiras; but the smallness of my force, and the uncertainty of that of the enemy, obliged me reluctantly to give up that plan. On my arrival off Figueiras the surf was so bad that landing was impracticable, and after remaining a day or two, I returned to Lisbon. Affairs at Santarem were in the same situation, and the only occurrence that had taken place in the neighbourhood was the attack the enemy had made on Setuval, which was very nearly surprised. On the evening of the 19th of April Captain Ruxton learnt from one of his boats'-crew that the enemy were advancing on Setuval, by the road of Aguas de Moira; the information came from some countrymen who had arrived at Setuval. This intelligence he communicated to the governor, who,

however, did not believe it; he said his picquets had just come in from that neighbourhood, and there was no appearance of an enemy. Nevertheless, at half-past twelve the following day the enemy's cavalry galloped into a redoubt that commanded the anchorage. Captain Ruxton was at that time in the English consul's house, and having ascertained the fact, went immediately to the barracks, where he found a company of the 21st infantry under arms. The officer in command acted with great promptitude, and marched to the redoubt, which was immediately abandoned by the cavalry. He had, however, not much time to lose, and had hardly got in when the head of a column appeared on the brow of the hill about two hundred yards off. A very sharp fire commenced from both parties, and several desperate attempts were made to get possession, but without success. By this time the garrison was under arms; a severe fire was kept up on various parts of the defence for a considerable time, but no attack was made elsewhere. The enemy then retired to the heights of Carvalheiro,

where they remained some time, and then returned unmolested to Agoa de Moira, and finally to Alcacer do Sal. I hardly know who was most to blame in this affair—the Queen's governor for allowing Miguel's cavalry to surprise the redoubt, or the officer who planned the enterprise, and did not sufficiently support the cavalry who got into it. Setuval was a most important point, and had it been lost it would have been no easy matter to have regained it; and lost it ought to have been half a dozen times over, had the enemy shewed either talent or energy. They had thirty-four men killed in their attempts on the redoubt; their wounded were carried off. Our loss was very trifling.

The attack on Setuval appears to have been intended to draw our attention from the Algarves, as it took place at the same time that Cabrera was marching on that kingdom; and happily for the cause of the Queen it failed. The capture of that place would have been a good set-off for the successes in the north, and probably occasioned the recal of the Duke of Terceira from thence.

Saldanha had expressed great anxiety for the Baron de Sa, and indignation at the ministry for not supporting him notwithstanding his urgent representations; indeed, I have reason to think that several of Saldanha's despatches to Freire relative to the Baron and other military matters had been withheld from the Emperor, and that the marshal had in consequence resigned, consenting to remain only at the urgent request of Don Pedro, and nothing but apprehension of injuring the Queen's cause, and the Emperor's promise that the ministers should not remain in office after the termination of the contest, prevented him from insisting on their immediate dismissal.

On the 9th of April the Emperor went to Cartaxo, but returned immediately both in bad health and bad spirits, in fact he had enough to make him so; he had Saldanha pressing him on one hand to dismiss the ministers, and the ministers pressing to be allowed to keep their posts. His position was painful; he knew he was becoming unpopular, through the follies that had been committed; he was convinced no other minister

could supply money so well as Carvalho, and the sequel has proved he was right. The Spanish government having also suspended the entrance into Portugal of their troops, in consequence of Carlos' retirement to Vizieu, did not tend to raise his spirits. Lord Howard also disapproved of Spanish interference without a military convention and the consent of the English government. All this was wrong. Spanish interference ought to have been courted instead of checked, and it will be shortly seen that the Duke of Terceira accepted their assistance without troubling his head either with application to Pedro's ministers or to the English ambassador, and they were actually carrying on a military operation in Portugal during the time Mr. Sarmiento, the Portuguese minister at Madrid, was treating the question.

Before I give an account of the operations of the Duke of Terceira in the north, and my own campaign, I shall return to the Algarves, where I left the Baron de Sa, on the 16th of April, in position on the heights of Bartholomew de Mes-sines, and a strong division of the Miguelites marching to crush him, instead of going to the

north to oppose Terceira. This division, under the command of General Cabrera, having united the Miguelite troops in the Alemtejo, bivouacked on the 23d at St. Marcos da Serra, and on the 24th marched on St. Bartholomew; the enemy's force was upwards of 3000 men, that of De Sa not more than 1500, nevertheless he determined to risk an action. A little before noon the enemy advancing, covered by a cloud of guerillas under the command of Remechido, were received by a company of Belgians and repulsed. This attack was followed up by a battalion of chasseurs, with cavalry and a piece of artillery, and the Belgians in their turn were obliged to fall back on the main body, supported by one small gun. Here there was a severe struggle, and the Miguelite tirailleurs were finally driven back on their reserve, who had not as yet moved, but now began to deploy; a squadron of cavalry attempted to turn their left, but were met by a superior force, and repulsed; the enemy now advanced in force, and the attack was severe.

About three o'clock the Baron de Sa, seeing his left was hard-pressed, reinforced them with a part

of the Belgians from the centre ; the Miguelite general observing this advanced a strong column on the weak point, and obliged Colonel Lecharlier to return to his former position in time to check the light troops, who covered the enemy's advance. A strong column composed of infantry and cavalry likewise attacked on the right ; this was met by part of the fourth regiment, who opened a heavy fire, and obliged them to halt, but were too weak to drive them from the position they had taken ; the left was now beat, and the centre could hardly hold their own.

At five o'clock a small detachment, stationed in the ravine, between the high ground on the left and that on the centre, moved to the right, leaving the defile unoccupied ; the enemy instantly penetrated into the ravine, and separated the left from the centre, which they forced, and the whole were obliged to retire to a range of mountains in the rear of the field of battle ; the retreat was well managed, but the loss of the Queen's troops was severe. The Miguelites were, however, so roughly handled that the second position was not attacked, and the Baron was enabled to make good his retreat on Silves,

where he arrived at midnight. After giving his men a few hours repose he continued his retreat on Villa Nova, but was obliged to leave the badly wounded men behind. He was much harassed by the guerillas, and lost some of the baggage ; the same night the active Baron embarked part of his troops, and sailed for Faro ; the rest followed on the 26th and 27th, and the whole arrived on the 1st of May.

The enemy, instead of profiting by their victory, and marching immediately on Faro, which would have been an easy conquest, before the arrival of De Sa, reposed themselves very comfortably at St. Bartholomew and Loulé from the 24th of April to the 3d of May, when they appeared before Faro, which they attacked on the 4th, and were repulsed with ease.

On the 7th the garrison and inhabitants of Olhao, without having seen an enemy, took fright and abandoned the town. Fortunately De Sa had time to send a fresh garrison before the enemy had notice of this affair, and saved the place. At six o'clock in the morning of the 9th a Miguelite division appeared and attacked

Olhao, but were repulsed, and on the 13th the whole of the Miguelite forces retired on Loulé.

While the enemy were before Faro and Olhao the garrisons of Villa Nova and Lagos made several sorties and shot and captured a considerable number of guerillas, and, indeed, before this they had been extremely active in clearing the adjacent country of their troublesome neighbours.

It is now time to return to the operations of the Duke of Terceira, whom I left in cantonments at Amarante and the neighbourhood. The enemy had great confidence in the position they occupied, and in the difficulties of the fords, which were only guarded by a small force; their encampment was at a considerable distance, and they appeared to direct their whole attention to the bridge, the passage of which was obstructed in every possible way. The Duke determined to surprise them. One column was directed to the right by the ford of St. Paul, another to the left by a ford half a league above the bridge of Amarante, and as the artillery could not follow the columns they were posted to the right and left

of the bridge to bombard the enemy's force in Amarantinho during the attack, and protect the passage of a third column, which was to force the bridge should an opportunity offer.

Such were the Duke's dispositions on the 10th of April, but during the night, having explored the ford to the left, he found it too deep to attempt a passage with success : he, therefore, changed his plan and strengthened the right and centre columns with the troops from the left, and at daylight on the 11th Colonel Queiroz passed the Tamega with a column at the ford of St. Paul, surprised the enemy's advanced posts, and occupied the adjacent heights, cutting them off from the road of Mezão Frio. When this column was sufficiently advanced, General Nepomuceno opened his artillery, and with great gallantry forced the bridge; this and the advance of Queiroz decided the enemy to retire, but not being able to unite their whole force, the cavalry and artillery retreated by the road of Mezão Frio, and the infantry by that of Marao. The Duke now collected his columns, and after giving his troops a little rest, he pushed on by the road of Mezão Frio in hopes of gaining the passage

of Regoa at the same time the enemy arrived by Marao. His attack having compromised the enemy's force in front of Canavezes, the first battalion fixos of Oporto was ordered to march on that place by the left bank of the Tamega, and combining with the second moveable battalion already there, dispersed the enemy. The first battalion was ordered to collect the prisoners, and march the next day to Regoa.

The Duke in the mean time pushed on with the cavalry, artillery, and the brigade of Colonel Queiroz, and arrived at Mezão Frio after sunset ; he there learnt that the enemy's cavalry were in a state of disorder, and profiting by the terror that the Queen's troops had instilled into them, he left the artillery and the brigade of General Nepomuceno in Mezão Frio for the night, with orders to march at daylight on Regoa, and followed them up with the cavalry and Queiroz's brigade. The enemy's horse, alarmed at being separated from the infantry, and not being able to communicate with their general, had made the best of their way, without halting, to Villa Real.

Two plans now presented themselves to the Duke, one to follow the enemy with a small force, and pass the Douro with another, thereby interrupting their communications with Santarem, or follow them in force, securing both banks of the Douro in Regoa, and thus securing an easy passage into Beira. The second plan appeared to him the best, because the enemy, followed by a small force in a province which abounded in positions, could make a good retreat. He also feared that, knowing they were cut off from the passage of the Douro, they might disperse into guerillas, and spread over the country. As he was about to leave Regoa, intelligence arrived that the state prisoners at Lamego, in conjunction with the inhabitants, had proclaimed the Queen; the first moveable battalion of Oporto was immediately sent there, and the second occupied Regoa; the Duke himself continued his march on Villa Real: the badness of the roads obliged him to halt at Val de Nogueira, and on the 13th at daylight he entered Villa Real, the enemy having retired on Murca the moment he appeared on the opposite heights, without having

made one effort to defend the position, which was strong, and they retired on Villa Flor. This march indicated their intention of crossing the Douro at Pocinho. The Duke taking advantage of the enemy's panic, followed them up with his usual activity, and sent his artillery back to Regoa lest it should retard his movements, the roads being bad. The second moveable battalion of Oporto occupied Villa Real, leaving a detachment at Regoa to protect the artillery. The battalion of the Minho and the skeleton of a battalion of volunteers of Beira who were in Oporto, were ordered to Lamego, and the cavalry organizing at Oporto were ordered on Mezão Frio; but Terceira did not calculate that the ministers had sent him horses without riders. Having made dispositions to be ready to unite at Lamego, and watch the movements of any of the enemy's troops in Beira, he continued his march on Villa Flor, where he halted for the night. On the 16th the enemy commenced the passage of the Douro at two in the morning. Brigadier Nepomuceno was ordered from the bridge of Villa Real to march by a cross road on Pocinho, while the Duke with Queiroz's brigade and the cavalry marched on Montcorvo. On arriving

there he found the enemy had already passed the river ; Queiroz's brigade was halted and the Duke proceeded with the cavalry to join Nepomuceno, who had arrived at the margin of the river. As the enemy were reposing themselves on the opposite bank, the Queen's volunteers and some companies of the eighth opened the fire across the river, and notwithstanding its width and the impossibility of passing, the panic of the Miguelites was so great that they immediately retired without destroying the passage-boat, which however they afterwards partially did with two pieces of artillery from behind the walls. The Duke, finding it impossible to continue his movement that day, left a strong piquet in Pocinho, united his forces in Montcorvo, and opened a communication with General Avilez, who had arrived at Braganza.*

On the night of the 16th the enemy abandoned the banks of the Douro and retired on Trancoso ; on the 17th the passage-boat was got hold off and

* General Avilez had been long a prisoner in Braganza, and had made his escape to Alcanicas, in Spain, where he had collected a small force consisting of Portuguese emigrants.

repaired, and at daylight of the 18th the Duke passed the river and halted for the night at Freixo de Numão, intending to unite his troops with those in Lamego, procure what he required, and carry his operations into the province of Beira. Not one enemy's regular soldier was left in the Tras-os-Montes, but to ensure the tranquillity of the province he left brigadier Pizarro with the moveable battalion Transmontano, at Torre de Montcorvo, and the second moveable battalion of Oporto in Villa Real, with orders to communicate with general Avilez, and send all the force he could dispose of after securing the safety of the province under his charge.

At daylight of the 19th Terceira received intelligence that the enemy had abandoned Almeida, and that the state prisoners had broken open the prisons and proclaimed the Queen. On the same day he occupied St. João de Pesqueira; there he learnt that the enemy had united a guerilla force, attacked Lamego, and driven the first battalion of Oporto back to Regoa, where they were joined by the Minho battalion from Amarante. Several companies of this corps

now passed the river in boats, attacked the army, put them to flight, and regained the town a few hours after they had left it.

On the 20th the Duke occupied Moimenta da Beira, and on the 22d Lamego, where he halted to refresh his men after their continued marches, reorganise his troops, procure information of the force of the enemy in Beira, and endeavour to discover their projects of defence in that province. It will be seen by what I have related, that the Duke of Terceira had lost none of his activity, and the enemy seemed to be entirely paralysed by his movements. From the 23d of March, the day I surprised Carminha, nothing but success attended the Queen's army; neither towns, rivers, bridges, nor positions were defended. In less than a month the two richest provinces of Portugal were entirely cleared of the Miguelites, and without their making any great effort to defend them. These provinces were considered to be favourable to Don Miguel, but they do not appear to have taken any part in the war.

In the Minho not one guerilla appeared, and I passed from Valenca to Caminha without an

escort a few days after its surrender, and met with nothing but civility. In *Tras-os-Montes* the Duke of *Terceira* met with no opposition from the people ; in fact they were tired of the war, and only required permission to cultivate their valleys in peace and quietness. The great error committed by the *Miguelites* was weakening their force in the rich provinces, and sending them to the poor ones in the south, and the only wise thing the minister of war did in the whole campaign was sending the Duke of *Terceira* to *Oporto*, and the *Baron de Sa* to the *Algarves*.

At *Lamego* the Duke received a letter from the Spanish General *Rodil*, then in *Guarda*, offering to enter into communication with him, and operate in favour of the Queen's cause. In the Duke's instructions there was nothing to lead him to suppose there was any probability of foreign co-operation ; but he immediately saw the advantages of *Rodil's* unsolicited assistance, especially as he was about to commence operations with a force much smaller than was requisite, and much less than he had demanded, particularly in cavalry, which were still organising at *Oporto*, in addition

to which he had been obliged to leave two battalions in the *Tras-os-Montes* to prevent the possibility of reaction. Under these circumstances the Duke very properly took the responsibility on himself, and sent his first aide-de-camp, Major Mouzinho de Albuquerque, to compliment Rodil, and to thank him for the provisions and money with which he had succoured Almeida, and to combine with him a plan of operations, which had for its object to observe his left flank, as he marched on Vizieu, and to request General Rodil to occupy Almeida, which would enable the Duke to move to Lamego a moveable battalion formed of state prisoners, and which was almost naked. The Spanish general accepted his proposals with great frankness, and on Mouzinho's return with his answer, the Duke prepared to recommence his operations, which could now be carried on with greater safety and a surer prospect of success.

CHAPTER X.

I had prepared the seamen and marines to make another attempt on Figueiras, and requested Marshal Saldanha to support me with a small force from Leiria on the south bank of the Mondego, but the weather was so unsettled that I was not able to leave the Tagus in the City of Edinburgh before the beginning of May. On arriving off Figueiras, the surf as usual was bad, and at no time since I left it, had it been practicable to land. I was joined by the Don Pedro, Eliza, Isabel Maria, Portuense, and Villa Flor, but could not anchor before the 7th. Preparations were made to land the following morning, and the men-of-war got ready to attack the various batteries at the same time, should the beach be practicable. I now shifted my flag on board the Eliza. During the night two English sailors were picked up; they

had drifted over the bar, half drunk, and knew little about its localities. Captain Henry was sent in with a couple of gigs in the night to examine the beach, with strict orders not to risk the boats; but Lieutenant Cullis, who commanded one boat, from over zeal approached too near the shore, was struck by a sea, and with the exception of one man all perished. This man was brought before the authorities, and he gave such a flaming account of our force, that next morning the governor, who had been some time ready for a start, abandoned the town, which was taken possession of by the officer detached from Leiria. Boats also came off from Buarcos, and with great difficulty we succeeded in landing. The Marquis Rezendi accompanied me on this occasion, and it was amusing enough to see a knight of Malta in full uniform, decorated with all his orders and crosses, mounted on a fisherman's back, wading through the surf and afterwards seated on a donkey, making his entrance into Figueiras. We were well received by the inhabitants, who were not sorry to get rid of their military friends: their force was nearly one thousand men. I

Appendix,
No. XXV. issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, organised

the government, and made preparations to commence my second campaign next day. In the evening I received intelligence that the Duke had that day entered Coimbra, another rare and fortunate occurrence. It was to be expected that our troops stationed at Leiria would have cut off the garrison of Figueiras, as the distance from that place to Pombal was considerably longer than from Leiria; but from some unaccountable mistake the whole garrison of Figueiras made its escape, and joined the Miguelite army. The officer who was opposite to Figueiras ought not to have crossed over; he ought to have immediately communicated to Colonel Vasconcellos the retreat of the garrison, and marched himself along the south bank and endeavoured to have prevented their crossing the river, or if too late for that, he might have harassed their retreat, while Colonel Vasconcellos marched upon Pombal; there they must either have been taken or dispersed. Great praise is due to the Miguelite commander for extricating his garrison from their critical situation, and some blame due either to the officer in front of Figueiras, for not sending

the earliest intelligence, or to the commanding officer at Leiria for allowing them to escape. Indeed, I have never seen any good reason for a force of three thousand men and upwards remaining at Leiria, while the Duke of Terceira was driving the enemy before him and across the Mondego. It is true the Leiria division formed part of Marshal Saldanha's army, and the Duke of Terceira had no power over them, and probably did not like to take upon himself to order them to move; but what was the minister-at-war about?—had he authority or not? If he had, he ought to have given directions to them to have moved on the Mondego, and disputed the passage of the river with the Miguelites, or broke the bridge down, while Saldanha kept the army at Santarem in check. If he had not authority to interfere, he ought to have resigned his place; but here again is an instance of want of combination. Terceira commanded an independent army, Saldanha another; the Emperor was commander-in-chief, and Freire minister-at-war; all four, in all probability, giving orders at the same time, or, what is the same thing, acting for themselves.

At Figueiras I received information of what had passed in the north from the time I had brought the Duke's operations up to Lamego. General Cardoso, who commanded the Miguelite army, after being driven across the Douro had united with his army the garrisons of Almeida and Lamego, and retired on Vizieu; he had also been joined by a strong brigade from Souto Redondo to the south of the Douro, and which force the Baron de Pico Soleiro had endeavoured to drive back; but his troops were few, consisting only of provisional battalions ill-disciplined, and a few unorganized cavalry; and he had himself been obliged to retire. From Vizieu the enemy watched Lamego, with a small force in Villa Nova a Coelheria, and another in Castro D'Aire.

On the 30th of April the Duke of Terceira, having refreshed his troops, marched on Castro D'Aire, leaving in Lamego the volunteers of Beira, to organize, and the prisoners from Almeida, who were also being organized and clothed; and it is worthy of remark how easily these battalions were got together, a pretty good proof that the country was not very

much inclined to Don Miguel, or he would certainly have formed them into battalions when in possession of the country; but, on the contrary, the army of the Queen kept increasing in about the same proportion Miguel's was reducing; it is true the Queen's troops were all paid and fed, while Don Miguel's lived on rather short commons.

The weather was very tempestuous; nevertheless the Duke crossed the serra and surprised the enemy, who were so terrified that they never attempted to defend their position, which (as the Duke remarked) was the strongest he had ever seen in his whole military career. The troops were so fatigued with this difficult and mountainous march that they halted at Castro D'Aire, and the Duke pursued the enemy with the cavalry on the Vizieu road, the greater part of whom were dispersed, and sought refuge in the mountains and valleys. On the 2d of May he advanced on Vizieu, but the enemy made no attempt to defend the line of the Vouga, and they even retired from Vizieu without firing a shot, retreating by Tondella and Mortagoa. At Vizieu the Duke communicated with General Rodil, who, agreeably to his pro-

mise, advanced by the road of Ponte de Murcella, and arrived at Gouvea, having dispersed a band of guerillas under the command of the Capitão Mor Botto. On the 4th Terceira had an interview with Rodil in Mangoalde, and agreed that the Spanish army should march by the road of Ponte de Murcella, and the Portuguese on the road to Coimbra. On the 5th he marched on Tondella, leaving General Azeredo, with the first moveable battalion of Oporto, at Vizieu, to maintain tranquillity in the province. On the 6th he bivouacked in Mortagao, which the enemy abandoned on his approach, directing themselves on Coimbra by the road of Botao, and they were followed up by the cavalry for some time, in order to mask the movement the Duke projected for the following day. On the 7th he marched by the Serra Bussaco on Mealhada, which he occupied without opposition; he there learnt that General Bernardino had retired with all haste from the Vouga, and that the General Gouvea Osório had ordered him to march on Coimbra the same evening that he evacuated Mortagoa. From Mealhada

he opened his communication with Oporto by the road of Sardão, in which route the Baron de Pico Celerio was marching in consequence of orders sent from Vizieu. On the 8th he occupied Coimbra, the enemy having abandoned it the night before, notwithstanding the fortifications they had raised, and a superior force, to the Duke.

The 9th and 10th were spent in Coimbra to rest the troops and organize a government, the people having declared for the Queen; and orders were sent to Colonel Vasconcellos to occupy Redinha or Pombal. Terceira had another interview with Rodil at Senhor de Serra, in which it was agreed that while he marched on Thomar, Rodil should march on the right bank of the Tagus, crossing the Serra de Estrella above Castello Branco, thus menacing Abrantes, and being ready to cross the Tagus if necessary at Villa Velha or Alcantara, and reinforce General Pinto at Marvao,* and when united on the left bank of the

* Marvao had been long under siege by the Miguelites, which they raised on the 23d of March, the day I took Caminho, and the day De Sa marched into Beja.

Tagus, would straiten the enemy if they attempted to remain in Santarem. This plan was proposed by General Rodil, and adopted by the duke, because he wished to profit by the co-operation of the Spaniards, at the same time avoiding, as much as possible, bringing them in immediate contact with the enemy, thus sparing Spanish blood in the Portuguese contest, and giving more honour to the Queen's troops. These arrangements made, orders were sent to the Baron de Pico to send his cavalry on, leaving a garrison in Aveiro, and then return to Oporto, and on the 10th he marched on Condeixo.

There being no further occasion for the squadron on the coast, Captain Henry was sent to the Algarves with the Eliza, the Portuense off Sinnes, and the Don Pedro and Isabella Maria to Lisbon, to complete their provisions and proceed to Madeira; and on the 9th I marched for Figueiras, and halted for the night at Mente Mor; on the 10th I was at Lourical, and on the 11th, the day the duke reached Condeixa, I joined Colonel Vasconcellos at Pombal, where he had arrived the day before from Leiria, with between two and

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three thousand men. Colonel Loureiro arrived from the duke, and it was agreed that we should halt a day at Pombal, and while he marched by the road of Velha on Thomar, we should march by Ourem on Torres Novas, and arrive at the former the same time the duke arrived at Prucha. This delay I thought unnecessary; we knew the enemy had a considerable force at Ourem, and the march from Pombal to that place was very long; however, so it was settled.

At daylight of the 12th we marched from Pombal, through a beautiful and romantic country, and I never saw a finer sight than the troops winding along the mountains; the ground was very strong, and every inch of it ought to have been defended had the enemy shown the least talent or enterprize, but they seemed to be now incapable of any exertion. About five o'clock we entered Aldea de Cruz, a small village in the valley, within gun-shot of Ourem, which is an old Moorish walled town, standing on a high hill, and difficult of access at all parts. As the troops marched in, and were

taking up their cantonments, the enemy opened a fire from their field-pieces. The seamen and marines were in the rear, and thought the attack begun, and though nearly knocked up with a march of seven leagues, and not very well shod, I was surprised to see them coming in at double quick least they should be too late. At Aldea de Cruz we were joined by Colonel Shaw's Scotch from Leiria and the moveable battalion of Alcobaca, not clothed, but well accoutred; and it is astonishing, notwithstanding that disadvantage, how military they looked. I believe no men in the world are sooner or easier made soldiers than the Portuguese; they are sober and tractable, and take a pride in their profession. It is true these provisional battalions were only to be kept up during the war, and it might have been considered by them an honour to see a campaign, and share in the glory of establishing the authority of the Queen throughout the kingdom. During the night orders came to Colonel Vasconcellos to join the duke at Cham de Macaas, the enemy having united their forces at Thomar, and been joined by a brigade from Santarem. The

duke requested me to remain before Ourem with the seamen and marines, reinforced by the Scotch and the Alcobaca battalion and several detachments, in all about one thousand four hundred men.

It now became necessary to see what could be done with this place ; it was strong, and not easy to get at, and difficult to blockade, having three gates. The garrison consisted of about one thousand men, and I was very unwilling they should escape. After reconnoitring well the defences, I ordered Colonel Shaw with the Scotch to occupy a convent within musket-shot of Ourem, which the enemy had neglected to do ; and this post he was ordered to defend at all risks. The Alcobaca regiment, two hundred and thirty strong, eighty volunteers of Ponte de Mos, and fifty of the tenth were placed on his right, in front of the Leina gate ; they had orders to retire, if attacked in force, till succoured. The British marines, Portuguese brigade, and the seamen remained in Aldea de Cruz, ready to operate where they might be wanted. These dispositions made, a summons was sent to the governor, who

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XXVII., refused to capitulate. In the afternoon I went

to the convent, against which there was occasionally a fire of musketry, and a picquet was pushed up close to the ramparts, where the ground was very favourable to protect them.

I observed the enemy had left a wall standing, which enclosed the convent garden nearly to the town, and a parapet had been thrown up, with a ditch at which they were still working, though disturbed by our musketry. The peasants were employed at this work, and when they attempted to leave it, were pelted with stones by the garrison. After dark Colonel Shaw and myself got close up to the walls, and recommended them to surrender, and a company was afterwards sent up to draw their fire, to ascertain, if possible, a soft place. During the night all was quiet, and next morning scaling ladders were brought, and the Portuguese and English marines and sailors were put in motion, and took up their ground close to the walls on the opposite side to the Scotch, in a small village, which they were ordered to defend. The enemy perceiving our dispositions for attack, sent a flag of truce to the convent, and I took up my quarters in a cuenta

close by. The governor asked for twenty-four hours, which was refused, and the capitulation was immediately signed. The Scotch marched in, and took possession ; the Miguelites laid down their arms, occupied the convent, and next day they were all sent to their homes.

I was much pleased at getting possession of Ourem without bloodshed ; it was very strong, and had the enemy made a good defence it would have cost many valuable lives. The seamen and marines had seen a good deal of service, but Shaw's regiment were very young, and the greater part had not been in action, and bringing them up to an assault as the first introduction to a military life would hardly have been fair. They were, however, fine young men, and I have no doubt would have done their duty.

At noon next day every thing was arranged at Ourem ; the Alcobaca regiment and the volunteers of Ponte de Mos were left in garrison, the Miguelites dismissed to their homes, and I marched on Thomar. I should have preferred going at once to Torres Novas, but the duke requested me to join him at Thomar, and he might have been

waiting for my reinforcement to attack the enemy. As things happened it was unfortunate, for had I arrived at Torres Novas that night, I should have fallen on the flank of the defeated army, and worked them on their retreat to Santarem; but we acted for the best, and nothing is certain in war. We arrived at Thomar after dark and found the duke had fought the

BATTLE OF ACEICEIRA.

He had been joined on the morning of the 14th by Colonel Vasconcellos, and in the evening he occupied Thomar, the enemy having retired on his approach.

On the 15th he communicated to Marshal Saldanha all that he knew of the enemy's position and intentions, which it was difficult to divine, as the information he received from deserters was very different; but in the course of the day a letter was intercepted from General Guedes, who was encamped in the neighbourhood of Aceiceira. This letter ordered the artillery that were coming

from Santarem to halt at Gollegão, which led the duke to suppose it was his intention to retire from his position. This the duke determined to prevent if possible, and either bring him to action the following day if he remained, or follow him should he retire.

On the morning of the 16th he marched from Thomar by the road of Atalaya, and soon discovered the enemy on the heights of Aceiceira, about a league and a half from Thomar. As his advanced guard arrived near Santa Cita, they fell in with the enemy's outposts, who were driven back to the main body, formed in position on the heights and in the valleys of Aceiceira. The duke lost no time, and put his three brigades into as many columns. Colonel Queiroz advanced on the right, João Nepomuceno on the centre, and Colonel Vasconcellos on the left. The enemy, favoured by strong ground and by his artillery, made a vigorous resistance and sustained for a long time the position he occupied, making repeated charges with his cavalry every favourable opportunity; they were repulsed by the right and centre columns with

great gallantry, closely formed, and by their firmness proved they were not to be broken or prevented from gaining the heights, which were finally carried and the enemy totally defeated, and obliged to fly by the roads of Punhete, Torres, Gollegão, and the adjacent mountains and valleys, followed up by the Queen's troops and cavalry, who by a decided charge put the enemy's squadrons to flight, killed and wounded an immense number of men, took fourteen hundred prisoners, including seventy-four officers; four standards and all their artillery and ammunition, consisting of eight pieces. Such was the result of the battle of Aceiceira, the only decisive action that was fought and followed up all the war. Nepomuceno led the Queen's volunteers and the fifteenth regiment to the attack over the roughest ground, animating them by his courage, and giving them confidence by his able dispositions.

Queiroz conducted his column with great bravery and intelligence, and by his able formation of the twelfth caçadores repulsed the cavalry who charged them. Vasconcellos, who commanded the left, was

obliged to make a long circuit with his column under the fire of the enemy's artillery, and met with the most determined resistance, which, however, he overcame with his usual ability. The cavalry under Fonseca deserved also great praise, and by their gallantry contributed greatly to the defeat of the enemy ; and no less credit was due to the artillery under Major Passoa : in short every officer and man did their duty, and Colonel Loureiro, the chief of the duke's staff, showed his usual talent, and received a severe wound in the chest ; the duke also expressed himself highly satisfied with the conduct of all his staff. The dispositions of the Duke of Terceira seem to have been excellent, and could only be excelled by the vigour with which he followed up his attack and profited by his victory ; and I shall ever regret I had not marched on Torres Novas instead of Thomar, where I should have had an opportunity, with my division, of finishing the catastrophe.

On the 17th the duke occupied Gollegão. I occupied Torres Novas, and rode over to compliment him on his brilliant exploit. I was anxious he should cross the Tagus to intercept

the enemy, who of course would leave Santarem ; but the Emperor having arrived at Cartaxo, and taken command of the army, he thought it more advisable to wait for orders. This was another inconvenience attending the system of carrying on the war, and it is very evident by the duke's despatch he thought it so, for he concludes his report giving an account of his campaign, dated in Lisbon on the 8th of August, by saying—" On the 17th I occupied Gollegão, and put myself in immediate communication with the Emperor, who had put himself at the head of the army at Santarem, and this day the operations of the army of the north, which was under my directions, ceased and commenced to operate under the orders of the illustrious chief."

On the Emperor's arrival at Cartaxo he issued a proclamation calling upon Miguel's army to quit his standard, but it had no effect ; they were devoted to their master.

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CHAPTER XI.

AFTER the defeat of the Miguelites, General Guedes reached Santarem with a feeble disorganized force, and General Bernardino crossed the Tagus, and united fifteen hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry at Chamusca. He was reinforced from Santarem by the Chaves cavalry, but they preferred the winning to the losing side, and went over to the Queen's standard. This obliged Bernardino to retire on Evora, very naturally expecting the Duke of Terceira would pass the Tagus in pursuit of him. The garrison of Abrantes took fright when they heard of the loss of the battle of Aceiceira, abandoned the fortress, and retired on Elvas. These disasters decided Miguel to leave Santarem, and retire on Evora. This operation was carried into execution on the 17th and 18th, and conducted so well and so

secretly that the whole of the troops and almost all the artillery and baggage were crossed over the Tagus before Saldanha was aware of it. His spies must have served him badly, and this saved Miguel's army; for had Saldanha received proper information, the enemy could never have effected their retreat from thence.

The Emperor now joined the army, and occupied Santarem with a portion of his troops. I joined him there, as did the Duke of Terceira. Both the marshals were anxious to return to Lisbon, particularly the duke. Don Pedro wished each to take command of a division, and pursue the enemy; having independent commands, they saw the impropriety of this, and urged the Emperor to give the command to one or other. He was anxious for the services of both, and unwilling to put Saldanha under Terceira's orders; in fact he wished it to appear that he, as commander-in-chief, directed the operations of the army, and insisted on them retaining their respective commands. It would have been more for his glory had he gone himself, but I apprehend he was beginning to feel the effects of the illness that

had hung so long about him, and did not feel himself equal to the task.

Terceira, with much reluctance, put himself at the head of his division, which now consisted of nine thousand men, and crossed the Tagus at Santarem. Saldanha returned to Cartaxo, and crossed with a like number at Salvatierra. The passage of the river occupied two days; both armies then marched, Terceira on Estremoz, and Saldanha on Evora; and I returned to Lisbon with the seamen and marines to make any naval arrangements that might be necessary, should the war be carried into the Algarves or into Spain, both of which operations were still open to Miguel. I also despatched vessels on the southern coast to be on the watch for the usurper should he endeavour to escape, and directions were given in case of his capture to bring him into Cascaes Bay. Don Carlos was in a different situation, and it was with some difficulty that I could obtain from the ministry any directions respecting him, and not before I gave them to understand that unless some specific order was given to me, I should not at all interfere.

Things were now drawing to a close: on the 22d of May General Lemos wrote to Terceira and Saldanha to propose a suspension of arms, and on the 23d he proposed an interview. Terceira Appendix,
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XXIX. received the second communication on his march, and declined a reply till he arrived at Estremoz. Saldanha consented to halt when he received Lemos's letter, and finally agreed to a suspension of arms for forty-eight hours.

Don Miguel had united at Evora, notwithstanding all his disasters in battle and by desertion, about ten thousand men, and the division in the Algarves, consisting of three thousand, were ordered to join him. General Louis de Bourmont had arrived with fifteen hundred men from Alcacer do Sal. It was now necessary to take a decision—to remain in the plains of Evora and fight a battle was useless; to retreat on Elvas impossible without first beating Terceira. General Bourmont proposed to unite eight thousand of the best troops, and attack one of the divisions of the Queen's army. This was a bold measure, and worthy of the active officer who proposed it; but Miguel had neither men nor officers fit for such a daring

measure; they were worn out and fatigued with war, and thought they had already done enough for their master, and in a council of war they did not hesitate to say so.

To retire into the Algarves would have prolonged the war. Faro and the minor seaports might have been taken, and supplies received from Spain across the Guadiana if Miguel had money to purchase them; the generality of the people in the Algarves were favourable to his cause, and the country abounded in strongholds.

It is said that Don Carlos proposed to march into Spain, and that appears to me the plan that ought to have been adopted. It would have been a bold and romantic measure. It would also have had the appearance of generosity in Miguel, having lost his own kingdom, to endeavour to recover the kingdom of Spain for his uncle. Whether such an enterprise would have met with the support of Miguel's officers is doubtful. A French writer observes that with the exception of Colonel Corvo de Camoes, the superior officers were unwilling to die in the plains of Evora, and wished to finish the war; the soldiers, on the other hand, were

eager to fight and shed their last blood in Miguel's cause. What, then, should he have done? Why, he ought to have thanked the officers for their services, and dismissed them, giving the command of his army to D'Almer or Bourmont, promoted the officers who chose to remain, and filled their places up from the ranks. With such a devoted army, having every thing to gain and nothing to lose, they would have marched on Madrid, rallied the Carlists, and it is more than probable Carlos would have now been king of Spain, and Miguel might have recovered his crown from thence. Don Pedro was in a much worse position at Oporto, without money, food, or ammunition; but he was obstinate and determined to the last, and finally succeeded. Miguel did not possess these qualities, and deservedly lost his throne.

On the 26th of May a capitulation was entered into, by which Don Pedro forgave his enemies and restored their property, subject, however, to the approval of the Cortes. Miguel lost his rank as Infant, and had a pension conferred on him during good behaviour. The troops laid down their arms and were sent home, and the officers preserved their legitimate rank.

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Thus finished the civil war in Portugal, a war undertaken by a handful of men against a large and well disciplined army,—a war undertaken by the ex-emperor of the Brazils to establish his daughter on the throne of Portugal, which had been usurped by her affianced husband and uncle,—a war conducted by imbecile and intriguing ministers, who hardly ever did one act that was not favourable to Miguel,—and a war brought to a successful termination by a chain of events that never could have been calculated upon, and which I shall take a summary of, when I have disposed of Don's Miguel and Carlos.

On taking leave of his troops Miguel in his proclamation attributed his fall to the Quadruple Alliance. Now that alliance had nothing to do with it; it never ought to have been signed, and never ought to have been ratified; in point of fact it was not ratified, there having been some diplomatic irregularity; and had I been at Lisbon when the treaty arrived, I should have used my best efforts with Don Pedro to have prevented its ratification. When the Emperor was in distress, neither France nor England would give him assistance. What, then, was the use of

a treaty when we had the ball at our feet and were driving it before us? On the contrary, it was owing to that unfortunate treaty that the war is now raging in the Peninsula ; it gave the ministers of France and England a right to interfere in the final arrangements, and to their interference is now owing the unnatural strife in Spain, and the possible return of Miguel to Portugal. What instructions the French and English ministers had I know not ; but when the treaty arrived, their interference became pressing. Freire was urged to offer terms to Miguel, which he declined until the ratification arrived from England.

That their conduct was guided by motives of humanity I have not the least doubt ; it had been currently reported, and I believe it was true, that many of the Queen's officers declared, if an opportunity offered, that they would put both Miguel and Carlos to death ; and the English, French, and Swedish ministers pressed Freire to give positive orders to prevent such a shameful act, which he declined as unnecessary. Here Freire was again wrong ; he ought to have complied with their wishes, and taken every precau-

tion to prevent such a catastrophe, with the express understanding that the fate of Carlos and Miguel should be left to the entire management of the Queen's government.

This was not done, and instead of Don Miguel being received on board a Portuguese ship of war, stationed off Sinnes for that purpose, an English frigate was sent there to embark him, which was accomplished with some difficulty and danger by Captains Lockyer and Macdougall amidst the hootings of the populace, who showed a strong disposition to put him to death.

This frigate was sent by the consent of the Portuguese ministers, but without making any communication to me ; and had there been a Portuguese frigate off Sinnes instead of a corvette, and the officer done his duty, having no orders to permit Miguel's embarkation in an English man-of-war, there must have been something very unpleasant between the two ships.

Captain Lockyer, after embarking Miguel, came to Cascas Bay in company with the *Nimrod*, when Admiral Parker made all the necessary arrangements to carry him to Genoa, the town he had

chosen for his future residence; and from which place, on the 20th of June he issued a manifesto recalling the submission he had made at Evora.

Don Carlos's friends managed his affairs well, and persuaded the English minister and admiral to take entirely upon themselves the arrangements for his embarkation.

After the death of Ferdinand, Carlos had been hovering about on the frontiers of Spain with a few followers, but he had met with no encouragement to enter that kingdom. When the campaign opened in the Tras-os-Montes and Minho, Carlos quitted Braganza, and retired on Lamego; from thence he repaired to Vizieu, and subsequently to Guarda. With fifty followers he presented himself at Rodil's outposts, in hopes his presence would induce the Spanish army to declare for him; in this, however, he was mistaken, and was obliged to make a hasty retreat to Almeida; thither he was followed by Rodil, and had some difficulty in escaping to Guarda, and finally was obliged to retire to Chamousca. After the defeat of Miguel's army, the defection of the Chaves cavalry, and the evacuation of Santarem, Don Carlos retired on Evora, and sent the Baron de

los Valles, a French agent in his service, and one who appeared devoted to his cause, with a letter to Admiral Parker to request he would receive him on board an English ship of war in the Tagus. The baron seems to have managed his mission with all the tact of an accomplished diplomatist; he pretended that Don Carlos wished to go to Italy, and begged he might be conveyed there; this was refused, but he was given to understand he might go any where else. Carlos feigned to be much chagrined at this, and unwillingly consented to go to England, the very place the baron wished to convey him, and on the 1st of June he embarked with his family at Aldea Gallegos in Admiral Parker's barge, his suite following in the boats of the squadron, and was received on board the Donegal under a royal salute, without any restrictions whatever. The

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XXXII. treaty was signed by the Duke of Terceira, the Count of Saldanha, and Mr. Grant, the secretary of Legation. Whether they had authority or not from the Queen's government to sign such a treaty I know not, or whether Lord Howard had instructions from his government to do it I am not aware; but it certainly was the most injudi-

cious and unnecessary act of generosity ever committed by diplomacy, and it will be difficult to persuade posterity that it was not done for the express purpose of embroiling Spain. I do not myself entertain such an idea for a moment, but I repeat, it will be difficult to persuade posterity that it was a diplomatic blunder. By the quadruple treaty Don Pedro was obliged to use all his efforts to drive Don Carlos out of Portugal, and Spain was obliged to employ a military force to drive Don Miguel out; but the Portuguese government, though they would not even allow Don Miguel the title of Infant, and obliged him to sign an engagement never to return to the Peninsula, or disturb the tranquillity of the kingdom of Spain or Portugal, quietly submitted (notwithstanding the demand of General Rodil to deliver up Carlos) to his embarkation without any condition whatever, merely because the English minister thought proper to promise to receive him. He never could have arrived at Aldea Gallegos without permission of the Portuguese government, and instead of embarking him on board a British ship of war, he ought to have been embarked on board

the Portuguese flag-ship, there to remain until the four powers had decided on his fate.

After remaining two days in the Tagus, the *Donnegal* sailed for Portsmouth, where she arrived on the 12th of June. The British government proposed to Don Carlos to renounce his claim to the throne of Spain, which he very wisely refused to do, was landed at Portsmouth, where he remained a fortnight, went to the neighbourhood of London, and in a fortnight more was in the midst of his followers in Navarre :—so much for diplomacy.

The generosity of Don Pedro in giving a full amnesty to the Miguelites was ill received at Lisbon, and the public feeling manifested itself strongly at the opera, where a very disagreeable scene took place. Miguel certainly did not deserve such lenient treatment ; his misrule and that of his minister had ruined some of the most respectable families in Portugal, and many had been immured in dungeons for years ; and I cannot help thinking a little wholesome castigation would neither have hurt Miguel nor his principal satellites. There are several very nice islands in the

western ocean, where he ought to have gone through a probation for a few years. Trusting to his engagement not to disturb Portugal was absurd; he had before, when uncoerced, made solemn promises, all of which he broke; and it cannot be supposed his conscience would suffer much in breaking those he was obliged to make. Don Carlos was in a different position; he had been heir to the throne of Spain in virtue of the Salic law, which was imported into that country by the Bourbons; but still it was the law of the land, and overturning that law promises to keep Spain in civil war for years to come. That the King and Cortes had as much right to change the law of succession in Spain as King, Lords, and Commons have to do it in England, there cannot be a doubt; but still Don Carlos is at liberty to maintain his rights if he can; and for the sake of Western Europe I sincerely hope he will fail; but it is impossible not to admire his perseverance. He threw himself into a corner of Spain to fight for a throne, against an established government, with a large native army, supported by a French and English legion, and assisted by

France and England, feebly assisted it is true; nay, worse than feebly—pusillanimously assisted; and I hope, for the character and honour of this country, that there are reasons, and good reasons too, that prevent England from at once sending an imposing force to expel Don Carlos from the Peninsula. Either let them do that fearlessly and openly, or leave the ring open to the contending parties to settle the succession themselves.

Don Pedro, with a handful of men, was left to his own resources; his cause was the cause of freedom, and hundreds of swords leapt from their scabbards to assist him, and he conquered. Carlos's is the cause of absolutism, and if Spain prefers Carlos and despotism to the Queen and liberty, let her have them; if, on the other hand, she prefers free institutions, she ought to fight for them, and they will have more stability when conquered than they possibly can have if thrust down her throat by foreign bayonets.

When I sailed with the expedition to the Algarves I made no secret of my opinions, and I told both the Duke of Palmella and Terceira,

and indeed every body, that if I found the people of Portugal were averse to the Queen's cause, I would not be one to force her upon them. I hold the same opinion still, and contend that if Spain prefer Carlos to the Queen, she ought to have him; if, on the other hand, the Queen is preferred, now that we have interfered, it is cruel to her party, and still more cruel to Carlos's followers, to allow them to butcher each other, when we have the power of at once settling the question. If Russia is disposed to quarrel with us for interference, the first shot Lord John Hay fired furnished her with as good a reason as if we had landed ten thousand men in the north of Spain; if the expense of the arms, accoutrements, &c. that we have already furnished the Queen's government, and for which we shall never be paid, is taken into consideration, the same money would have gone a great length in paying any troops we sent, and whom we could oblige them to pay before they left the country.

CHAPTER XII.

It may now be as well to take a view of the causes that led to Miguel's downfall.

His first error was in not at once putting down the regency of Terceira; an attempt was made, it is true, which failed, but can it be supposed for a moment, had the resources of Portugal been employed with energy, that insignificant island could have held out a week? His refusal to grant an amnesty, notwithstanding the frequent warnings he had from the Tory administration, was also another cause of his fall. The change of ministry in England, and the French revolution, aroused the energies of the Dukes of Palmella and Terceira; and too much praise cannot be bestowed

on them and their gallant followers for their successful attacks on the Western Islands. I was present at these operations, and made acquaintance with the gallant bands that occupied Terceira. I first knew them in adversity, and admired their patience and cheerfulness under all their misfortunes and deprivations, and their moderation after victory.

The arrival of the Emperor from the Brazils took place at this time, and after the capture of the islands, Palmella repaired to London, and concerted means with Don Pedro for future operations. Don Miguel's government quietly allowed them to collect their forces in the Western Islands, without making one effort to interrupt them on their passage, or destroy them when there. They were allowed to cross from St. Michael's to the coast of Portugal without meeting a Portuguese cruizer. General Cordoza permitted them to land without firing a shot, and Santa Martha abandoned Oporto without an effort. After collecting their forces round Oporto, and having known by experience that their troops were not equal to force Pedro's lines, or take the Serra convent

by assault, they amused themselves for nearly a twelvemonth in drawing lines of circumvallation round Oporto and the neighbourhood, and collecting an immense number of guns and mortars, * foolishly supposing that their firing on the town would force the inhabitants to rise and oblige Pedro to surrender; and to crown this, when Gaspar Texeira took command of the army, he issued a proclamation, calling upon his troops, in the event of taking Oporto, to destroy the whole of the inhabitants. This proclamation gained Pedro every man, woman, and child in the city, whether favourable or hostile to the cause; they felt Oporto was a devoted town, and, if captured, destruction would fall upon their heads, without respecting age, sex, or principles. Had they collected their guns, and established batteries against the Serra convent and the Foz, and issued moderate proclamations, advising the inhabitants to keep quiet in their houses, they would have pounded the batteries to pieces, cut off the communication with the sea, and made friends instead of enemies of the inhabitants of Oporto.

When the expedition sailed for the Algarves,

and appeared off the rock of Lisbon, the Miguelite fleet ought to have put to sea, and made every effort to obstruct the landing; our ships were then crowded with troops, and an action would have been fought under great disadvantage; and if they did not choose to risk an action, instead of following me to the south they ought to have proceeded off Oporto, drove away the numerous merchant vessels, and attacked the Foz in conjunction with the army, and it must have fallen. Even after these errors were committed, had a sufficient force been crossed over to the south, and met the Duke of Terceira after he left Setuval, he would have been placed between two fires, and obliged to gain the high ground by Cape Espichel, to defend himself, till I appeared off; and after the capture of Lisbon, had Miguel's army rallied and marched on the capital, they would have regained it before I had a breeze to bring the squadron to the town.

After Bourmont's failure at Oporto, he ought to have remained before it, and brought all his guns to bear on the Serra and the Foz; he ought

not to have calculated that the Queen's minister at war would have slept for three weeks before he began to fortify Lisbon, and when repulsed there he ought immediately to have sent a sufficient force to the south, and occupied Setuval, which town Mollellos never ought to have left, unless he had intended to have retaken the capital.

The failure before Lisbon was followed by the resignation of General Bourmont, caused by the intrigues of Miguel's ministers, who, like Pedro's, fancied they were monstrous clever fellows, and knew the art of war better than the marshals. General Macdonell next took the command of the army, and like his predecessor, was intrigued against, and resigned; he was followed by Povoas and then Lemos, who allowed Saldanha to make a flank movement on Pernes, and afterwards on Leiria and Thomar, and patrol even to Gallegao. Troops were then recalled from the rich and strong provinces in the north of Portugal, and after Saldanha had had time to concentrate his forces, he was attacked at Alinoster, the Miguelites beaten back to Santarem; and to complete their follies a strong division was sent into the

Algarves, about the same time we were augmenting our force in the north. The troops before Oporto, instead of retreating to Braga, and detaching a force to save Vianna and Valenca, and drive me across the Minho, (where from the richness of the country and the strength of the ground they could have maintained themselves for ever,) retreated on Amarante, and from thence south, leaving the whole of the north in our possession, with the means of reinforcing the Duke of Terceira's army on his march to Santarem; finally, they did not dispute one inch of ground with the duke as he advanced, and left a garrison of twelve hundred men in Ourem, when they could have been better employed at Aceceira.

Such were, in my opinion, the faults committed by Miguel's government, and I shall now relate all the blunders committed by Pedro's.

Instead of purchasing two bad frigates, and hiring transports to carry the army, they ought either to have hired or purchased ten East India-men, embarked their troops, and run them into the Tagus. Such a bold measure would have paralysed Miguel's army, and gained the capital :

which would have finished the war, provided the ministers knew how to rule the country after they got it.

I shall pass over all the faults that were committed in raising men, in breaking faith with them, and disgusting the foreign troops, and shall bring them at once to Oporto. There, it has been shewn, they landed without opposition, but instead of crossing the Douro, and pushing boldly on, they remained in Oporto till Miguel's army recovered their panic, and got the better of their unwillingness to fight against a royal personage.

There was not one wise act done at Oporto afterwards. They intrigued against Terceira, and got him to resign. They lost the wine at Villa Nova. Instead of nursing their troops, they threw away their lives in useless sorties; they disgusted Sartorius, and nearly lost their squadron; they intrigued against Solignac, and wanted him to march out of Oporto, which they were afraid to do when they first landed. They treated all the foreign officers and men ill, and drove the best of them away; and had they been left to themselves, they would have either surrendered Oporto,

or escaped from it. Fortunately the Emperor was a strong-minded man, and was determined to defend it to the last extremity; that saved Oporto. Sylva Carvalho, the minister of finance, was a bold financier, and procured money:—he deserves credit.

When the expedition arrived from England, the Emperor was spirited up against Palmella, Mendizabel, and myself; and he was hardly civil to us; nay, more, I believe nothing but fear kept his ministers from either sending Palmella away or to prison. Ten days' precious time was lost by their intrigues and indecision after we arrived, and when the Emperor had decided to go himself with five thousand men, I positively believe he was dissuaded from it under pretence that he ought not to risk his imperial person; but in reality they were afraid to go in the flag-ship with me, and still more to stay in Oporto with Solignac; and when they sent me off troops, they forgot to send water.

When they were shut up in Oporto, I am not aware of one wise statesman-like decree they issued, or one that had the least tendency to conci-

liate the opposite party ; and when they arrived in Lisbon, there was hardly one political act they did, that Don Miguel would not himself have counselled them to do in order to make Don Pedro unpopular. I have no hesitation in asserting that had they staid in Oporto one month, and left Palmella, Terceira, and myself in Lisbon, the war would have been finished.

I assert this from experience ; for when I landed at Caminha with between five and six hundred men, only in ten days I gained the whole of the province of the Minho (which is decidedly Miguelite) by kindness and conciliation ; and because the troops stationed there had confidence in the promises I made to them, and the people were satisfied that no persecutions for political opinion would be permitted.

With regard to military measures or plans they never had any ; Lisbon was left defenceless for three weeks, and they never believed that Bourmont would appear before it. They did not accept the assistance that was offered to them by Admiral Parker under the plea of protecting British property, which would have had a great

moral effect on the Miguelites ; and when Bourmont approached, they applied for it but were refused. The Duke of Terceira, after having performed the greatest service, was never consulted, and was merely left in command of his division. Setuval, the best port in Portugal after Lisbon, was left I believe two months without any defence. The Algarves were frequently left without provisions. They endeavoured to prevent me from going to the north ; they disgusted Saldanha ; in fact the only wise act they ever did was sending the Duke of Terceira to Oporto, and then they sent him horses without men to mount them. They disgusted all the foreign troops, and broke faith with them by wholesale, and then were surprised at their being disorderly.

They certainly clothed their own troops well and paid them regularly, and Saldanha organized them ; but after the war was over and Saldanha and Terceira unemployed, Freire ruined them. As for the navy, I never could get my old minister of marine to do one single act for its advantage ; he was as immoveable as a rock, and nearly as little animated.

After the capture of Figueras I sent a small squadron to blockade Madeira, and on Miguel's army laying down their arms, the governor gave up the island to Captain Bertram, who commanded the ships-of-war. He took upon himself the government *ad interim*, and by his judicious management very soon brought things into a state of peace and quietness.

The inspector of the arsenal had been sent to Brest to fit out the ships the French squadron had taken from Lisbon. France had a demand on Portugal for three or four hundred thousand francs, and Mr. Freire, in his character of foreign minister, negotiated the matter so badly that she refused to give the ships up; and for that paltry sum they were left at Brest to run to decay. This minister had the art of disgusting every person he had to treat with, whether native or foreigner. I had prepared the Duchess of Braganza to bring them over, landing me first at Portsmouth, having obtained permission from the Emperor to return to England for a few weeks; and on the 10th of June, the day twelvemonth I hoisted my flag, I sailed from Lisbon, and, after a pleasant passage

of fourteen days, landed at Portsmouth, where I was received in the most gratifying manner by the inhabitants. After ascertaining that there was no prospect of the ships at Brest being restored, the Duchess of Braganza went into dock and received some slight repairs. I passed a few weeks with my family, and repaired to Lisbon in the packet, to wind up the affairs of the officers and men, who were all anxious to return to England; which met the wishes of the Portuguese Government, who manifested the most indecent haste to get rid of those men who had served them so well and so faithfully. The officers, by contract, had their choice of remaining in the Portuguese service or leaving it; commissioned officers in the navy receiving four years' full pay, and all others two: but as the Government showed no wish to preserve them, and even positively refused to keep any employed, they all sent in their resignation; and after much trouble and unnecessary delays in paying the men, which delays cost the Government at least £50,000, the whole were sent to England, paid to the time their accounts were made up, and a

positive assurance that the six weeks' arrears would be paid on their arrival in England, which, however, has not been done to this day, notwithstanding my repeated applications.

On my return to Lisbon I found the Emperor in very bad health; his troubles, anxieties, and fatigues for the last two years had been too much even for his robust frame, and he was now evidently declining. He had taken up his residence at Queluz, where he hoped quiet might restore his health. During my absence he had visited Oporto with the Empress and the Queen, and the sea-voyage and the excitement attending such a visit had certainly not been at all conducive to his health. The approaching meeting of the Cortes, before whom he was preparing to lay an account of what he had done for the restoration of the Queen and Charter, and also to resign the Regency, kept him in a constant state of excitement.

On the 15th of August the Emperor met both Houses of Parliament in the Chamber of Deputies,

Appendix, and after having given a long account of what he had
No.
LXXIII. done, he resigned the Regency and retired. His

medical adviser, a Brazilian, the only one he employed, recommended him to try the baths of Caldes, which he did for a few days, and returned decidedly worse.

Both Chambers having decided that the Emperor should preserve the Regency and the command of the army during the minority of the Queen, they assembled on the 29th, at the palace of the Ajuda, where the Emperor took the oaths prescribed by the Charter. He now suffered so much from a difficulty of breathing, that it was with evident pain and inconvenience that he got through the ceremony, and after remaining a short time at the Ajuda, during which he got rapidly worse, he retired to Queluz.

At this time the Chamber of Peers consisted of only sixteen members, for all those who supported Miguel were excluded. Palmella was appointed President for life. Very few of the peers were favourable to the ministry; but, with the exception of the Marquises of Loulé and Frontera, Counts de Taipa and Villa Real, they all voted on the ministerial side. On the 1st of September the

Emperor created twenty-four new peers, the greater part of whom supported the ministry.

Don Pedro became so much worse that on the 17th he sent a message to the Cortes, expressing his wish to resign the Regency; and after a short delay and a little intriguing, the Queen was declared of age, and assumed the reins of government. Taking every thing into consideration, and her approaching marriage, perhaps it was the wisest thing they could have done; but the death of her husband threw every thing into confusion, and left her a young inexperienced woman, without either chart or compass to direct her, hence the constant changes that have since occurred.

Her first act was to confer on Don Pedro the Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword for his services, which he had not assumed when Regent, and a few days after, the Duke of Palmella was desired to form an administration. Whether this was done with or without the approbation of the Emperor, is very doubtful; I am inclined to believe he was far from satisfied at seeing

Palmella entrusted with the re-construction of the ministry, and he, on the other hand, found it no easy matter. Saldanha, who had placed himself at the head of the opposition and declined the peerage, positively refused to serve with Carvalho and Freire; and the Duke was obliged to consign himself again into the hands of the men who had before put him out of the ministry. Mendizabel was anxious to preserve Carvalho, and he would not serve without Freire, and with them Palmella, (by the aid of Mendizabel, who took part in every transaction, even in recommending to the Emperor's medical men how he ought to be treated,) patched up an administration which it was very evident could not last. He became President of the Council without a portfolio; Carvalho Minister of Finance; Freire, who had proved himself unfit for Minister at War, and had ruined the army, took the Marine to ruin that also; Villa Real, Foreign Affairs; Bishop of Coimbra, the Interior Ferraz of Justice; and Terceira, Minister at War. When the ministry was formed I waited on Freire and put into his hands a plan by which the navy should be governed, and in the

Appendix,
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XXXIV.

event of its not being adopted, I signified my intention of resigning. I also sent it to the Duke of Palmella, by whom it was submitted to the ministry and rejected. My resignation followed, and I applied myself to the winding up of the accounts of all the officers and men, which was soon effected. Bills were made out in Mendizabel's name and mine, at three, six, nine, and twelve months for the payment of the prize money, and the officers received their gratuity agreeable to their claims.

The minister approved of a list I presented to him for the settlement of the claims of the widows and orphans. This list assigned to the heirs of officers killed in battle or drowned the gratuity which they should have received had they lived. This was also extended to the mothers, wives, and children of those who died in the service. The list was approved by Mr. Augustinho Freire, and I was the bearer of it to England, yet unknown to me this honest minister wrote a letter to the Portuguese minister in London, desiring him to inquire what were the British regulations, and if he found those regulations entitled them to a

larger sum than the allowance fixed by me and agreed to by him, they were to have it; but if a less sum they were to have the British regulation. Although representations have been made by me on this subject to every minister of marine, one of which will be found in the Appendix, no attention whatever has been paid to their claims, and at the moment I am writing, many widows and orphans are still starving.

Appendix
No.
XXXV.

The complaint of the Emperor, which was originally inflammation of the lungs, had settled into a decided consumption, added to which dropsy had made its appearance; and notwithstanding the violent and torturing remedies that were applied the disease baffled all the skill of his medical attendants, and on the 24th of September, 1834, he breathed his last in the arms of his amiable consort, who had never left him a moment. He was perfectly sensible of his approaching end, and bore his sufferings with Christian fortitude. Shortly before he died he sent for a private of the 5th Caçadores (his own regiment), and by him sent his last farewell to the troops.

His loss to Portugal was great, the services he

had performed were of a nature that entitled him to the gratitude of the whole nation, and had he lived Portugal would have been saved from the misrule that has brought her on the brink of ruin.

It is difficult to describe the character of princes, and none but those who are intimately connected with them have an opportunity of knowing their real sentiments.

Don Pedro was above the middle stature, of a strong robust habit. He had a fine forehead and fierce eye, a sallow complexion, and marked with the small pox, his face was by no means prepossessing. He had the appearance of a savage-looking man, but that was not his character. On the contrary he had no cruelty in his disposition. He prided himself on being a liberal prince, and a friend to free institutions, nevertheless he, like most princes, and indeed like most men, was very fond of having his own way.

He was proud of military renown, and fancied himself a great general. But when Saldanha was at the head of his staff, and had acquired his confidence, he left the command of the army almost entirely to him.

Don Pedro's name will go down to posterity as having freed the land of his birth from despotism, and restored the throne of his daughter, and without having any thing personal in view except the desire of gaining glory,

He was suspected of aiming at the crown of Portugal. But I believe his thoughts were more turned to the possibility of his being called to the throne of Spain, in the event of any thing happening to the young Queen.

He was the most active man I ever saw, rose early, and looked into every thing himself, and knowing the procrastinating character of the Portuguese, he was right; had it not been for his activity the expedition would never have sailed from the Western Islands. He was a man of courage, but not of dash, or he would not have been persuaded to remain at Oporto instead of advancing the moment he landed, or given up his * intention of embarking in the squadron with five thousand men.

When his mind was made up, he was firm and determined, and even obstinate; nothing but the last extremity would have induced him to have

given up the contest. He was more easily elated by success than cast down by adversity; he was frank and I believe sincere, and hated both intriguing and lying. He was a bad politician and unwise prince, for if he did not like a person he took no pains to conceal it.

He did not easily forgive his enemies, but he was not cruel to them, nor was he very kind to his friends.

To sum up his character, his good qualities were his own, his bad owing to want of education; and no man was more sensible of that defect than himself.

He was universally regretted by the whole nation. The Miguelites even lost a friend in him, and had he lived I believe Portugal would have been in a very different situation than it now is.

His remains were moved from Queluz by torchlight on the 28th of September, and conveyed to the cathedral of St. Vincent de Foro. He was buried with the honours of a general officer, agreeable to his own request. Saldanha, Terceira, and myself were the chief mourners. The funeral was attended by all the principal people and nobility

in Lisbon. The streets through which the cortege passed were lighted and lined with the military and national guards: it was a solemn sight. The inhabitants seemed really afflicted at their loss, and few dry eyes were to be seen amongst the females who were at the windows as the procession passed. The ceremony in the church was imposing, after which the coffin was deposited in the vaults. This done, we returned to the body of the church, and Pacol d'Almeida, the Emperor's Chamberlain, with tears in his eyes and much affected, delivered up the keys of the coffin to the Bishop. A paper was then signed by the chief mourners and other officers and people, certifying the day his remains were deposited amongst those of his ancestors.

On the 15th of October I hauled down my flag, and received the following letter from the Queen.

COUNT CAPE ST. VINCENT,

I, the Queen, send you much health. Taking into consideration the weighty reasons by which you are convinced that you cannot continue to

exercise the functions of Major-General of the Navy, to which you had been named by the Royal Letter of the 10th June, eighteen hundred and thirty-three, and the extraordinary circumstances of war having ceased which made it necessary to invest you with the command-in-chief of the squadron which was confided to you by the Royal Letter of the said date,

I now exonerate you from the said command-in-chief, as well as from the office of Major-General ; notwithstanding you will preserve the honorary post of Admiral, in consideration of your distinguished valour and the various services for which you have deserved my entire approbation and praise.

I communicate this to you for your information.

Given in the Palace of the Necessidades, the 15th of October, eighteen hundred and thirty-four.

A RAINHA.

To the Count Cape St. Vincent.

The House of Peers, on the motion of the Count de Taipa, honoured me with a vote of

thanks for my services: this vote was written on parchment, signed by the Peers, to which was attached a gold seal, and conveyed to me by the Duke of Palmella, the president of the Chamber.

Chamber of Peers.

ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT LORD,

I have the honour of conveying to your Excellency the resolution of the Chamber of Peers, who express the most sincere and unanimous thanks of the said Chamber to your Excellency for the weighty reasons therein mentioned, and at the same time that I believe that this resolution will be very agreeable to your Excellency, I cannot help assuring your Excellency that I have great pleasure and satisfaction in communicating it.

God preserve your Excellency!

DUKE OF PALMELLA,

President of the Chamber of Peers.

Palace of the Cortes,

December 9th, 1834..

*To his Excellency
Count Cape St. Vincent.*

The Chamber of Peers of the kingdom of Portugal unanimously resolve that a vote of thanks be given to Admiral Napier, Count Cape St. Vincent, for his brilliant and heroic conduct in the naval action of the 5th of July, 1833, in the waters of Cape St. Vincent, and for the services which he afterwards performed by sea and land, which greatly contributed to the establishment of her Most Faithful Majesty and the Constitutional Charter.

The Chamber also resolves, that to the illustrious and always conquering Admiral their thanks be communicated in this form, as a perpetual testimony of their gratitude.

Given in Lisbon on the 1st of December, 1834.

Signed by the Peers.

Don Pedro had, after the action of the 5th of July, conferred on me the Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword; Commodore Wilkinson and Captain Peak were made Commanders, and the other officers Companions, with the gold or silver Cross agreeable to their ranks. A good many silver Crosses were also given to the men who

particularly distinguished themselves. After the campaign in the Minho I had been created Count Cape St. Vincent, and when the war was ended the Duke of Terceira was created Duke, Relation, and Saldanha a Marquis.

On the 1st of November I took leave of the Queen and Empress ; the latter presented me with a lock of Don Pedro's hair in a gold locket, and on the 4th I embarked for England in the packet, the minister of marine not having either offered me a ship to carry me home, or even complimented me with a salute on leaving the Tagus.

Shortly after my arrival in England I read in the papers that the Chamber of Deputies had also given me a vote of thanks, as also to the officers and men in the action ; the same was given to the Duke of Terceira and Saldanha, and the officers of the army and soldiers.

A P P E N D I X.

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

Oct. 5th, 1833.

MY DEAR SIR,

I enclose your Excellency the copy of a letter sent to me by the Director of the Comptability. If I understand that order right I can be of no further use here, because all appointments and promotions emanating from me must cease, as I never can subject myself to give an appointment to an officer who is not in consequence to be paid. I must also observe, that orders coming direct from the minister of marine to a subordinate officer brings me into contempt with the officer to whom they are addressed, and leaves me completely in the dark with respect to what is going on.

Yours, &c.

TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE COUNTABILITY,

His Imperial Majesty determines that no receipt belonging to any individual of the marine department shall be noted in the Marine Countability but in virtue of decrees, patents or any other legal documents emanating direct from government, and recommends the most scrupulous execution of this order.

AGOSTINHO JOZE FREIRE.

Palace of the Necessidades,

Sept. 9th, 1833.

October 6th.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL,

I have just received a letter from you at half-past three, which I sincerely confess has afflicted me.

The fact is that the order, of which you sent me a copy, is no more than the execution of a law which I myself have no right to infringe. It is necessary that appointments of a certain importance ought to be sanctioned by a decree of H. I. M. otherwise they cannot be paid; and if I order them to be paid, I will be responsible before the Cortes, in which case I should have, as you well know, a number of enemies to accuse me, without it being in my power to answer. On the contrary, if I follow a rule, I shall be liberated from responsibility, without your losing any of your powers; besides, you know that I refuse to make any promotion. I could order the payment, but to keep the books in order in the countability, it is absolutely necessary to present decrees.

I yet beg leave to observe that the responsibility weighs exclusively on the minister, and consequently his orders must be on the Treasury. H. I. M. in the quality of commander-in-chief, has himself no previous knowledge of what regards money.

Marshal Beresford and Lord Wellington had also no authority on the treasury or arsenal. By this you will see that there is not, on my part, the least idea of contradicting you, and that you will not be less at liberty to make your appointments.

No. II.

MY LORD,

As long as I remained on the list of naval officers I abstained from delicacy writing to your Lordship on the affairs of Portugal.

Your Lordship is aware of the occurrences up to the present moment; they have been great, and fortune has had her full share in placing us in Lisbon. I am, however, far from thinking the affairs of Portugal settled. The enemy have a considerable army on foot, certainly in a state of disorganization, but they are commanded by experienced French officers fighting on Portuguese ground for the Duke of Bordeaux, while Don Carlos is assisting Miguel in order to support his own cause in Spain. It is beyond a doubt that many French officers

pass through Spain to join this army; they are also supplied with money, and I dare say with men also, and this can be easily done without it coming officially to our knowledge.

The English government have acknowledged the Queen it is true, but I fear that will not put an end to the misfortunes of this country. She must do more, unless she wishes to see Portugal become a field of blood. Already in various places have the Miguelites been committing the most horrid murders. At Beja, and many towns of the Algarves, the most abominable scenes have taken place, and we have not troops to prevent it. We are organizing men, and establishing lines for the defence of Lisbon as fast as possible; but should the enemy break through them, your Lordship can form no idea of what will happen here. I see only two ways of preventing this; the first is, England sending troops to assist her ally; the second is, France and England insisting on the immediate recognition of the Queen by Spain. There is also another means, which I shall most decidedly advise, let the consequence be what it will: should this horrid war last, and be encouraged by Spain, we must fight her with her own weapons. Your Lordship, I dare say, is perfectly aware were I to appear off Cadiz with my squadron, composed of two sail of the line, two hundred and fifty guard-ships, three frigates, three corvettes, and half-a-dozen brigs, in half-an-hour it would be revolutionized, and Spain would have to look to herself. Now I am far from wishing this: we

have no business with Spain, if she is quiet; if otherwise, she must take the consequence.

This is my own opinion. I have never conversed with the Emperor or ministers on the subject; but nothing but decision will save this country.

I am sorry to see many of the English papers full of getting rid of Don Pedro. It would be the greatest misfortune that could happen. He is the most active man in Portugal. He saved Oporto; and if it had not been for him, I never would have got the lines begun at Lisbon. He has his faults, like other people, but he is far from being a bad man. He is a great favourite with the army and the people, and it would be no easy matter to displace him. I for one would not lend myself to it. I believe him to be perfectly sincere about the young Queen; he was the first to propose to send for her. As to his ministers, I regret exceedingly Palmella is not at the head of the administration; it will come round, I have no doubt, in time, but the less he is spoken of and brought in competition with the Emperor the better. The way to keep him out is to try to force him in.

CAPE ST. VINCENT.

No. III.

Don Pedro's letter to the Queen of Spain not having been delivered, it is considered improper to publish it.

No. IV.

St. Ubes, November 3, 1833.

MY LORD,

I beg to inform you that the enemy attacked our position at Alcasa, on the morning of the 2d instant, in three columns, consisting of infantry and cavalry to the number of about 1500, under the command of General Lemos. The English and Portuguese marines under my command were stationed in front of the constitutional troops as skirmishers, and kept the enemy at bay till the cavalry charged them in three squadrons, when we immediately formed into square and twice repulsed them with great loss. We then prepared to charge a column of infantry, who were advancing, but the Portuguese volunteers and ninth infantry, who were stationed in our rear, seeing the determined manner in which we were attacked, betook themselves to rapid flight without firing a shot, leaving my men with some of the Portuguese marines to do the best we could, and when finding ourselves overpowered by numbers we commenced our retreat, keeping the enemy at bay and covering the flight of the Portuguese. I tried to persuade the colonel, commanding our troops, who asked my opinion, to retire to a convent, a strong position on our right, at which place we might have made a good stand, but instead of doing this he led to the marshes beside the river; and here the scene was beyond description, the whole country was strewed with arms and accoutrements, which the volunteers threw away in their

flight, and the enemy's cavalry closing on them hewed them down in all directions. I kept my men together, and made good my retreat to the side of the river with the loss of only three men; but on coming to the river for want of a sufficient number of boats (the Portuguese troops having taken all) the men were obliged to throw away their arms and accoutrements and swim across the river under a heavy fire of musketry from the enemy, who lined the north bank of the river. In this place, I am sorry to say, my loss was great, in consequence, I fear, of some of the officers and men breaking off to the right and attempting to pass the river lower down, they were all cut off. My loss consists of Mr. Ebsworth, taken prisoner; Mr. Fitzpatrick, drowned in crossing the river; four non-commissioned officers and thirty men, killed and taken prisoners. I assure your excellency I cannot speak too highly of the gallant conduct of my officers and men.

The colonel commanding lost all self command and gave himself up to the enemy; and a great number of the volunteers, when they found themselves surrounded, passed over to the enemy, crying "Viva Don Miguel." The loss of the Portuguese in killed, wounded, taken prisoners, and missing, could not be less than eight hundred men.

The remainder of my men and officers are now on board the Donna Maria, where I wait your Excellency's orders.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's

Most obedient humble servant,

— BIRT, Captain of Marines.

MY DEAR SIR,

There has been nothing but the greatest mismanagement displayed here, as you will see by the report of Captain Birt, which I send you.

It appears that the Queen's forces took possession of Alcacer de Sal on the 25th of October, the enemy flying from the place.

Colonel Florenza advanced at four in the morning of the second, about three miles, and took up a position; the enemy made a movement on his left, which brought his troops into a plain, with a wood on each side of him. The Portuguese troops were drawn up across this plain with the English marines and Portuguese brigade in front as skirmishers; they advanced three squadrons of cavalry at a gallop; Captain Birt threw the marines into a rallying square, and repulsed them with great loss. The cavalry formed again, and were again repulsed with severe loss, retiring in the rear of their infantry; Captain Birt then formed in line, and advanced against a column of infantry, then coming forward to attack him: at this moment the whole of the Portuguese troops turned round, fired a volley in the air, and fairly run away as fast as they could. He was in consequence obliged to retire, and cover their flight to the town; there the volunteers threw away their accoutrements and ammunition. Captain Birt begged Colonel Florenza to rally his regiment at a castle on this side of the town; but his head was so entirely gone that nothing was done, and away they all went, helter-skelter, through the

marshes towards the river. The cavalry took a road to the right, and cut them up in all directions; some escaping in boats, some swimming, many drowning, and the others surrendering. Captain Birt pursued his retreat in good order to the river, where he found all the boats gone down with those who had saved themselves. There were boats on the opposite side of the river, which were brought over by some of his men who could swim, those who could not went in the boats on board a yacht, the others swam off: a party of fifty, with several officers, went lower down the river, where they were charged by the cavalry; those who could swim took to the water, the rest were either killed or taken. Lieutenant Fitzpatrick I believe was drowned; Mr. Ebsworth was taken. Our loss is fifty-four marines and four commissioned officers killed, drowned, and taken. As for the rest of the troops God knows where they are. I heard two hundred are at Palmella, and there may be about a hundred here. I have ordered the men from Palmella, and am rallying the rest as fast as I can.

&c. &c. &c.

No. V.

Is the decree against the old contractors of tobacco, which cannot be found, but the nature of it is stated in the work.

No. VI.

Count Taipa's first Remonstrance.

To His Imperial Majesty.

SIRE,

In England the peers of the realm address the sovereign in their individual character, even on ordinary affairs, that have any connexion with the public weal. Raised as I have been by your Majesty to the high rank of a peer of the kingdom, I adopt the same means to make your Majesty acquainted with matters of the highest consequence, in which not only the fair fame of your Majesty is concerned, but on which also depend the interests of the nation so gloriously saved by your Majesty's arms from the most atrocious despotism. This fame evil councillors are attempting to blacken, by casting upon your Majesty's name foul aspersions that have no place there, and by changing into sorrow the enthusiasm and gratitude with which the Portuguese nation hailed your Majesty as the restorer of the national liberties. The suspension of the laws, which ought never to take place but in cases of absolute emergency, has been vilely made use of as a cloak to cover rapine and confiscation, as well as numerous arbitrary arrests, confessedly unnecessary.

Occupied as your Majesty is in carrying on the war, and liable to the misfortune, common to all princes, of with difficulty hearing the truth when the liberty of the press does not break through the veil that surrounds

them; your Majesty knows little of what is passing. But I will attempt to enlighten your Majesty with respect to all the complaints that the want of political courage, and the habit of submission to despotic power, prevent reaching your Majesty's ears, trusting that your Majesty, when better informed, will make the constitution a reality while your ministers only wish to make it a falsehood. Let not your Majesty imagine that I am actuated by any spirit of party, or any expectations of favour from some new ministry. I here publicly beg of your Majesty that if at any time that should be presented to you a petition of mine for any favour or office during the present or future ministry, your Majesty will put on the back of it "dishonoured."

The tobacco contract is the business that has principally induced me to offer this letter to your Majesty's notice: it is a business which has given scandal to the whole city, and carried consternation into numerous families by the destruction of their property, by the despotic acts of the minister, and by exactions more tyrannical than those of the most atrocious Roman proconsul. The contract has been given clandestinely to an individual for 1,200 contas of reis, for the space of twelve years, while there were here in Lisbon persons who offered 1,400 contas: so that the public revenue suffers a loss of 6,000,000 of crusadas, an arrangement in which I am sorry to say your Majesty's credit is called in question by those who are not so well acquainted as myself with the elevation and greatness of your Majesty's moral virtues.

Moreover, Sire, the ministry, after having acknowledged the impossibility of the present contractors to pay their monthly obligations in the royal order of the 10th of September last, for the obvious reason of their not being masters of the contract, in consequence of the provinces being occupied by the rebel forces, has suddenly ordered the property of the said contractors to be confiscated, to the amount of 500 contas of reis, the sum which would be due to the government in case that the commerce of Portugal and the islands were free. Such an act of tyranny was never before practised by any government upon its people; nor can that *summa injuria* be palliated by the *summum jus*, because nobody can exact a right if he does not comply with his own obligations.

If the contractors are bound to pay, the government is equally bound to leave them the means of pursuing the branch of trade which they have undertaken free and unembarrassed; but this is impossible, in consequence of the occupation of the country by the rebel troops.

But, Sire, public opinion does not hesitate to say that this confiscation is neither more nor less than an act of private revenge by a cabal, in consequence of the present contractors having outbid by 200 contas, those on whom the contract has been clandestinely (*camarar-camente*) bestowed. Of this indeed there can be no doubt, because laying aside the morality of the case, and looking at it only as a question of interest, it is not with such precipitation, and that too, without consulting the council of state, that a measure on which the ex-

istence or credit of one of the principal branches of our trade depends, should be adopted.

Therefore, Sire, out of love to my country, for the honour of your Majesty, for the triumph of justice, and above all that it may not go forth to the world, that your Majesty's government is but little different from a government that bears the very stamp of infamy—that of Don Miguel—I pray your Majesty, after convoking your council of state, and obtaining better information, to act with that justice which is so congenial to your Majesty's heart.

I am your Imperial Majesty's

Faithful subject,

CONDE DE TAIPA,

Peer of the Realm.

Lisbon, October 25, 1833.

No. VII.

Taipa's second Letter.

SIRE,

The Constitutional Charter (chap. 8. § 28) says,
“ Every citizen shall be at liberty to present in writing to the legislature and executive authorities reclamations, complaints, and petitions ; and even to expose any in-

fraction of the constitution by demanding at the hands of the competent authorities the practical responsibility of the infractors." Availing myself of this political right, which the Constitutional Charter allows me, I again throw myself at Your Majesty's feet to expose to Your Majesty the false position in which the present ministry has placed the cause of the Queen Donna Maria II. by rendering a part of the nation indisposed towards Your Majesty, and by preventing such foreign governments as are friendly to us from interposing their good offices to restore peace and tranquillity to this unfortunate country.

The Portuguese nation desires nothing so much as tranquillity : distracted with dissensions ever since the year 1820, she is so exhausted and worn out that nothing but desperation still keeps together to the bloody standard of Don Miguel that portion of the people which, having been deceived or compelled, has followed the cause of injustice. Difficulties are increasing from day to day. The recovery of the kingdom is paralysed by the imbecility of ministers and the discredit of government. The ministry has completely lost the opinion of the public. The most helpless ignorance is displayed in their laws. The merest clumsiness in all the provisions of government. The most scandalous profligacy in almost all the appointments of their officers, and in all their other acts. The present ministry does not represent the interests even of a party : it is purely a faction of ignorant charlatans, anarchists, cosmopolites, without name, without property, without services, without talents ; who

belong to Portugal simply from the circumstance of their being born within its territory: their only object being to engross for themselves all the fat appointments of the state.

Principles they have none, either good or bad; they were unjustly accused of being ultra-liberal. They are anything and everything, the dregs of all parties; the *caput-mortuum* of all factions, from which they have formed a new and unwonted monster.

Thus alone is explained the strange phenomenon that we see them presenting, at once both friends and enemies, ungrateful and disloyal to their friends, and impolitic to their enemies, they gain no hearts, and make all foes.

Not one of these accusations is vague: I will point out and examine analytically the facts.

Vattel, that great writer on the laws of nations, whose authority is almost received as law among the nations of Europe, says, treating on civil wars, "le plus sur moyen," &c. &c. ' * * * *

The men who compose the present ministry have placed us in the case mentioned in the last sentence which I have just quoted in the words of the author.

The Constitutional Charter says, (chap. 8, § 19) "no punishment shall go beyond the person of the delinquent, therefore in no case shall confiscation of goods or public infamy be extended to the criminal's relations in any degree."

In the present case, Sire, although the Charter does not prohibit confiscations, policy imperatively demands

the prohibition. The citizens of Oporto, who, on the for ever memorable day of the 29th of September, 1832, went forth almost unarmed, to face death upon the bayonets of the usurpation, had seen Villa Nova pillaged. It was the defence of their Penates that impelled them to this heroism.

By the decree of the 31st August, 1833, the ministry, after a wily preamble, proceeds to plunder the greater part of the proprietors of Portugal, because the regiments of militia which were compelled, under the pain of seeing their houses burned, to go and fight for the usurpation, are composed of the provincial proprietors. They are too numerous to have the name of rebels : but being desperate of every thing which constitutes the happiness of man they may be elevated to the heroism of desperation—not to conquer, for the cause of the usurper cannot succeed, but to make this war of devastation last long enough to annihilate this wretched country. I fear not, Sire, the execution of this decree : I fear only the terror which it inspires—because there is in it nothing more than the diabolical wish of the ministry, having in itself the salutary principle of its impracticability ; and I will yet quote Vattel, who says, “ La punition,” &c. * * * * *

Sire, Your Majesty cannot make laws, because the legislative power is by its nature incommunicable : when the ministers of the restoration in France were wishing to make of the French charter the same mockery which Your Majesty’s ministers are seeking to make of the charter which Your Majesty has granted, that illustrious

peer of France, Count de Landjuinais, whose voice is always heard in the defence of liberty, said, "Le pouvoir," &c. &c. * * * *

But I will grant that the supreme law of public safety authorized every thing: that upon it was founded the dictatorial authority which the government has arrogated to itself; yet this authority could not extend further than circumstances required.

What circumstances have authorized government to create new places, to establish their salaries, increase them, multiply them infinitely, and then add supernumeraries?

They have assumed to themselves the reformation of the administration of justice, and created a much greater number of judges, doubled the length of the processes, confounded the inextricable confusion of legal chicanery! Jurisconsults as little at home in their country's laws which they have set themselves to reform as in those of the civilized nations which they have copied without having understood; they have published in that disgraceful law of the 10th of May last a solemn record of their gross ignorance and miserable talents. Ragged patches picked by these clumsy hands from the French codes, and with fitting skill stitched, without order or connexion, into a barbarous language, filled with ambiguities (amphibologies) and obscurities, and even grammatical errors which would put a lay brother to shame! Such is the law with which our Lycurguses have presumed to reform the courts and the legislature of their country! Let him who ventures to deny any one of

these accusations enter the lists, and I will sustain them one by one upon him.

More scandalous still perhaps is another pretended reform, that of the clergy, secular and regular. No church was in need of more reform than the Portuguese, but the mission was not for such apostles; and never by such means was the Gospel preached. It would be enough to mention here one name to be more than sufficient: it would be enough to name the priest Marcos Soares Vaz Preto, to whom, from the formulary of his curious sentences, the public have given the title of *Conselheiro Profanador*. The word profane, although it is not incorrect, has the effect of rooting in the opinion of the people that sophism *ad odium*, the war-cry of "Freemasons," with which our enemies have endeavoured to make us execrated through the ignorance of the people. Common sense is horrified at such stupidity. They have profaned the convents, taken their rents, taken to themselves the subsistence of the secular clergy, not provided for the ecclesiastical revenues of the priests. They have done all this and more; but where appears a single provision for the reformation and improvement, intellectual and moral, of the clergy, either regular or secular? Where have they restored ecclesiastical discipline? Where have they caused the canons to be respected? Where are their councils? Which of the holy fathers have they invoked for so interesting and useful an object? "*Papam habemus Marcum*." Padre Marcos is our Pope, the only authority which governs the Lusitanian church. Who has

taught him the canons of the Holy Fathers, that he should know them? Who has established him in the opinion of the people, that his authority might be received with moral submission in a case of such high importance? Let them cast a veil over this subject before the enemies of the cause have seen all the embarrassments which surround the profanation of the sanctuary.

As for the laws of the revenue I will merely say, at present, that we have a million of fiscal employés, with more than a million salaries; many millions of debts and loans, and little money in the treasury. The subject of the gross ignorance of the ministry, and their colleagues and agents, would be inexhaustible; but at my leisure, and with more minuteness, and when I possess some documents which I am expecting, I will again, at Your Majesty's feet, resume the consideration of these affairs. Their unskilfulness and complete incapacity for governing is no less helpless and scandalous—at one time in the internal administration of the country, at another in our foreign relations with the powers of Europe. I know not in what it is not displayed, in such a manner as not only causes horror and shame at the sight of such misery and such want of superintending intellect, but also causes serious apprehensions for the cause of the Queen. And if I speak with so much freedom to Your Majesty, it is because I see, as I have already said, the impossibility of the success of the Usurper's cause; because I see Your Majesty at the head of a valiant army; I see the brave Duke of Terceira, who,

by the miracle which his boldness worked, liberated the capital; I see also the energetic Count Saldanha, who under the orders of Your Majesty in the lines of Oporto, broke in pieces the triumphant baton of a marshal of France, the conqueror of Algiers; I see those brave academicians and volunteers of Villa da Praia, who were called by nature to civil appointments, not disheartened when they saw them all given to the busy-bodies of the anti-chambers of the ministry, and continuing at the military posts, in the bivouacks to which honour had called them, ready to make fresh sacrifices. The cause of the Usurper is lost: we must save that of the Queen.

Turn we our eyes to the civil government of the liberated territory. The confusion, the dismay, the anarchy of the administration, is even more astounding; the prefects and corregidores, the new tribunals, and the old Juizes da Fora, the ancient law and the law of grace—Sidon and Babylon (sixes and sevens)—all goes *dancing like mad* (macabra) to the fiddling of these gentlemen. They never cease their sequestrations of the rebels' property that they may have no opportunity of changing sides, and they ruin every body to give places to the turncoats of the ministry, without having reformed a single place, or abolished a single sinecure. Each minister gives his own orders, without connexion with the rest, each subaltern in authority does what he pleases: the people cry, but no one takes notice of their cries. It is true that since I began the letter which I have the honor to lay at Your Majesty's feet, they have at last ordered to be suspended the sale of the sequestered pro-

perty ; of which and of the manner in which they have made it such scandalous and indecent histories will go forth to the world ; but if in the issuing of this same order, the government has yielded to opinion, and confessed virtually the excess which it had committed, they have not thus paid even a moiety of the homage which is due to justice which has been offended, to public decency which has been insulted ; and to the cause of the Queen and of liberty, which has been outraged and degraded by such abuses. What has become of the enquiry which was to have been made into the mode and legality of the sales already effected ! The ministry has placed itself in such a situation, that it is not enough to do no evil ; it is necessary for it to give proofs repeated and continual that it does not evil, and will not allow it to be done. In the delicate state of its credit a mere suspicion is its ruin.

Let Your Majesty enquire if the house of Ascenço de Segueira, a child of four years old, has been sequestered, if José Balbino Barbosa has been to select furniture, at the unfair price of the valuation, in the sequestered houses, to pay for them by deductions from his government salary ; and if much more of the same sort has not been done : it is of this that Lisbon is full.

Turn we now all our attention upon the state of our foreign relations. We are losing the friends we have gained in some cabinets, we are gaining none ; and we are increasing the distance between us and that government which it most behoves us to have for an ally, and without which I do not believe our triumph is possible.

Spain, the legitimate inheritance of the Queen Donna Isabel II., seeks to ally herself intimately with Portugal, the legitimate inheritance of the Queen Donna Maria II. - - the cause is the same ; the war against the government of order, is the war which is in the present day lacerating the western Peninsula of Europe ; the party of those who wish without working to consume the produce of another's sweat, is that which forms the Carlist and Miguelite parties. Let there be established in Lisbon a government which may afford guarantees of order, which will be immediately recognized by the government of order of the Cortez of Madrid. It is not for the difference of the forms of government that this salutary union is not already cemented ; it is because Your Majesty's government oppose itself as an invincible barrier, by its discredit with the nation and with Europe. Nor is the recognition of England and France any more than a recognition of right which is evident from the fact that as one of the diplomatists accredited near Your Majesty tells any of the secrets of his cabinet to Your Majesty's ministers, because there is no guarantee that by the return of the packet they might not see such secrets published in the revolutionary journals of Europe to suit the private interests of Your Majesty's ministers and their associates. To remedy these evils I humbly bring to the feet of Your Majesty the following petitions :

First, that Your Majesty will grant an amnesty full and general, excepting only the Usurper.

Second, that you will cause to be quashed all sequestrations for political causes.

Third, that in order to afford guarantees, and that these measures may produce their effects, and to cure the evils which I have pointed out in the body of the letter, Your Majesty will dismiss your ministers, and proclaim others who may be in the national confidence.

Fourth, that in order that Your Majesty may be informed of the opinions of the public, Your Majesty will command to be put in execution the project of law, regarding the liberty of the press, which passed the Chamber of Deputies in the last legislature, and to which nothing was wanting but the examination of the Peers and the Royal sanction, to become the law of the land.

And the blessings of the Portuguese will be heaped upon your Majesty.

(Signed) DA TAIPA.

No. VIII.

PEERS' PROTEST, No. I.

SIRE,

The undersigned have the honor of representing to Your Imperial Majesty that there was this morning presented to the Count da Taipa, peer of the kingdom, an order for his arrest signed by one of the criminal judges of this city, which was attempted to be executed, involving, as it would appear, a manifest infraction of the constitutional charter, Art. 26, seeing that they could not

shew a case of *flagrante delicto* of a capital crime, which is the only case excepted in the said Article, which is as follows: Art. 26. "No Peer or Deputy, during the time of his being a Deputy, can be arrested by any authority, unless by an order of his own Chamber, except in *flagrante delicto* of a capital crime." The undersigned deeming that it is necessary, in order to the maintaining of the immunity of the Chamber of Peers, that they should ask Your Imperial Majesty to deign to command to be declared whether the articles of the Constitutional Charter, which guarantee the inviolability of the Peers, are suspended by the Decree of the 10th July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, in order that such Declaration may serve as a Rule. — Heaven preserve Your Majesty.

(Signed)

DUKE OF TERCEIRA,	} <i>Peers of the Kingdom.</i>
DUKE OF PALMELLA,	
MARQUIS OF FRONTEIRA,	
MARQUIS OF PONTA DE LIMA,	
MARQUIS OF LOULÉ,	
MARQUIS OF SANTA IRIA,	
COUNT DE LUMIARES,	
COUNT DE FICALHO,	
COUNT DE PARATI,	

Lisbon, 7th Dec. 1833.

No. IX.

Answer to the Peers' 1st Letter respecting Count da Taipa, from José da Silva Carvalho.

(Translation.)

The warrant of arrest issued by the criminal magistrate of the upper district against Count Taipa, and acknowledged by him, was given in consequence of information received. If the person informed against has any thing to allege in his favour, or if any of the noble Peers considers his rights encroached upon, he may have recourse to the means permitted by law. Their inviolability laid down in the 25th Article of the Constitutional Charter will be fully preserved to them. As far as regards the decree of the 10th July, 1832, as it makes no distinction of persons, it comprehends all alike, since according to the Art. 145, cap. 12, of the Charter, "The law is equal for all, in protection and punishment."

Palace of Necessidades,

(Signed) JOSE DA SILVA CARVALHO.

Dec. 9, 1833.

No. X.

PEERS' PROTEST.—No. 2.

SIRE,

The representation which certain peers of the kingdom

presented to Your Imperial Majesty (dated the 7th inst.) on the occasion of an order for the arrest of the Count da Taipa issued by the *Corregidor de Bairo Alto*, having been published in the Chronicle of the 11 inst. and been called a complaint (*requiramento*), with the addition of an official answer, signed by the minister charged with the affairs of Justice,—the undersigned peers of the kingdom find themselves in the harsh necessity of protesting before Y. I. M. as well against the essential alteration, which is made in the character of the representation, by calling it a complaint, as against the form of the answer, which was that of an ordinary despatch, and lastly and chiefly as against the erroneous and pernicious doctrine which the said despatch contains.

The undersigned protest against the calling of the representation a complaint, because complaints are petitions to the executive power upon subjects which it is competent to entertain, and for it to decide upon constitutional subjects, which is a violation of the privileges of the organs of the legislative power, whether permanent or elective, cannot be the attribute of a power to which it is not subordinate. It was for this that Your Imperial Majesty, as Regent in the Queen's name, exercises the powers of government to which by the Charter belongs the watching over the maintenance of the independence of the chief political authorities (Tit. 5, chap. i art. 71), and to which the peers have recourse in their representation, as it was impossible for them to submit the subject to the consideration of the Cortes. And they protest against the answer being given in the form of an ordinary de-

spatch, for the same reasons as those which they make to calling the representation a complaint.

Lastly, they protest against the doctrine contained in the despatch : forasmuch as the decree of the 10th July, 1832, did not and could not give to the executive prerogative more than was in extraordinary cases conceded to the government by § 34 of the 145 art. of the 8 Tit. of the Charter, which permits the suspension, *for a determinate time, of some formalities which guarantee individual liberty*. Now the immunity of the peers and deputies is not a guarantee of individual liberty, but *of the independence of the legislative power*, and to suspend it, is to make it no longer independent, and in fact annihilates altogether the representative form of government. The despatch argues sophistically enough to make it appear that the independence of the legislature is not endangered, while the peers are secured in the expression of their opinions, as settled by the 25 art. 4 Tit. of the 1st cap. This is not sufficient for the independence of the legislative authority ; for a government, which wished to oppress its organs, might do it upon any pretext, by asserting that such opinions were not expressed in the exercise of their functions ; and for this reason the learned author of the Charter established as the palladium of the constitutional liberties of all Portuguese, the immunity of the members of both Chambers. Art. 26 of the same tit. and chap.

They are not, Sire, the privileges of an individual,—they are not the legal prerogatives annexed to a dignity. still less are they the pretensions of a class, which the

undersigned peers defended before Your Majesty in their representation, and again uphold in their present protest. If such were the subject, if the question did not concern the legal liberties of all Portuguese, the peers would have preserved silence, and most willingly have made this sacrifice for the sake of preserving former harmony ; but they are the fundamental principles, without which the representative government, for which so much blood has been shed, would become a counterfeit, and it is the strict duty of the peers to uphold and defend them.

The undersigned peers, in the unfortunate absence of an elective chamber which, with your Majesty and the other chamber, would complete the national representation, acknowledge no legal means but that of availing themselves of an address to the chief of the government in whom resides the governing power ; and they cannot see what is the legal resource to which the said despatch refers them if they feel aggrieved ; as they cannot admit, for the decision of fundamental questions of public liberty, any other authority but that of the legislature, or in its unavoidable absence, of the government which they addressed. The undersigned peers would not have so eagerly made the representation of the 7th inst. or the present protest, notwithstanding its great importance, if they had had the least suspicion that the publication of it would be injurious to the happy progress of the important national cause ; but they have the fullest conviction that the respectful and frank expression of their opinions in favour of the constitutional government and the legal liberty of the Portuguese can never be favour-

able to the enemies of that liberty, but that they, on the contrary, prosper, and rejoice at the invasions of power with the violations of the guarantees of the liberty they fight against, and with the annihilation of the rule of the Constitutional Charter, for which the sound part of the nation has made so many sacrifices, and is still fighting with the most laudable enthusiasm and admirable perseverance.

The undersigned peers claiming from your Imperial Majesty, as chief of the government, the Charter entire and religiously observed, have the noble confidence that they are expressing the wish of the nation which is making sacrifices and fighting for that Charter.

(Signed)

DUKE OF TERCEIRA,	} <i>Peers of the Kingdom.</i>
DUKE OF PALMELLA,	
MARQUIS OF FRONTEIRA,	
MARQUIS OF PONTA DE LIMA,	
MARQUIS OF LOULÉ,	
MARQUIS OF SANTA IRIA,	
COUNT OF LUMIARES,	
COUNT OF PARATI,	
COUNT OF FICALHO,	

Lisbon, 11th Dec. 1833.

No. XI.

Letter to the Duke of Terceira in reply to the Peers' Protest.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,

By order of His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent in name of the Queen, I communicate to your Excellency, in order that you may make it known to your colleagues who signed the Protest, which, on the 11th of this month, and by your Excellency's hands, was conveyed to his august presence.

1st. That His Imperial Majesty has read with every attention the protest drawn up and signed, on the 11th inst. by your Excellency and other peers of the kingdom, to the number of nine, four of whom have not yet taken their seats in the chamber.

2dly. That it does not belong to the moderating power, even "during the compulsory absence of the legislative power," to interpret the Constitutional Charter of the monarchy; nevertheless, if circumstances should occur, such as to oblige His Imperial Majesty to give any explanation upon any article or articles of the Charter, His Imperial Majesty, not as author or as granter of it, but as encharged with the noble mission of saving the country of his birth, and with it the throne of his august daughter, would do so by endeavouring to reconcile the independence of the political powers of the state and the interests of the members of the chambers, with the indispensable execution of justice which is due to society.

3dly. That the said protest shall be submitted to the Cortes as soon as we have the happiness to see them assembled, in order that they may decide, with it and the order of the Minister of Justice before them, whether the Constitutional Charter has been infringed or not.

4thly. That His Imperial Majesty is much rejoiced to see the noble peers who signed the protest profess sentiments of respect to His Imperial person, and of attachment to the Charter, for which and for the Queen he has shewn such zeal and submitted to so many sacrifices.

God preserve your Excellency!

Palace of Necessidades, 16th Dec. 1833.

(Signed) JOAQUIM ANTONIO D'AGUIAR.

His Excellency the Duke of Terceira.

No. XII.

SIR,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 7th of December, informing me that some English officers have committed the scandalous abuse of ordering Portuguese seamen to be flogged, and that a man so barbarously punished is at death's door on board the corvette *Eliza*. I beg to inform your Excellency, before such an infamous accusation is made against an officer, in all well regulated services it is usual to make

inquiry into the subject, and not give ear to reports that are made to your Excellency, in all probability for evil purposes. I should like to be informed who was the person that made such a report to your Excellency. I can inform your Excellency better. The man alluded to received one dozen lashes for desertion, and is not sufficiently punished ; and as for the authority of inflicting this punishment, I beg to call your Excellency's attention to the 12th article of Sartorius's contract.

Your Excellency will there observe that I neither can discontinue the infliction of a regular punishment nor reprimand the officer.

I must further observe that so long as I am at the head of the Portuguese navy I will never sanction the habit of beating and bruising the men about with sticks, as is the custom, and can allow no punishment to take place, except it is done in a solemn and regular manner by the captain.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

CABO ST. VICENTI.

Dec. 9th, 1833.

*To His Excellency
the Minister of Marine.*

No. XIII.

SIRE,

I took the liberty some time back of telling your Majesty frankly my opinion of the state of things. It

was my duty as Her Majesty's admiral so to do. I have no private interests to serve,—no wish but for the prosperity of her cause. My character is above intrigue; and what I shall now state to your Majesty I have no wish should be secret.

I do not like the aspect of affairs. Lisbon, Oporto, St. Ubes, Peniche, Faro, and Lagos are in the power of the Queen, and a small territory as far as Santarem. At Oporto the *regular force* is small; I understand under fifteen hundred men. Marshal Saldanha has, I suppose, twelve thousand men before Santarem; at St. Ubes there may be a thousand; Peniche five hundred; in the Algarves, including the brigade, not more than twelve hundred. I speak of regular troops only. Don Miguel has at least seven thousand men in the north of Portugal and round Oporto; at Figueras, Coimbra, Leiria, and the neighbourhood three thousand men; at Santarem, Salvaterra, and the vicinity twelve thousand men. I believe I state the least probable number. In the other parts of Portugal I have no certain information; but I should suppose there cannot be less than three thousand men. Don Miguel is certainly recruiting and successfully; and his losses by desertion are much below his recruiting. His army, we believe, have not been paid; they are not well clothed; but there can be no doubt they are well provisioned. This leads to prove only that Don Miguel's army is attached to him. I like to stare things in the face. From my position as a foreigner I look at things with impartiality. I do not believe all I wish, and I like to look forward,

Santarem, we all know, cannot be attacked without great risk. At Oporto we can do nothing; at Peniche and St. Ubes we are in the same situation; and in the Algarves the guerillas are organizing themselves, and assuming the appearance of a regular force. They are arming in the Guadiana, and we cannot prevent them. They have even introduced vessels into the river in spite of the force I had there; such is our military position; the force is so nearly balanced that neither can act on the defensive.

Don Miguel clothes and feeds his army, and pays them badly, he has in consequence less cause for money—the great sinew of war. Your Majesty has enormous establishments to keep up; a large army, a navy, and all the public departments; the expense is enormous. Hitherto the government have had considerable loans, but every day it will be more difficult to raise money. The cause is decreasing in interest in England, and the funds have considerably fallen. In Lisbon there is little or no credit. In this department we can get no supplies without ready money. Nobody will furnish stores on credit, and we shall shortly be at a stand. The arsenal has not been paid for weeks, and the men are absenting themselves daily. There is much discontent in Lisbon, and every person is inquiring how this war is to finish.

Should Spain and England interfere there is no doubt the war will be brought to a speedy conclusion; but I am by no means sanguine in their immediate interference, and every day our position will get worse. Should they not interfere, Don Miguel will get money from the

Tories in England, the Carlists in France and Spain, and from the Holy Alliance. The struggle for despotism will be fought on Portuguese ground. We have strong reason to believe Captain Elliott is in England to arm a squadron; I will do all I can to prevent it; but if he has money and support there is no difficulty in purchasing in England as many East-Indiamen as he pleases, who will carry sixty guns each; our ships are not in good condition, and it will require great expense to make them so. I will do all I can, but we cannot command success, though we may deserve it.

I have, as clearly as I can, laid my opinion frankly before Your Majesty; you desired me always to do so; and from the first moment I had the honour of seeing Your Majesty, I have made it the rule of my conduct. Your Majesty will naturally wish to know the remedy I propose.

The first is to form a combined and extended administration, to conciliate all parties, and gain the confidence of the public—to conciliate that portion of the Miguellists who are desirous to treat—to encourage them to abandon the cause of Don Miguel—and to give them confidence in the future. At present they have lost their property; their only hope of regaining it is by adhering to the usurper; it is human nature; they are desperate, and will resist to the last.

I have no fault to find personally with Your Majesty's present Ministers; with Mr. Freire I have always been on the best of terms; but it is impossible for him to perform the duties of two Portfolios. In these critical times a

Minister at War has enough to occupy him all the twenty-four hours, and he must be well supported to carry it on as it ought to be; and Your Majesty knows full well the procrastination of the bureaux. The Minister of Finance has the duties of half-a-dozen offices to do, while his labour in the Finance alone must be enormous; that, God knows, can be no sinecure. The Minister of Marine is I believe as honest a man as lives, but he is unaccustomed to office, and things go on proportionally slow. The Minister of the Interior I have had little opportunity of being acquainted with, but he too must have enough of occupation.

I now approach the most difficult part of my subject, but it is my duty to do it candidly and openly. I have heard that Your Majesty is prepossessed against the Duke of Palmella. Believe me it is without cause; I have known him since he was at Terceira, and there never existed a man more devoted to the cause of the Queen. Will Your Majesty look back to his exertions in planning the expedition that put the Western Islands in the hands of the Queen; there I assisted him all I durst, and I knew what he had to contend with. When in London, I came again in contact with him, and his exertions were without end. This brings me to the fitting out the expedition that placed the Queen on the throne of Portugal. Your Majesty cannot be aware on what slender grounds we began. I will tell Your Majesty. The Chevalier Lima wrote to me to say that Oporto was reduced to the last extremity, and that he had received letters from Sartorius to say the fleet was

determined to come to England. Not one shilling could be raised to pay them, or for any thing else; the cause was gone. He requested me to come to town. It was proposed that I should take three steamers and twelve hundred Poles that Mendizabel fancied he could procure at Rochfort, and proceed to the Guadiana, pass the river, and march upon Bega. To put this wild scheme in execution, three English houses offered to advance the money, provided I would go. After some hesitation I acquiesced, provided the Marquis Palmella would go also. On his consenting, the £6000 increased to upwards of £20,000, and five steam-boats were fitted out. There was no great merit then in coming out, the merit was offering to risk life and every thing in the cause of the Queen then in despair.

We arrived at Oporto; after much discussion an expedition was fitted out -- the Algarves taken -- the squadron captured, and Lisbon occupied in the short space of six weeks, after the most brilliant march recorded in history. Your Majesty's activity defended Oporto and conquered Bourmont, fortified the lines of Lisbon; the enemy were repulsed, and finally driven to Santarem; there our success ended, and with all the acknowledged talent of General Saldanha, which he has shewn on so many occasions, it does not appear to me any thing further can be done but by conciliating parties. Far be it from me to point out who are the men Your Majesty should add to the Ministry. Unite all parties, put an end to feuds, gain the confidence of the people in Portugal and of all nations out of it. The funds will

rise, the resources will increase, the same enthusiasm that Your Majesty experienced on your arrival will return, the Miguelites will be paralyzed, and the Queen's cause gained without further loss of blood.

I have the honour to be, Sire,
With the greatest respect,
Your Majesty's most obedient servant,
CABO ST. VICENTI.

No. XIV.

The order of the day was calling upon Miguel's troops to exert themselves, and promising they should be at Cartaxo the 15th, Villa Franca the 19th, and Lisbon the 22d.

Nos. XV. and XVI.

Being a project and counter project not acted upon, are withheld, as being improper to be published.

No. XVII.

INHABITANTS OF THE ALGARVES!

Being named by His Imperial Majesty, the Duke of Braganza, regent in the name of the Queen, to the command of the troops in this kingdom, all my energies will be used to establish order and confidence, which can only exist under the government of Her Most Imperial Majesty.

Algarvians, who have been obliged to leave your homes and your employments, to sustain with arms the cause of your oppressors, return to your families, and be certain that no persecution shall be instituted against you, whatever may be the posts you occupied in the militia, royalist volunteers, or guerillas

BERNARDO DA SA DE BANDEIRA.

Head-quarters, Tavira,

Feb. 23, 1834.

No. XVIII.

INHABITANTS OF CAMINHO!

I have delivered you from the tyrannical government of the usurper. I call upon you to come forward, and take up arms in the defence of your legitimate queen. Every man capable of bearing arms will enrol himself under her standard or quit the town.

SIR,

I have surprised Caminhó; you cannot be succoured. If you surrender, you shall be well received and retain your rank; if you do not I will storm the fort, and put you and your garrison to the sword.

*To the Commanding Officer
at the Fontellezza, in the
Entrance of the Minho.*

No. XIX.

INHABITANTS OF VIANNA!

You are now free, and under the government of your legitimate Queen and the Constitutional Charter. Live happy together, and forget political animosities. Those who have left the town will return to their homes; no person shall be persecuted for his political opinions.

CABO ST. VICENTI.

• *Vianna, March 28th.*

No. XX.

(Copy.)

Before Valencia, March 31st, 1834.

SIR,

To morrow I shall be joined by Spanish troops. I have a squadron at Caminho; and if you do not surrender to your legitimate Sovereign, I shall bring up one hundred guns and besiege the town, you will in that case be treated as rebels.

In the event of surrendering, you and your garrison will be well received, and permitted to serve the Queen or return to your homes.

You cannot be succoured, because all the province is in possession of the Queen's troops; I therefore advise you to assist in putting an end to this horrible civil war. Your garrison is small and well disposed to the Queen; and if I decide upon assaulting the town you cannot defend it, and your garrison will be put to the sword.

(Signed)

CAPE ST. VINCENT.

To the Governor of Valencia.

No. XXI.

ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,

I request that you do not make an attack on this place before to-morrow night; for at that time it will be delivered up, in spite of the obstinate resistance of the governor.

God keep your Excellency!

FRANCISCO ANTONIO CALDAS,
Major of the Militia of Bastos.

Valencia, April 2d, 1834.

To the Viscount Cabo St. Vicenti.

(Copy.)

Before Valencia, April 2d, 1834.

SIR,

I know you are a friend of the cause of the Queen. I shall be sorry to shed Portuguese blood, but I am determined to take the place. I shall receive fifty guns to-morrow, and then I shall not treat; at present I am ready to treat.

(signed) CAPE ST. VINCENT.

No. XXII.

(Copy.)

*Conditions for the Surrender of Valencia made by the
Governor of Valencia.*

SIR,

If I accept the conditions of your Excellency, will you guarantee the life and property of the garrison and inhabitants, and allow them either to serve the Queen or return to their homes, under the condition of not taking up arms against the legitimate sovereign the Queen of Portugal, and assuring us that no person shall be persecuted for their political opinions.

(Signed) THE GOVERNOR OF VALENCIA.

(Copy.)

April 3d, 1834.

SIR,

If you surrender the place I guarantee the life and property of the garrison and inhabitants. The troops may either enter the Queen's service or return to their homes. No person shall be persecuted for their political opinions.

(Signed) CAPE ST. VINCENT.

To the Governor of Valencia.

No. XXIII.

*Before the Walls of Valencia,
April 3, 1834.*

SIR,

I learn, with equal surprise and disgust, that two days after I left Lisbon, to do all in my power to forward the cause of the Queen, your Excellency appointed another Acting Inspector, and superseded Captain Cunha, whom I appointed.

I am sorry to be obliged to tell your Excellency that you have *broken your word to me*, and put me in a false position; and after the letter I had the honour of writing to you, unless you wished to disgust me this never would have been done. Your Excellency cannot be a judge of the proper persons to assist me in regenerating the Portuguese navy: I make appointments from merit; while a parcel of rascally intriguing clerks, who surround your Excellency, impose on your good nature. Who ought to be your adviser, the major-general or an intriguing clerk? Common sense and a desire to serve the Queen ought to point out to your Excellency that I am the fit person to give you advice. After the services I have performed, and am still performing, I expected a different treatment, and I am sorry to observe that it appears to me to be done on purpose.

I remark that any thing that tends to disgust me is done immediately, there is no delay in your Excellency's office; while at the same time any thing I propose for

the good of the service reposes quietly in your portfolio for months; this state of matters cannot continue. I will not submit to affronts, and the Government shall either change the system or dismiss me; and I shall return to England to justify the prophecies of my friends, that I have been serving an ungrateful country.

I have heard of the intrigues of Don Miguel's Government, which lost him his throne; but, by my soul, they never could have exceeded the unworthy intrigues of the existing one.

I feel strongly, and I write strongly, and I do not mean this to be a private letter; your Excellency is quite at liberty to shew it to the Emperor, and, if you do not, I will. The moment I have reduced this place, I shall return to Lisbon. I shall do my duty, because a sense of honour makes me; but, unless I have a most ample apology, I shall call on the Government to fulfil their engagements, and I will retire; and, when this crisis arrives, your Excellency will also get rid of all my officers.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

CAPE ST. VINCENT.

I understand the invalids are still at Lisbon in the Hope, an additional expense to the Government.

No. XXIV.

PROCLAMATION.

Charged, by His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent, in the Queen's name, with the command of the operations of the north of the kingdom, destined to effect the complete pacification of your provinces, I have much satisfaction, as I feel it to be my duty, to invite the inhabitants of these provinces to aid with their utmost energies the accomplishment of the sacred trust for which the country so much yearns.

Enough have our dissensions desolated the country; enough of our blood has been shed in the struggles between us; and enough of discord has kept back, if not paralyzed, our national prosperity.

I invite you, therefore, to join the standard of the Queen, not, indeed, for battle, but for the enjoyment of her legitimate government. Proclaim it, therefore, for by proclaiming you may have that tranquillity of which you have been so long deprived.

Soldiers of the ranks of the opposite army, lay down your arms and return to your hearths, or come and join yourselves to those who never seek, and have never sought, to return offence for offence, and never harboured in their hearts so unworthy a sentiment as revenge. The party for whom you are fighting have lost the brilliant aspect which perhaps might have dazzled you in former times, and victory in the hands of the

Queen has a force in paternal hands which has the firmest security of sweetness and clemency.

DUKE OF TERCEIRA.

Oporto, April 6, 1834.

No. XXV.

May 8.

INHABITANTS OF FIGUERAS!

The Usurper has lost his last sea-port, and you are free; forgive your enemies, and shew yourselves worthy of living under the just and free Government of the Queen, Donna Maria the Second. I shall follow the enemy up with vigour, and I hope you will soon see not only this province but all Portugal free from tyranny and oppression.

CABO ST. VICENTI.

No. XXVI.

May 8, 1834.

MEM.

You will complete the Eliza and Portuense with provisions; you will then take under your orders the Isabel

Maria, return to Lisbon, complete with provisions, and proceed to Madeira, which you will rigorously blockade; you will endeavour to get possession of Porto Santo, where you will be able to water. Any men of war proceeding to Madeira will be allowed to pass, and you will be very careful in maintaining a good understanding with all foreign ships of war. It is possible an attempt may be made to remove the garrison of Madeira to the Algarves, which you will look out for. It is also possible Don Miguel may attempt to get to Madeira; should you intercept him, you will come to Cascaes Bay, and inform me of the circumstance, keeping it perfectly secret. He will be treated with respect and decorum, but not as a royal personage. You will endeavour to communicate all that has happened to the governor, and do all you can to bring him over to the cause of the Queen.

CABO ST. VICENTI.

*To Capt. Bertram,
Her Imperial Majesty's Ship Don Pedro.*

No. XXVII.

*To the Governot of Ourem.**May 14.*

SIR,

I have the honour of sending you the Proclamation of the Duke of Terceira, with which I perfectly agree. I have only to add that a treaty has been signed with England, France, Spain, and Portugal, to expel from the Peninsula Don Carlos and Don Miguel, and the Spanish troops are actually in Portugal. If you love your country, you will immediately proclaim the Queen ; in that case, I guarantee that yourself and officers shall preserve their rank, and the men may join what regiments they please, or go to their homes. If you uselessly defend the place and spill Portuguese blood, you will be held personally responsible; there is now no point of honour, because there is not the possibility of being of the least service to the cause of Don Miguel, who is lost for ever. I have with me the same men who took the fleet on the 5th of July; they are ready to receive you as friends, but you will find them devilish unpleasant enemies.

Translation of the Governor's Letter.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, and about its contents, it is my duty to acquaint your Excellency that I cannot agree by any means to the propositions that your Excellency has made to me; for as much as that both the commander of the corps and the garrison are resolved to defend that point; and my honour obliges me to defend with the greatest energy, shewing that I am a Portuguese officer.

I return to your Excellency the proclamation.

14th May, 1834.

Head-quarters at Ourem.

*Conditions given for the Delivery of the Castle and
Town of Ourem.*

1st.

That all the officers and men, and in general every individual who are in the service of Dom Miguel in this town of Ourem, shall be received as if they never acted against the cause of Donna Maria the Second, and that both officers and men shall choose their future destiny as most convenient to them.

2nd.

That the officers shall be allowed to keep their horses and baggage, provided it be their individual property.

3rd.

That all who wish to be excused from serving, passports shall be given them that no person may interfere with them; and during the present war they shall not be obliged to take up arms.

4th.

That all the officers shall pledge their honour, never more to take up arms in favour of Don Miguel, and the troops shall make the same declaration.

5th.

That so soon as this is signed, a competent force of Dona Maria the Second's troops shall take charge of the castle and town of Ourem.

Head-quarters at Aldea da Cruz, 15th May, 1834.

(Signed) JOAO ANT. DA MOITA,
Governor, &c.

(Signed) CAPE ST. VINCENT.

No. XXVIII.

(*Translation.*)

PROCLAMATION.

Unhappy Portuguese, who still follow the banners of the Usurper!

How long do you purpose to continue in the way

of crime, despising the path of honour, which I have so often pointed out to you, and calling you into the bosom of the faithful Portuguese; forgetting all that you have done against me when your King; against my daughter, your legitimate Sovereign, by my solemn abdication; and against your country and her liberty? You see that on all sides the victorious phalanxes are closing round you, and have left you only the ground you tread on; you cannot be ignorant that the people of the northern provinces, those who were the most deluded, have now spontaneously and heartily proclaimed the *Queen* and the *Constitutional Charter* of the monarchy; you must know that you are reduced to the last stage of misery; without pay, without clothing, without shoes, and without all the comforts enjoyed by regular armies: What can you hope for? Whilst the question was doubtful, your obstinacy might be regarded as a point of honour or delusion; now, however, when every thing is against you, you ought to be undeceived; that the squadron, which was promised you, never can arrive; that such a promise was only made to continue the tyranny you are under; that the powerful nations do not protect you; finally, that Spain has already acknowledged the government of *the Queen*, and that the Spanish troops have entered Portugal to support legitimacy, your persisting in crime will redouble your crime. Notwithstanding all, Portuguese, do not think that I breathe vengeance, blood, and death against you; do not judge *me* by your chief: I pride myself on being true, humane, and generous, and to

know how to forget injuries done to me. A series of victories assures me a final triumph. Portuguese of every class and opinion, there is yet time—come and join the banner of honour and of legitimacy. I assure you that the amnesty, which, *in fact*, still exists, will by me be ratified justly, and thus you may immediately return to your homes to enjoy domestic pleasures in the bosom of your families, without the fear of persecution, sheltered by the laws, and the clemency which I take pleasure in shewing you, in the name of your legitimate Queen *Donna Maria the Second*.

If you be Portuguese—if you love your country—if you wish for the blessings of your fellow-citizens, who now comprise the majority of the nation, afflict them no longer by prolonging the civil war, *which will soon finish against you*. Abandon the Usurper to his fate; do not fear that this proceeding will be looked upon as an act of treason; on the contrary, it will be considered by all as an act of sincere repentance of your crimes, arising from the love you bear, first of all, to your country; from that same love which has so distinguished, in all ages, true Lusitanians. Come, Portuguese of all classes and opinions, there is still time; I repeat to you, come. I will receive you in my arms; I will pardon you in the name of your Queen; and I will forget all your crimes at the sight of your penitence.

Imperial head-quarters at Cartaxo, 17th May, 1834.

D. PEDRO,

Duke of Braganza.

No. XXIX.

*To the Most Illustrious and Most Excellent the Duke
of Terceira.*

I am authorized to propose a suspension of arms, with a view to open negotiations that no more Portuguese blood may be shed ; and if your Excellency consents, the two armies must not approach each other more.

I wait a prompt answer from your Excellency.

Accept the protestation of esteem and consideration with which I have the honour to sign myself

Your Excellency's,

&c. &c. &c.

JOSE ANTONIO DE AZEVEDO LEMOS,
Commanding the Army of Operations.

*To the Most Illustrious and Most Excellent the Duke
of Terceira.*

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,

Yesterday I sent your Excellency a letter by General Guedes, of which the enclosed is a copy ; and as my desire is to cease shedding any more Portuguese blood, and not being certain that you have received my letter,* I have taken the determination of sending you an officer of my staff, and I hope by him you will do me the honour of replying.

In case your Excellency wishes to have an interview with me I shall be very much flattered, and you may fix the hour and place.

I profit by this occasion to compliment you.

JOSE ANTONIO DE AZEVEDO LEMOS,
Honorary Lieut.-General commanding
the Army.

*Head-quarters, Evora,
May 23d, 1834.*

*To the Most Illustrious and Most Excellent Seigneur
Lemos.*

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

In reply to the letter which on the march I received by your Excellency's aid-de-camp, with the copy of that which your Excellency addressed me by General Guedes, and which I have not yet received, I can only say to your Excellency that I march on Estremoz, and from thence I shall answer to any propositions your Excellency may make. My government and myself have done all we could to spare Portuguese blood, and that same desire dictates my present answer.

I am, your Excellency,
&c. &c. &c.

LE DUC DE TERCEIRA.

On the march, May 24, 1834.

No. XXX.

CONVENTION OF EVORA.

His Imperial Majesty the Senhor Don Pedro, Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen, the Senhora Donna Maria II., moved by the desire of terminating as speedily as possible the effusion of Portuguese blood, and of pacifying the kingdom, grants, in the name of the Queen, to the troops assembled at Evora, and in other parts of the monarchy, as also to all the individuals who shall submit, and give obedience to the Queen, as follows :—

ARTICLE I.

A general amnesty is granted for all political delinquencies committed since the 21st day of July, 1826. The execution of the decree of the 31st of August, 1833, is suspended in favour of those who are included in this amnesty, until the Cortes shall have deliberated upon their cases. These persons shall re-enter upon their property ; but cannot alienate the same till after the decision of the Cortes. The amnesty does not include restitution of ecclesiastical, political, and civil offices ; nor of crown property ; nor of orders, commanderies, and pensions : neither does it extend to offences against individuals, nor exempt from responsibility to the prejudice of any third party.

ARTICLE 2.

All persons included in this amnesty, whether natives or foreigners, are at liberty to quit Portugal, and to dispose of their property, in so far as it is not subject to the restrictions of the preceding article ; and they shall give their words never to take part, in any manner whatsoever, in the political affairs of these kingdoms.

ARTICLE 3.

The military officers under this amnesty shall preserve their rank legitimately acquired, and the government undertakes to provide them a subsistence proportionate to it.

ARTICLE 4.

The same rule shall hold in ecclesiastical and civil employments, so far as the holders shall deserve them by their services and merits.

ARTICLE 5.

An annual pension of sixty contos of reis (400,000 francs) is secured to Don Miguel, in consideration of his high birth ; and he is allowed to dispose of his personal property, under condition that he give up the jewels and other property belonging to the crown, or to private individuals.

ARTICLE 6.

He may embark in a vessel-of-war of one of the

Powers united in alliance by the treaty of London of the 22d of April of the present year, which vessel shall be sent to him at any port he shall name; full assurance being given to him of security for his person and suite, and of all the respect due to his exalted birth.

ARTICLE 7.

The Senhor Don Miguel obliges himself to quit Portugal within the space of fifteen days, and engages never to return to any part of the Peninsula of Spain, or of the Portuguese dominions, nor in any manner to disturb the tranquillity of these kingdoms. In case of his acting contrary to this engagement, he shall lose all right to the stipulated pension, and be liable to all the consequences of his conduct.

ARTICLE 8.

The troops in the service of the Senhor Don Miguel shall lay down their arms in the place to be pointed out to them.

ARTICLE 9.

All the regiments and corps now in the service of the usurpation, after surrendering their arms, horses, and ammunition, shall separate peaceably, and return to to their respective homes, under pain of forfeiting the benefits of the present amnesty.

The commander-in-chief of the forces assembled at Evora, after having accepted the present concession, in

the name of all the persons comprehended in it, has agreed to the following articles to ensure its execution.

ARTICLE 1.

He shall immediately despatch orders to the commanders of all the fortresses, and of all the troops in the field, and to all the authorities who still acknowledge the government of the Senhor Don Miguel, to submit without delay to the government of her most Faithful Majesty Senhora Donna Maria II. under the condition of receiving the benefits of the amnesty.

ARTICLE 2.

The dispositions of the preceding article shall extend to all ecclesiastical, civil, and military authorities of the possessions of the monarchy beyond sea.

ARTICLE 3.

The Senhor Don Miguel shall quit the town of Evora during the day of the 30th of this present month of May, to repair to Sines, where his embarkation shall take place (according to his own desire). He shall be accompanied on his journey by the persons of his personal suite, by twenty horsemen formerly serving in his army, and by two squadrons of the cavalry of the Queen's armies.

The commander of the forces assembled shall send to the marshal commanding the army Queen a list containing the names of the persons of the Senhor Don Miguel's suite.

ARTICLE 4.

During the day of the 31st of May instant, the troops assembled round Evora shall lay down their arms in the building of the Seminary of that town, and shall form themselves, according to the nature of their services, into troops, which, under the responsibility of their senior officers, shall repair to the localities hereinafter specified: they shall be provided on their march with their daily rations, and on arriving at the place of their destination shall receive orders of route to repair to their respective homes.

The natives of Lower Beira,	to	Abrantes ;
Upper Beira,	—	Viseu ;
Tras-os-Montes,	—	Villareal ;
Entre Douro-e-Minho,		Oporto ;
Alemtejo,	to have their passports immediately ;	
Algarves,	—	Faro.

The militia and the volunteers, of what denomination soever, shall immediately receive the orders for their route to their respective homes.

And that this may be definitively agreed, the marshals commanding the armies of the Queen, and the commander of the forces assembled at Evora, Joseph Antonio de Azevedo-Lemos, have signed in duplicate.

Evora-Monte, 26th May, 1834.

DUKE DE TERCEIRA,
Marshal of the Army.

CONDE DE SALDANHA,
Marshal of the Army.

JOSE-ANTONIO DE AZEVEDO-LEMOs,
Lieutenant-General.

ANTONIO DE ANDRADE-TORREZAO,
Acting Chief of the Staff.

No. XXXI.

Proclamation of Don Miguel to his Army.

SOLDIERS !

The valour you have displayed whenever you have been called to combat for my crown, and your fidelity to my person in the midst of the difficult struggle in which we have been engaged, render you worthy of the highest eulogiums, and deserve all my gratitude.

Nevertheless, since the three great Powers of England, France, and Spain, in conjunction with the government of Lisbon, have concluded a treaty, the object of which is to force me to quit this kingdom, the continuation of the war can only lead to the useless effusion of Portuguese blood which is so dear to me.

This consideration alone has induced me to separate myself from you.

The conventions and arrangements which arise out of this resolution are concluded, and will shortly be communicated to you : you will then learn what stipulations have been made for your safety.

It is no want of confidence in you which has induced me to take this step, but a conviction of the impossibility of overcoming the powers opposed to us, and the desire to prevent the evils to which the presence of foreign armies would expose our beloved country. I have reason to hope, from your discipline and your obedience to myself, as well as from the love which you

have always testified towards me, that the troops will conduct themselves in the existing crisis as troops worthy to obey their King ; therefore it is that I again recommend to you the observance of order and tranquillity, for which I make the commanders and officers of all ranks responsible.

You will remember that it is no act of weakness which I require of you, but merely one of resignation, in yielding to the disproportionate forces which, in pursuance of the treaty above mentioned, are preparing to pour into this country. You will appreciate as they deserve these reasons, which prudence dictates, for the prevention of calamities that would consummate the miseries of our country.

Again I recommend to you order and resignation. Be assured that I shall never forget your valour, your constancy, and your fidelity. Contribute then by your conduct to the welfare of our dear country.

(Signed) MIGUEL.

*At the Palace of Evora,
May 27th, 1834.*

No. XXXII.

ARTICLE 1.

His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, in the name of the Queen Donna Maria II., binds himself to exert every means in his power to drive the Infant Don Carloe from the Portuguese dominions.

ARTICLE 2.

Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, invited and entreated by his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, and having moreover very just and serious cause of complaint against the Infant Don Miguel, on account of the support which he has lent to the Infant Don Carlos of Spain, engages to send into the Portuguese territory such a number of Spanish troops as may be sufficient and necessary to co-operate with those of his Imperial Majesty in expelling Don Carlos of Spain and Don Miguel from the Portuguese territory; the Queen of Spain also undertaking to maintain at her own charge, and without any expense to the Portuguese government, the said Spanish troops; which troops shall be everywhere received and treated in the same manner as the troops of his Majesty the Duke of Braganza: and her Majesty binds herself to withdraw her troops from the Portuguese territory immediately that the expulsion of the said Infants shall be accomplished, and that the presence of the said troops shall no longer be required by her most Faithful Portuguese Majesty.

ARTICLE 3.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain engages to co-operate by employing a naval force to second the necessary resolutions and operations consequent upon the present treaty.

ARTICLE 4.

In case the co-operation of France *shall be deemed*

necessary by the high contracting parties, his Majesty the King of the French engages to do all that his Majesty and his very august allies shall unanimously determine upon.

ARTICLE 5.

The high contracting parties have agreed, that in consequence of the stipulations contained in the preceding articles, a declaration shall be immediately published, acquainting the Portuguese nation with the object of the present treaty; and His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, animated with a sincere desire of effacing all remembrance of the past, and of rallying the entire nation round the throne of his daughter, declares his intention of publishing a general and complete amnesty in favour of all the subjects of her most Faithful Majesty who shall within a prescribed time return to their allegiance; and the said Regent also declares his intention of securing to the Infant Don Miguel, as soon as he shall have quitted the Portuguese and Spanish dominions, a pension corresponding with his rank and birth.

ARTICLE 6.

Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, in virtue of the present article, declares her intention of securing to the Infant Don Carlos, as soon as he shall leave the Spanish and Portuguese territories, a pension correspondent to his rank and birth.

ARTICLE 7.

The present treaty shall be ratified, and its ratifications shall be exchanged in London within a month, or sooner if possible.

In faith of which, the four above plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed in London, the 23d of April, 1834.

MIRA-FLORES, TALLEYRAND,
PALMERSTON, MORAES-SARMENTO.

ARTICLE 1.

His Majesty the King of the French engages to take, in that part of his dominions which adjoins Spain, the measures best calculated to prevent any kind of succour, whether of men, arms, or ammunitions of war, being sent from the French territory to the insurgents in Spain.

ARTICLE 2.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland engages to furnish to her Catholic Majesty all the succours in arms and ammunitions of war which her Catholic Majesty may require; and further, to assist with naval forces if necessary.

ARTICLE 3.

His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of Portugal in the name of the Queen Donna Maria II.

fully participating in the sentiments of his august allies, and desiring to acknowledge by a just requital the engagements contracted by her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain in the 2d article of the treaty of the 23d April, 1834, undertakes to lend assistance, if the necessity should arise, to her Catholic Majesty, by all the means which may be in his power, according to the form and manner which shall be afterwards agreed upon with their said Majesties.

ARTICLE 4.

The above articles shall have the same force and effect as if they had been inserted word for word in the treaty of the 23d April, 1834, and shall be taken as forming part of the said treaty; they shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, within the period of forty days, or sooner if it may be.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed them, and have hereto affixed the seals of their arms.

Done at London,
18th August, 1834.

No. XXXIII.

ARTICLE 1.

His Royal Highness the Infant Don Carlos shall quit

Evora, with his family and suite, on the 30th instant, to proceed to Aldea Gallega, and there to embark.

ARTICLE 2.

On this journey the marshals answer for the safety of his Royal Highness, his family, and suite, and will furnish him with such an escort as his Royal Highness shall require.

ARTICLE 3.

All Spanish subjects now in Portugal, and compromised in the service of His Royal Highness, shall be received into a provisional depôt at Santarem, and shall be conducted thither under the escort necessary to their safety.

ARTICLE 4.

The Portuguese government shall provide them, at the depôt, with the means of existence, until they may without danger quit the depôt for some other residence.

THE DUKE OF TERCEIRA, Marshal of the Army.

THE COUNT OF SALDANHA, Marshal of the Army.

JOHN GRANT, Secretary of the Legation of his
Britannic Majesty.

Evora-Monte,
26th May, 1834.

No. XXXIV.

*Speech from the Throne, in the Royal Session of the
Extraordinary Cortes of the Portuguese Nation in
1834.*

Worthy Peers of the Kingdom, Gentlemen Deputies of the Portuguese Nation,

The day which I have so anxiously and ardently desired has at length arrived, a day of glory and happiness, in which, after having passed through a vast circle of events nearly miraculous, having extinguished the fury of civil war, overcome the monster of tyranny, and restored the throne of the Queen, my beloved daughter, I see assembled around her the representatives of the nation, rich in wisdom, in prudence, firmness, and patriotism, and nobly eager to promote, by the observance of the Charter, and the enlightened developement of its principles, the stability and splendour of the throne, the consolidation of the constitutional system, and the prosperity and happiness of this honoured and generous nation.

On so happy a day, I must not present to your eyes the sad and gloomy picture of six years of public and private misfortunes; but I cannot avoid alluding in general terms to the principal events of that period, because they belong to history, and must guide your deliberations.

You know, and all Europe knows, that as soon as I

was called to the throne of Portugal on the lamented death of my august father, it was my first, I may say my only thought, to fulfil the important mission which PROVIDENCE was pleased to confide to me, by laying down a secure foundation for public happiness, and endeavouring to restore the ancient glory and national greatness, by means of institutions suited to the genius and character, manners and wants of the people, and conformable to the progressive state of European civilisation. And desiring at the same time, to conform to the interests of policy, and the relative situation of the several States which obeyed my Government, I spontaneously abdicated the throne of Portugal in favour of the Queen, my beloved daughter, thus giving to Europe a new and secure pledge of the sincerity of my intentions, and to the Portuguese the fullest proof of the ardent desire which animated me to promote their future prosperity.

The constitutional charter which I granted on the 29th April, 1826, and which entirely fulfilled my inefficient views and the measures which accompanied it, were received by the nation not only with applause and gratitude, but with extraordinary enthusiasm.

All the orders of the State were to obey it. All the Princes who then constituted my Imperial and Royal family gave positive and manifest testimonies of their approbation. All foreign nations recognised the legitimacy of my succession and abdication, and of the measures which I had adopted for the benefit of the Portuguese. In short all sensible and sincere persons conceived the flattering and grateful hopes that with

this precious gift there would be obtained, besides its principal effects, the cessation of discord and of the divergency of opinion which had before been excited and artfully promoted.

Meanwhile a rebellious and fanatical faction directed by secret and powerful forces, and perhaps relying on some foreign co-operation deserted the country, declared itself the enemy of liberal institutions and of the happiness of its fellow citizens, and undertook the base task of supporting the empire of abuses and privileges, of destroying the Charter, of restoring the infamous and abominable regimen of absolute power, and even of calling into question my incontestible and acknowledged rights to the Portuguese throne.

This faction was repressed by the noble efforts of the national army, assisted by the energetic and patriotic union of the people. But the declared enemies of liberty and public happiness did not suspend their dark machinations, but actuated by mad rage, armed with fanaticism, imposture, atrocious calumny, and all the base and perfidious means which desperation and rage suggested to them, they saw in the end the failure of the system of ferocity, which for six whole years oppressed the Portuguese, and gave to the world examples such as never were seen in the most calamitous times of this or other monarchies.

It was a Prince of my family (I cannot record this circumstance without the most sensible grief, but I am obliged to say it)—it was a Prince of my august family, an ungrateful and degenerate brother, who encouraged

and promoted the efforts of the rebels, in order to seat himself upon a throne erected upon treason, disloyalty, and perjury. The intimate ties by which this Prince bound himself to observe the Constitutional Charter, and to acknowledge and obey the legitimate Sovereign, by his oath, and promises made and repeated at Vienna, Paris, London, and Lisbon—by the solemn acceptance of the hand of the Queen, who was destined to be his consort—by the confidence which I placed in him in appointing him Regent of the kingdom, and my Lieutenant—lastly, by the very acts of the Government which he exercised under that honourable title;—all this, I say, was despised by him with the most scandalous immorality; and, convoking a vain and illegal phantom of the very national representation which he wished to see annihilated, he caused it to decide a question, which, in reality, did not exist—to declare him King, when he already exercised, in fact, the authority and power of Royalty, and he pretended to justify the enormous irregularity of this rash act by the most notorious falsehoods and gross sophisms.

In this manner the work of iniquity was completed; and by these steps the Usurper ascended to the occupation of a throne which had never been stained by such black and scandalous perfidy. Thousands of illustrious victims were then sacrificed to tyranny, either on the scaffold or in the horrors of prison, or in exile to remote climates, without any crime but their loyalty, without any trial but the will of the Government, and of the infamous satellites of its barbarity.

Consternation and dread, sometimes more cruel than

death itself, continually haunted those who still appeared to enjoy some degree of individual liberty.

Meritorious and respectable persons were everywhere persecuted with injuries and insults, reproaches and sarcasms of a mad populace, who, animated by example, and certain of impunity, perhaps of reward, committed all kinds of violence. The asylum of the house of the citizen was every moment violated. Robberies and murders were continually committed with impunity, not only with the acquiescence, but with the approbation of the Government.

In the pulpits—(I shudder to say it) but you know, and every body knows that I say the truth, in the pulpits, in face of the Holy Altars, in the midst of sacred and august mysteries, the ministers of the God of peace and charity preached assassination as a service done to religion, and announced to the astonished people a new gospel of persecution, blood and death.

In short, there was no crime that was not committed, no error that was not defended, no virtue that was not insulted, there was no security or protection except for the wicked, who distinguished themselves by their ferocity and sanguinary zeal.

I refrain from continuing this horrible picture. The facts are notorious, and were repeated in all parts of these kingdoms. There are few honourable citizens who have not experienced them, or witnessed and lamented them in their neighbours, relations, and friends.

My heart was deeply wounded and afflicted by the consideration of the deplorable situation of my country

and my fellow-citizens and subjects, whose felicity has been, and ever will be the constant object of my most anxious care ; and though I assisted as far as was possible those whom honour and loyalty had driven far from their country and scattered in different parts of Europe and America, all this was not sufficient for my personal sentiments nor for the honour of my exalted dignity, nor to the rights and honour of the Queen, my beloved daughter.

Events certainly inspired, but arising from the inflexible purpose which I had formed never to depart from my word, and the sacredness of the oaths with which I had bound myself to my subjects, brought me to Europe after I had abdicated the Imperial throne of Brazil.

Here two spectacles equally great, but of opposite tendencies, presented themselves to my contemplation. I saw, on one hand, a numerous and distinguished portion of illustrious patriots of honourable and loyal Portuguese incessantly labouring with the most generous assiduity to recover from the hands of the usurpation the throne of the Queen, and ready to encounter for that purpose all kinds of obstacles, opposition, and dangers.

I saw, on the other hand, and experienced myself, the great and redoubled efforts which opposed so arduous an enterprise, whether on the part of the numerous sectuaries of despotism, or of the political interests of the Cabinets ; or, lastly, of the powerful force of an association, which called itself Conservative, and which was organized and spread over all Europe.

In the midst of all this it was easy for me to perceive

that the eyes of all, and the sole hope of the loyal Portuguese were fixed upon me; and convinced that PROVIDENCE, by extraordinary and unusual ways, called me to the direction of so difficult though glorious an enterprise, I undertook to place myself at the head of the noble and honourable party of loyalty, and not to neglect any means of saving the honour of the nation, the throne of my august daughter, and the liberty to which the oppressed Portuguese were justly entitled.

From that time forward I did not hesitate invariably to follow my resolution, despising with profound indignation the insulting means which were attempted to make me deviate from my purpose. Every thing, however, was wanting, and every thing was created anew. I regret that I cannot mention individually all that was suffered, all that was done, all that was attempted. I regret that I cannot mention the names of all the noble Portuguese who, with indefatigable zeal, and with sincere and efficacious diligence, employed themselves in supporting so important an undertaking. But I must not omit that the pecuniary resources, as indispensable as difficult to be obtained, were procured by a singular contract, in which the success of the enterprise was the only pledge, my signature the only surety. The zeal and the confidence of the party that gave, and that which received, were equally frank and unlimited.

I assumed the Regency of the kingdom in the name of the Queen, because the enterprise required a centre always present, always active, always vigilant. I enrolled myself the first soldier of the brave and valiant

national army, and I had the satisfaction to see that the friends of constitutional liberty in other countries, convinced that the constitutional cause in Portugal was common to them, and in every respect conformable to truly just and liberal principles, came to join us, generously resolved to share in our sacrifices and our reverses, or our triumphs.

In the manifesto of the 2d of February, 1832, I published my intentions, my principles, and the plan of my future proceedings, offering to all peace, good will, oblivion of the past, and even pardon, if they needed it, on the sole condition of their acknowledging their duty, being faithful to their oaths, and obeying the legitimate authority of their Queen.

With these intentions and preparations I left the shores of France and went to the Azores, where a part of the loyal nation was concentrated, and the Regency established which governs those provinces with wisdom and patriotism, and improved their administration.

There was organised the little Portuguese army, small indeed in number, but great, strong, and invincible by its valour, by its civic virtues, and by the noble sentiments which animated it, by the justice of the cause it defended, and by the tried skill of its chiefs.

At the head of 7,500 men I landed on the shores of Portugal, on the ever auspicious day, the 8th July, 1832. The terror which the enemy felt opened a way for this handful of loyal Portuguese, and on the 9th, without the loss of a single man, we entered the honourable and loyal city of Oporto, whose inhabitants displayed from

that time the most ardent enthusiasm in the cause of the Queen and of the Constitutional Charter, and a series of prodigies of loyalty, valour, constancy, and patriotic resignation, which may some day be repeated, but can never be surpassed. It is not the place in a short speech to recount the events of the war, and often obstinate and close siege which we gloriously supported there for a whole year. It is for history faithfully to transmit them to posterity.

But I must not omit to mention, at least in general terms, the rare examples of civil and military virtue which I observed in the army and inhabitants, the valour with which they worsted 80,000 men, abounding in resources, and every moment reinforced by all the means which fanaticism and despotism could suggest—the almost incredible firmness and constancy with which we braved death in its most frightful forms, without seeing, even in the most anxious moments, any signs of weakness or discouragement. In short, prodigies of the most exalted patriotism, in the midst of the most dangerous crisis—patriotism and love of liberty, and the efforts of civilization combating servitude, barbarism, and tyranny, and continually gaining signal victories over those monsters.

At the end of a year fertile in events, and which will be ever remembered in the annals of Portugal, the national army was reinforced with some new troops.

A detachment of this little army conquered Algarve, and proceeded to deliver the capital of the kingdom, which it entered on the 24th July, 1833, assisted by the

energetic and cordial co-operation of its illustrious inhabitants, and in the midst of their ardent acclamations.

The enemy's squadron was gloriously combated and taken off Cape St. Vincent. The signal victory which we obtained in the lines of Oporto, on the 25th of the same month, over the numerous forces of the enemy, enabled me to join the forces in the capital, where I arrived on the 28th.

I immediately found, as if by enchantment, a new army and a fortified city. Lisbon was defended by miracles of valour and the patriotism of the troops and of the heroic inhabitants, whom I always found around me in the most dangerous conflicts.

On the 10th of October I attacked the 16,000 men who besieged the city with 8,300, of whom scarcely 2,500 were experienced soldiers; but valour made up for every thing. The enemy was thrown back upon Santarem, and the arms of loyalty obliged him to remain there till I judged that the time was come to undertake decisive operations in the North of the kingdom.

From that time everything yielded to the valour of the army. In a few days all the provinces were delivered—the rebellious and disloyal bands dispersing themselves. Oppressed and tortured citizens issued from horrible dungeons—the inquiring and humane army soon showed what were its sentiments, and what a great difference there was between legitimacy and usurpation. The people, bathed in tears of joy, raised their hands to Heaven, and loaded their generous deliverers with benedictions.

On the 27th of May this year, the enemy at length laid down their arms. Having been lately beaten in the obstinate battle of Asseiceira, he abandoned the strong positions of Santarem, and retreated to Evora, still accompanied by a great force.

Here the reign of usurpation expired, after two years of frequent combats, sustained and gained against a vast inequality of force, and with a perseverance superior to all praise.

The Government of the Queen was again every where acknowledged, and the oaths of fidelity to her authority and the Charter were renewed. The nation began to enjoy peace and tranquillity. Some conditions dictated by circumstances and approved by humanity were spontaneously and generously granted to the enemy. And as it was never my desire to make war upon the Portuguese, but only on the usurpation and tyranny by which they were oppressed, I granted them, in the name of the Queen, a second amnesty, conformably to my principles and the dictates of my heart. The articles of both will be duly laid before you.

We feel particular satisfaction in being able to announce to you that during the struggle and since its termination the Government of the Queen has been formally recognised by England, France, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark. All other nations are at peace with us, and I expect from the justice, the enlightened policy and good faith which directs them, that they will, without difficulty, hasten to re-establish and to confirm the ties which formerly, to the interest of all parties, united them with Portugal.

The Court of Rome will certainly not be the last in taking so just and wholesome a resolution, since we boast of not being the last to respect and venerate in its head the common Father of the Faithful, and the centre of the Catholic unity, to whom we are indissolubly united by the sacred bonds of Faith and Religion.

We have concluded with Spain, England, and France, the treaty of quadruple alliance, signed the 22d April, this year, the articles of which will be laid before you. Its principal object was to give new securities for the happy and prompt termination of the struggle in which we were then still engaged, and thus to co-operate in the tranquillity and general good of all Europe.

To these three nations, as well as to Belgium, we are indebted for no small proofs of kindness and efficacious friendship; the Government of Spain in particular distinguishing itself by ordering the troops of her Catholic Majesty to pass the frontiers of the kingdom, and by this movement to give an advantageous assistance to our operations. The interest which those nations might expect from their proceeding does not relieve the Portuguese from the duties of gratitude, nor me from the pleasing obligation of recommending it in this place.

Many and very important measures have been taken for the better government of the kingdom and the more easy and prompt observance of the Charter. A new force has been given to the exercise of the judicial power, and to the public administration in its different branches. The army and its civil departments have been organised. Free ports have been established at Lisbon

and Oporto, and more regulations ordered for the extension, liberty, and security of trade. Such regulatory laws as seem the most necessary have been made, many obstacles have been removed which impeded the course of business, and opposed the prosperity of the people. Lastly, all the families and associations of religions of every denomination and order have been suppressed; those establishments, considered with respect to religion, were totally alienated from the primitive spirit of their institution, and almost exclusively governed by love of the temporal and worldly interests which they professed to despise, and, considered in a political point of view, they were like denationalised bodies, indifferent to the good or bad fortune of their fellow citizens, and zealously serving a despotic or tyrannical Government, if they expected from it favour and consideration. To their influence over individuals and families, which was the more dangerous in proportion as it was secret, Portugal owes in great degree the evils which it has just experienced. There are indeed, in the individual members, honourable but rare exceptions. The Government has taken everything into consideration.

A detailed account of all the measures and regulations of which I have just spoken will be presented to you by the several Ministers. Many of them were conceived or proposed, and discussed in the preceding meetings of the Representatives of the nation, and in the Regency of the Island of Terceira; and it seemed that they should be adopted or continued, as well to convince the people of the great benefits which they might expect from the con-

stitutional regime, as that at the present wished-for moment of the meeting of the Cortes, experience might have already shown, at least in part, what inconveniences or difficulties were encountered in their development and execution.

Among all these measures, the means which have been employed to establish and increase the public credit, merit your most serious attention. Most important transactions, all founded on justice and good faith, have taken place with that view. The result is notorious. The creditors of the State have been paid, both in and out of the kingdom, with the most scrupulous punctuality. The paper currency, which has for so many years secretly undermined the fortune of the public and of the citizens, is going to be extinguished. The Queen's Government has acquired a respectable name on the Exchanges of Europe, and is now equal in this point to the most prosperous and pacific nations.

The singular situation of the kingdom appeared to make it necessary to suspend some of the guarantees established by art. 145 of the Charter. However no excess has taken place on the application of this measure. It is for your zeal and prudence to deliberate on this subject, and consider what may be most useful and just.

While the Government was employed in such assiduous and important labours, almost all our vast and rich transmarine dominions voluntarily declared in favour of the Constitutional Charter and the authority of the Queen. The inhabitants of Madeira followed the same glorious example as soon as a sufficient force could sup-

port their efforts, which were restrained. The Government begins to make its beneficent influence felt in all these dominions.

After having showed you in a short but faithful sketch the principal events of a period which for so many reasons will form an era in the history of Portugal, and having shewn you what has been done to restore the nation, and to raise it from the deplorable state of depression to which it had been reduced by the errors and crimes of the usurpation, I must recommend to you, which I do with the most entire and unlimited confidence in your zeal, the two principal objects which now call for in preference the attention of the Cortes: viz. 1st. Whether the Regency ought or ought not to be continued during the remainder of the Queen's minority. 2dly. To take the proper steps that her Majesty may marry some foreign Prince. Your consummate wisdom and prudence will deliberate and decide upon both points with the discretion which may be expected from the union of so much knowledge, and a happy association of the most estimable virtues.

It is also necessary to fix the amount of the force by sea and land, conformably to art. 15., sect. 10. of the Constitutional Charter, having respect to the circumstances and internal state of the country, and not losing sight of the peculiar situation in which the neighbouring and allied nation may be placed where a Prince pretending to the throne is come again to revive the almost extinguished flames of civil war.

Besides these objects, many others claim your attention. The laws regulating the liberty of the Press,

the responsibility of the Ministers and public officers, the inviolability of the residence of the citizen, the law which is to regulate the use and the employment of the property of the citizen for the benefit of the public, and the indemnity which is previously to be given him first, according to act 145, sect. 21, of the Charter, the organization of public instruction and study in all their branches, the pious and charitable establishments, the laws for the protection and promotion of manufactures, commerce, and arts, and of agriculture, which is the queen of them all ; the measures for improving the situation and administration of our transmarine dominions, from which so many inestimable advantages hitherto overlooked or despised, may be derived ; every thing, in short, which the Charter prescribes or recommends. All that public necessity requires, and all that may contribute to the prosperity of this honourable nation, and to restore its ancient glory and greatness, must deserve the zeal and labour of the Cortes, and will, doubtless, be the constant object of their thoughts and attention.

Gentlemen Deputies of the Portuguese Nation,

The Minister of Finance will present to you the present state of the public funds, and the estimate of the resources necessary to meet the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the State. It will be for you to examine this subject, and to enable the Government to fulfil its obligations.

Worthy Peers of the Kingdom,

Gentlemen Deputies of the Portuguese Nation,

I most cordially rejoice with you and the whole nation

at seeing our country restored, the Constitutional Charter enforced, and the august throne of the Queen established, and to see you united around it, ready to employ your talents and your zeal to promote its splendour, and to raise the Portuguese to that station which belongs to them in the number of civilised nations.

For myself, I reserve only the glory of having placed myself at the head of so brave and honoured a people, and of the national army, and of having co-operated with them to maintain the rights of a daughter whom I love and esteem so highly, and those of a nation which has rendered itself so illustrious in the world by its heroism in war, and by its virtues in peace.

The Extraordinary Session is opened.

Palace das Necessidades, Aug. 5.

No. XXXV.

Lisbon, July 26th, 1834.

MY DEAR SIR,

When people are to work together I think it is always best that they should thoroughly understand each other; it hinders many disagreements afterwards, therefore I think it better to put on paper the substance of what I spoke to you about this morning.

Fourteen months' experience has clearly shewn me that, constituted as the offices of minister of marine and

major-general now are, a good understanding cannot long subsist between them, were they at the beginning the best friends in the world. The offices are, in a certain degree, independent of each other; one may be giving one order, at the same time that another is contradicting it, and both be in ignorance of what the other is doing; this begets jealousy, and opens a wide field for the intrigues of clerks, which, I am sorry to observe, I have suffered much from, and have only been patient because I was bound in duty to remain till a final settlement had been made with my officers and men, who so nobly supported me on the 5th July; that settlement is now nearly completed, and the formation of a new ministry is the proper time for me to state my opinions clearly and distinctly.

It appears to me that the two bureaux of minister and major-general should be consolidated into one, with a number of clerks sufficient to do the duty, and no more. The whole of the correspondence, except between the ministers, should be addressed to the major-general direct; this correspondence should be examined by him, and what was competent for him to decide should be done immediately; any changes of importance, or any thing that required the decision of the minister, should be laid before the minister of marine by the major-general in person; there should be no correspondence between them; every thing should be done *viva voce*; he should be the naval councillor of the minister; neither the inspector of the arsenal, rope-walk, countability, hospital, or any other department belonging to the marine, should

have the power of corresponding direct with the minister; this is the spirit of the major-general's present instructions, which has, however, been widely departed from, and he has long since ceased to be the minister's adviser. Whatever he proposed has been referred to a clerk to give his opinion, and hence I have had repeated affronts heaped upon me, and the service has suffered. Experience has shewn very evidently that the system of education, and indeed the whole detail of the Portuguese navy is bad; it requires regenerating, and that can only be done by adopting the British system, which is proved to be good, and no man of honour can conscientiously consent to receive a salary, when he is intimately convinced that he is doing no good to the country he serves, nor will he risk his reputation in executing any commission he may be sent on, unless the materials he has to work with are good, and if he is not permitted to make them good, he has no business to remain and receive his pay.

His Excellency

Agostinho José Freire,

Minister of Marine, &c. &c. &c.

No. XXXVI.

Purbrook, July, 1835.

SIR,

Before I left Lisbon I submitted to your Excellency lists of officers and men who had been killed in the Queen's service, and your Excellency agreed with me, both in conversation and writing, which I have now before me, that the heirs of the officers and men who fell in battle were to receive the same gratuity as the survivors who had been discharged from the Queen's service, and that the mothers, widows, and children only of those who died in the service were to be allowed the gratuity. On this assurance I wrote to the parties concerned. I find, however, that your Excellency made me the bearer of a different communication to the Queen's minister in London, which communication states that inquiry was to be made into the custom in the British navy, and if the sum allowed in this country was more than stated by me, they were to have the amount awarded on the lists, but if it was less, they were to have the British allowance. Such a system is not a proof of gratitude to the officers and seamen who were so instrumental in saving the cause of the Queen, and is moreover a breach of faith to me. The pension to be allowed is stated both in the contract and the minister's instructions to be agreeable to the British regulations, but up to this time nothing has been heard, and I receive daily complaints from the widows and orphans. I have, therefore, to request, nay,

I demand that your Excellency fulfils your promise to me, and which promise is in your Excellency's own handwriting. I have also written to your Excellency on other subjects, and to which I have to request your Excellency will be good enough to reply.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient humble servant,

CHARLES NAPILR,

Count Cape St. Vincent.

His Excellency

Senor Augustinho José Freire,

Minister of Marine.

ERRATA.

Page 8, last line, *for thought* ~~once~~ *once* ~~alarming~~ *read* ~~though~~ *at*
one time alarming.

- 44, line 7, *for port* *read* *post*.
- 46, — 18, *for Macdonald* *read* *Macdonnell*.
- 57, — 6, *for Farola* *read* *Faroba*.
- 59, — 1, *for prisoners* *read* *provinces*.
- 83, — 9, *for were attacked* *read* *was attacked*.
- 83, — 10, *for double their numbers* *read* *double his*
numbers
- 91, — 3, *for Lomes,* *to embark* *read* *Lemos,* *embarking*.
- 91, — 14 & 15, *for accede to it* *read* *accede to them*.
- 91, — 16, *for accept it* *read* *accept them*
- 135, — 17, *for reconnoitred* *read* *reconnoitre*.
- 135, — 19, *for endeavoured* *read* *endeavour*.

